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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A. Overview 
1. Nepal - with a d@cult geography, a feudal history and a late start in development - made good 
progress in overcoming these constraints within the short span of a few decades; but now this progress is 
under serious threat from conflict at home and a more competitive environment abroad. Policy reforms 
starting in the mid 1980s significantly increased per capita income growth and there i s  emerging evidence 
o f  a significant decline in poverty in the second hal f  o f  the 1990s that i s  corroborated by improving 
human development indicators. Still, as the intense conflict and polit ical instability in Nepal indicate, 
progress was neither fast enough and nor were i t s  benefits well distributed to meet the tide o f  rising 
expectations that accompanied the advent o f  democracy in 1990. Due to i t s  extreme init ial poverty, even 
after 15 years o f  reasonable growth ending in 2001, Nepal remained a very poor country with the lowest 
per capita income in South Asia. 
2. Further, inequality in income and human development left the mid- and far- Western hil l  regions 
and the Janajati (indigenous) and Dalit (“oppressed’? groups lagging behind and feeling excluded. This 
exclusion has helped to fuel an eight-year long Maoist insurgency and social conflict that has sharply 
escalated since 200 1. A constitutional crisis following the suspension o f  parliament in 2002 has created 
further uncertainty. This conflict combined with a more competitive external environment has led growth 
to falter in the last three years and now threatens to reverse Nepal’s progress. The extent o f  this threat 
cannot be over-estimated. If the threat posed by this conflict i s  not  addressed through peace or mitigation, 
Nepal could j o i n  the few countries that achieved considerable progress but then went on to lose a decade 
or more o f  development during when poverty reduction and human development were markedly reversed. 
3. This report, the Nepal Development Policy Review (DPR) of 2004 provides an assessment of 
Nepal S progress in development and discusses the development policy agenda and priorities to 
accelerate development. The a im of the review i s  to i n fo rm both Government policies and further 
refinement o f  i t s  poverty reduction strategy as wel l  as Wor ld  Bank assistance and policy dialogue. It takes 
as i t s  point o f  departure the l o *  Five Year Plan (2002-2007) and i t s  Summary/the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) and presents a menu o f  policies that address three related development themes. 
The f i rst  i s  the need to restart and accelerate growth mainly through commercializing agnculture and 
increasing trade and competitiveness. The second i s  making growth more inclusive through focusing o n  
developing agriculture and the lagging Western regions. The third i s  improving governance and public 
service delivery by strengthening institutions at both the national and local government levels. In 
discussing these issues, the D P R  presents recommendations, at the end o f  this executive summary, to help 
Nepal achieve i t s  development goals. But implementing many o f  these policies will require a polit ical 
consensus and mitigating, if not ending, the adverse effects o f  the insurgency and political discord among 
the principal actors. I t  i s  important to note that it i s  outside the purview o f  this Review to discuss the 
polit ical process o f  reaching such a consensus. However, fo l lowing the lofi PladPRSP’s approach, this 
review highlights the risks of an alternative scenario if a consensus i s  not  reached and majority o f  the 
policies recommended are not implemented. 
B. Constraints and Challenges 
4. Lack of Connectivity: Because o f  Nepal’s geography, transport costs are very high, hindering the 
growth o f  commerce and markets, and contributing to regional disparities in economic and human 
development. Given that many disadvantaged groups l ive in relatively remote regions, the lack o f  
physical connectivity mirrors to some extent the lack o f  social connectivity. The high level o f  ethno- 
linguistic fractionalization and the isolation o f  mountain and hill population made it very diff icult to 
achieve better distribution o f  even the modest gains from growth that took place after 1985. This together 
with social exclusion may have contributed to the present crisis over time. 
5. Deficient policy regimes: Until the mid-1 980s, the policy regimes were interventionist, 
protectionist and public sector led. The exchange rate was overvalued. The policy environment resulted 
in limited private sector activity and depressed investment and foreign trade. GDP did not grow fast 
enough or have a broad base, being mainly confined to construction, trade and hospitality sectors, missing 
the benefits o f  the Green Revolution in agriculture that was taking place in neighboring countries. The 
pol icy regime created rents for some segments o f  the society, while others did not have access to 
opportunities to  earn higher incomes or to public services. 
6. Limited governance and institutional development: Good governance i s  hindered by a legacy o f  
gender, ethnic and caste-based social stratification coupled with high ethno-linguistic diversity. The 
centralization o f  power in the Government and in the Kathmandu area has not helped to extend 
development to the mid-Western and Far Western regions. Whi le there have been good efforts in recent 
years to address this issue through decentralization and devolution strategies, much remains to be done. 
Over-centralization o f  government in an ethnically and culturally diverse country also meant that 
economic opportunities and service delivery were poor in the remote regions. Consequently, the 
insurgency has planted i t s  base firmly in those remote Western regions, further hampering the delivery o f  
public services to those areas. Deepening the vicious cycle o f  lack o f  representation and poor service 
delivery, conflict has also led to the dismantling o f  local Governments in the past two years. 
7. External conditions have become more challenging. An increasingly competitive external 
environment caused by the winding down o f  the Multi-f ibre Arrangement, the loss o f  market share in key 
exports such as carpets, and a more restrictive trade treaty with India suggest that the rapid growth o f  
exports and the non-agricultural sector in the 1990s cannot be sustained without implementing further 
pol icy reforms and improving infrastructure. Exports have sharply fallen since 2001. The progress in 
integrating with the world economy in the 1990s i s  l ikely to be reversed unless Nepal implements 
measures to raise competitiveness. Meanwhile, Nepal’s competitors in i t s  major exports have undertaken 
stronger reform measures making them more competitive compared to their past and in relation to Nepal. 
Thus, Nepal has a formidable reform agenda ahead to keep pace with i t s  competitors. 
C. Policy Reforms and Response 
8. A fiscal and external payment crisis led to reforms starting in the mid-1980s. The reforms 
progressed in four phases. The f i rs t  phase liberalized the import regime, investment and licensing 
regulations, the financial sector, and improved fiscal and financial management. In the second phase, in 
the early 1990s, entry o f  f i rms ,  trade and current account transactions, and financial sector policies were 
liberalized and important governance reforms such as an independent auditor general and parliamentary 
oversight were introduced. In the third phase, in the second ha l f  o f  the 1990s, the agriculture sector was 
liberalized, a VAT was introduced, and local government laws were passed. In the last three years, the 
fourth phase, the Government has implemented further tax reforms, improved public expenditure 
management, strengthened anti-corruption institutions, and infrastructure and financial sector regulatory 
frameworks. The Government i s  gradually devolving service delivery management to local communities 
to increase their power to monitor and discipline service providers and to increase accountability. 
9. Nepal’s economy responded well to these reforms. Per-capita income growth accelerated since the 
mid-1 980s, the economy became more diversified, and income volatility decreased markedly. Per capita 
growth rate rose to 2.5% p.a. between 1986 and 2001. The economy became more open and diversified 
as the share o f  trade in GDP and in wor ld  exports almost doubled. The share o f  agriculture dropped f rom 
70% to 40%. The pattern o f  growth also changed in the second hal f  o f  the 1990s as agricultural growth 
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rates accelerated and i t s  contribution to growth increased. Growth in incomes in this period also appear to 
have been pro-poor in the sense o f  leading to a proportionately greater increases in consumption by the 
lower two deciles. 
10. A preliminary analysis of the Rural Household Consumption survey (2001), the Demographic and 
Health surveys, and the Nepal Living Standards survey of 2003/2004 suggests that there has been a 
signijicant decline in poverty since the mid 1990s, though inequality across regions has persisted and 
poverty may have increased in the last three years given the lower GDP growth rate. In i t ia l  results o f  the 
latest household survey suggest that poverty declined from 42% in 1996 to about 3 1% in 2003104. Higher 
agricultural incomes combined with a swift increase in remittances were associated with these first signs 
o f  falling poverty. Consistent with the decrease in consumption poverty, surveys also show a perceptible 
improvement in related human development indicators, higher consumption o f  durables, and significantly 
greater access to  services. Despite this progress, Nepal remains very poor given that it started i t s  
development f rom a very l o w  base and late. Nepal i s  also unlikely to achieve key millennium 
development goals such as universal primary education, chi ld malnutrition, matemal mortality, and access 
to safe drinkmg water. More  importantly, the differences in poverty and human development indicators 
across different regions, ethnic groups and castes have persisted, which gives rise to  social stress and 
conflict. Reduced GDP growth in recent years may have reversed gains in poverty reduction made until 
2001. 
11. Further, Nepal’s good progress over 1985 to 2001 could not be sustained in the face of conflict 
and a sharp slump in exports since 2001. Nepal’s GDP growth declined in FY 2002 and while a modest 
recovery i s  underway, per-capita GDP in 2004 will not have recovered to their 2001 level. The recovery 
i s  fi-agile as it i s  mainly based on a good monsoon and foreign remittances. Private investment - currently 
at around 12% o f  GDP compared to the average o f  15% in the mid 1990s -- remains shy and key non- 
apcu l tu re  sectors, whose growth accounted for three-fourth o f  the growth in the 1990s, are performing 
significantly below trend. Sectors which enjoyed substantial export l ed  growth (e.g. manufactures such as 
garments and carpets) in the 1990s are now facing l o w  demand and adverse medium term prospects. 
Except for tourism (4% o f  GDP), most o f  the service sector i s  also similarly afflicted. But tourism itself i s  
threatened by the insurgency and street demonstrations. 
12. Afer nearly two decades of betterpe$ormance, three issues stand out as medium term challenges. 
First, growth has to be restarted and accelerated to reduce poverty and cope with Nepal’s population 
increase. Even with 2.5% per-capita economic growth between 1985 and 2001, large incidence and 
pockets of poverty persisted. And even if Nepal’s fertility rate declines to the average level o f  selected 
Asian countries, Nepal will add 40 mi l l ion to  i t s  population in the next 50 years.’ Without faster growth 
of income and employment, Nepal will be unable to  provide employment for  the 2.8% growth p.a. in 
labor force that i s  currently talung place. Second, economic growth has to be more pro-poor, inclusive 
and spatially even. Of particular importance i s  the need to accelerate a p c u l t u r a l  growth rates. Further, 
more attention has to be paid to the lagging regions. Despite plans to the contrary, investment in 
infrastructure in the poor and excluded Western regions lagged considerably behind, resulting in lower 
economic opportunities. Third, governance and public service delivery has to  be improved by 
strengthening institutions at both the national and local government levels. 
D. Development Agenda for Restarting Growth and making it Inclusive 
13. The Government is aware of the challenges and has included goals to address them in its strategy. 
Achieving the goals of the 1 Oth plan and PRSP wil l  require restarting inclusive growth while maintaining 
I Thapa, Shyam, “Population Growth in Nepal: The Challenges Ahead”, Perspective, 2001. Dr. Thapa cites a UN Study’s 
estimate o f  21 Asian countries. 
. . .  
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macroeconomic stability and undertaking reforms to increase competitiveness. The goals or the four 
pillars o f  the Government’s poverty strategy are: (i) broad based growth, with special emphasis on 
agriculture; (ii) accelerating human development through renewed emphasis on effective delivery o f  basic 
social services and economic infrastructure; (iii) ensuring social and economic inclusion o f  the poor, 
marginalized groups and backward regions; and (iv) vigorously pursuing good governance as a means o f  
delivering better development results and to ensure social and economic justice. In addition, public 
investment will be appropriately focused on developing social and physical infrastructure. 
14. Meeting the PRSP’sfirst aim of reducingpoverty through broad based income growth wil l  depend 
critically on raising growth of agriculture to the PRSP target of 4% and above and through accelerating 
the growth of aggregate productivity from its current low rates. Agriculture growth particularly in the 
lagging regions will also support the objective o f  social inclusion. Excessive reliance on raising 
investment rates significantly may neither be feasible nor advisable in a poor country where resources are 
highly constrained. The main thrust  should be to raise overall productivity in the medium t e r m  by 
commercializing agriculture and increasing Nepal’s trade and competitiveness. Achieving this will 
depend, in turn, o n  a sound macroeconomic fiamework and improving the investment climate and the 
incentive regime. 
Macroeconomic Policy 
15. A sound fiscal policy, complemented by prudent monetaly and exchange rate policies, 
underpinned Nepal’s better economic performance in the 1990s; but, there are three impending fiscal 
challenges that have to be addressed to achieve steady and stable growth. First, the most significant 
danger i s  contingent and off-budget liabilities arising f rom the financial sector related to two large, whol ly 
or partly owned, Government banks that have a negative net worth o f  around 7% o f  GDP. Further, with 
the present liabilities of the Agricultural Development Bank o f  Nepal (ADBN), total financial sector 
liabilities can increase the fiscal burden by as much as 10% o f  GDP - or roughly o f  the same order as tax 
revenue collection. The second challenge to fiscal stability and sustainability i s  posed by the rapid growth 
in pension liabilities in the next decade that will further crowd out pro-poor spending. The third cause o f  
fiscal vulnerability i s  l o w  tax revenue collection (9 to 10% o f  GDP), causing Nepal to be excessively 
dependent o n  external assistance and constraining public services, growth, and future revenues in a 
vicious circle. 
16. Given the scarcity of resources, Government needs to make public spending more effective 
through four measures. First, budget envelopes need to be made more realistic. The medium-term 
expenditure framework (MTEF) introduced in 2002 has been a good start for prioritizing development 
expenditures, but i t  only partly addresses the issue o f  unrealistically large development budget envelopes. 
A second measure would be to base the MTEF on program budgets that integrate and prioritize regular 
(current) and capital expenditures. This will also help the Government to improve donor harmonization. 
Third, regular tracking o f  expenditures and development outcomes along with publicly disseminating the 
findings will help to achieve development targets. A fourth way to increase the effectiveness o f  public 
expenditures would be to leverage private provision o f  services and infrastructure investment. 
External Sector 
17. The external sector is crucial for the growth of a small-open economy such as Nepal and 
opportunities exist in several areas to increase competitiveness. However, external sector adjustment i s  
needed to avail these opportunities and restore growth o f  exports and the manufacturing sector. Export 
growth has fallen to 8% in the current year compared to 15% growth p.a. in the 1990s. The medium term 
outlook i s  clouded by the rescinding o f  the Multi-f ibre Arrangement in 2005 that wi l l  put Nepal at a 
disadvantage vis-A-vis the duty free access o f  African garments exporters to the U S  market under the 
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Afr ican Growth and Opportunities Act. Yet, Nepal has opportunities to exploit to increase i t s  
competitiveness: i t s  comparative advantage in a number o f  agriculture and manufacturing niche markets, 
i t s  proximity to the large and fast growing Indian and Chinese economies, the availability o f  preferential 
access to  Europe and to India, hydroelectric resources for power exports to the supply constrained Indian 
markets; i t s  natural beauty and important religions and cultural sites that draw tourists; a growing pool  o f  
educated labor, and “catch up opportunities” to raise productivity. 
18. But Nepal has to undertake signijicant trade policy and behind- the-border reforms to improve the 
investment climate and to take advantage of these assets. First, the remaining anti-export bias has to be 
reduced by adjusting tariffs away f rom their present cascading structure. Second, improvements in 
customs, duty drawback, trade facilitation, standards and quality, infrastructure and transport, and 
business support services will be crucial. Third, regulatory reforms in labor markets and in specific 
sectors such as garments, carpets, agriculture to remove price or entry restrictions have to be addressed.’ 
These measures are needed to make the country more competitive both within and outside the region. 
19. Nepal can also take measures to benefit from the large and swiftly growing Indian market and the 
trade preferences its exports to India and EU enjoy. First, Nepal needs to broaden its agreement with 
India to include and attract Indian investment. The a im should be to forge Indian capital, technology and 
market access to  Nepalese capital, labor, and resources. T o  this end, Nepal has to pursue the proposed 
Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement to provide further assurance on investment and 
trade rights to investors (including Indians). Efforts to forge formal agreement should be further 
complemented by advertising efforts to  attract investment f rom India. Thus, Nepal should make a special 
effort to advertise i t s  preferential access to Europe through the “Everything But Arms ’ ’  initiative. Second, 
economic diplomacy with the Indian central government needs to be extended to the neighboring Indian 
states, for ensuring market access and easing transit rights. T h i s  i s  important as state governments wie ld  
discretionary powers that sometimes disrupt trade. Third, Nepal needs to harmonize border procedures, 
documentation, special economic zones (SEZ) rules, product standards and Customs software with India 
such that Indo-Nepal trade and transit i s  easily facilitated and third country oriented exports can also 
proceed with minimal transactions costs. Fourth, Nepal could facilitate Indian interests in Nepal by 
proceeding with building the Tibet-India transit routes and in return request more transit routes and 
shipping facilities at a variety o f  Indian ports including the efficient Mumbai  port. 
20. A crucial challenge for Nepal now is to sustain the level of the current remittance earnings, which 
now account for about 12% of GDP. Government i s  now preparing a new Ac tPo l i cy  guideline relating to 
Migration and Foreign Employment. A formal memorandum o f  understanding has been signed with 
Malaysia and ratified. Talks are proceeding with Qatar, UAE, Hong K o n g  and Korea. Nepal could take 
three other measures to sustain foreign employment. First, the most important, for the long run i s  the need 
for continued investments in education, with special emphasis on the English language, to  increase the 
demand for Nepalese labor abroad. Second, employment-seelang talks also need to be extended to 
countries such as Japan, where aging o f  i t s  population will require the import o f  more foreign labor. 
Third, if the private sector i s  not  forthcoming, Nepal needs to provide attractive financial instruments for 
Nepalese labor to transfer their salaries v ia  formal channels. In general, service standards in the transfer o f  
remittances that allow a quick and secure transfer o f  funds i s  important. Finally, Government also needs 
to ensure a jo in t  public and private sector oversight body to ensure that Nepal’s business reputation as a 
reliable source of  educated and disciplined labor i s  maintained. Conversely, this oversight should also 
ensure that unscrupulous private sector operators do not defraud the hard-eamed remittances by workers. 
See Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies, HMGN, Nepal Trade and Competiliveness Study, 2004 for more details. 
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Improving the Investment Climate 
21. Aside from restoring peace, or at least signlficantly mitigating the conflict, improving the 
investment climate wil l  be essential for restarting growth. I t  will depend on three broad factors i.e. 
strengthening business environment regulatory framework to promote competition and efficiency, 
undertaking financial sector reforms to ensure access to credit, and improving infrastructure. 
22. First, to reduce the costs o f  
entry, there i s  need to clarify and simplify the implementation o f  the rules o f  entry. For  this Govemment 
could reduce the number o f  institutions involved and adopt automatic clearances (e.g. company 
registration could be l inked to the tax system). Second, the bankruptcy l aw  needs to be modemized 
through the new Company and Insolvency Acts to allow easier and less time-consuming exit policies. 
Third, consensus needs to be built around an appropriate competition l aw  for Nepal, emphasizing both 
traditional l a w  enforcement (control o f  cartels, abuse o f  dominance and mergers) as well as enhanced 
competition advocacy - influencing the regulatory process to spur grass-roots entrepreneurship as well as 
influencing public awareness o f  all stakeholders regarding the benefits o f  competition. Finally, labor 
market rigidities need to be addressed. Legislative reforms are needed to allow flexible labor contracts 
under which employers could retrench workers with reasonable compensation (in fact, rigid labor laws 
encourage extra-legal contracts and hiring many foreign nationals because they are easy to get rid of). 
Due to the rigidity o f  the labor laws, formal-sector wage differentials between India and Nepal are 
becoming narrower than what differences in labor productivity would warrant. As labor reforms may take 
time due to polit ical opposition, Govemment could proceed, as announced in the last budget speech, to set 
up Special Economic Zones and Export Processing Zones where more flexible labor market conditions 
could prevail. 
Reform of the regulatolyfiamework would include the following. 
23. I n  the case of infrastructure, transport remains a key constraint. Nepal has one o f  the lowest road 
densities for a landlocked country. In a terrain where roads are the main arteries o f  the economy, their 
lack means connectivity becomes a costly constraint. An estimated 3.5 mi l l ion people (15% o f  the 
population) do not  have road access in Nepal; some villages can be up to 13 days walk  to the nearest road. 
To increase connectivity f ive issues need to be addressed. These are: (i) ensuring adequate funding for 
road maintenance (only 50% o f  the needed funds are available) and making expenditure more effective 
through institutional arrangements such as the Roads Board; (ii) expanding the domestic road network 
and increasing public funding for i t  through completing key North-South corridors, the fast track 
Kathmandu-Terai link, and expanding and upgrading rural roads; (iii) better coordinating public spending 
o n  roads to meet demands for private sector development and public services; (iv) creating room for 
greater private sector participation through improving the legal environment and institutional reform; and 
(v) ensuring that rural roads program supports local economic needs by transferring authority and 
providing technical assistance to District Development Committees (DDCs). 
24. Nepal has vast hydroelectric resources, which present a source of wealth and exports to India. 
But, access to power i s  highly limited in rural areas and power costs are among the highest in South Asia. 
Despite this potential and a large increase o f  capacity in the last f ive years, only 522 MW has been 
developed so far. Only 40% o f  Nepalese households have access to electricity. The agenda o f  reform 
would include the following: (i) cut system losses that are s t i l l  high at about 24% to gain efficiency and 
revenue and reduce business costs; (ii) examine alternative restructuring options to lower costs o f  the 
power sector through negotiating good contracts with private providers and using the growing prospect o f  
power trading; (iii), explore the power export potential t o  India (since at present i t exports only 10% o f  
generation); (iv) promote more commercial and private sector l ed  power exchanges and rat i fy the Power 
Trading Agreement between India; and (v) perhaps, most important, set up a competent and effective 
independent regulatory body for attracting efficient private investment. 
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25. Developing telecommunications is a key to increasing connectivity and external competitiveness. 
Despite strong growth, there i s  s t i l l  considerable unmet demand and costs for f i r m s  are among the highest 
in the region. A re form agenda would involve increasing competition in the sector, rebalancing tariffs to 
reduce cross subsidization, expanding access to the rural areas, reforming institutions to clarify regulatory 
authority between the N T C  and FMD and commercializing the NTC perhaps with a view to privatization 
of the services. There i s  also the need to clearly separate the govemment’s policy-makmg and operational 
roles in the sector. The Government has started to implement these policies by creating Nepal Telecoms 
and proceeding to divest i t s  stake. 
26. I n  addition to sector-spec$c regulatory agencies, Nepal would benefit from an improved legal 
and enabling environment for private sector participation and strengthened capabilities for contract 
design, bidding and monitoring across infrastructure sectors. The lack o f  sufficient protection o f  
investor rights in the existing Build Operate Transfer (BOT) Ordinance (2003) and Rules (2004), coupled 
with a potential exclusive emphasis on unconstrained sole source contracting, creates an undesirable 
environment that i s  not  in the interest o f  the country as a whole. There i s  a need to professionally review 
the existing Ordinance and Rules within the context o f  the broader legal enabling environment for private 
sector participation, together with a decision on appropriate measures to strengthen the existing BOT cell 
within the Ministry of Physical Planning and Works. Such a review will help to ensure that a l l  projects 
benefit f rom sufficient pol icy development, information sharing and implementation capacity. 
Fostering Growth in Agriculture and the Lagging Regions 
27. Agriculture is central to poverty reduction and growth in Nepal. I t  contributes about 40% o f  GDP; 
it employs more than two-thirds o f  the labor force. I t  i s  especially important to the poor, as i t  i s  the main 
source o f  income of the poorest households (90% o f  the bottom consumption quintile). Unsurprisingly, 
stagnant per-capita agricultural incomes over the last few decades were associated with Nepal’s 
persistently high poverty rates until the mid-1990s. Conversely, accelerating agricultural growth has 
helped reduce poverty since the mid-1990s. 
28. Sustaining and improving the agricultural sector’s growth performance over the longer term, wi l l  
require emphasis on increasing farm productivity and agricultural marketing eficiency to strengthen 
farmer capacity to respond to growing domestic and international market opportunities. This will involve 
policy and regulatory reforms to reduce the barriers to increased private sector participation and 
investments in the agncultural sector, including reforms o f  land and credit policies and regulations 
governing agricultural trade. I t  wi l l  require fostering increased public and private investments in rural  
infrastructure (roads, markets, electrification) and rural  services (credit, agncultural research and 
extension, land administration, market information, export promotion, phyto-sanitary services, grading 
and quality control). Integral to the revival o f  the government’s investment program will be institutional 
reforms o f  government agencies to ensure the improved delivery o f  rural-related public goods and 
services, including through greater participation o f  users and communities. 
29. Developing agriculture in lagging regions is a principal factor in poverty reduction and conflict 
resolution. Developing agriculture in the mid-Western development region (MWDR) and the far-Westem 
development region (FWDR) i s  a crucial issue for Nepal  both for prosperity and peace. These regions lag 
significantly behind the rest of Nepal by most development indicators and poverty i s  more acute. Yet, 
these regions have considerable growth potential. The strategy for developing the lagging regions could 
include the following elements: (i) strengthening rural  connectivity and access to markets and market 
services; (ii) regulatory and legal reforms to promote contract farming and producer marketing groups; 
(iii) developing innovative approaches to irrigation, such as drip irrigation; (iv) improving research and 
extension services, including through private sector and NGO participation, to improve access by farmers 
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to better technologies and farming practices, including support for diversification to high value crops such 
as horticulture; and (v) formulating market promotion strategies. 
Addressing Social Exclusion and Improving Institutions and Governance 
30. Improving governance is constrained by a legacy of gender, ethnic and caste-based social 
stratijkation coupled with high ethno-linguistic diversity. Against this backdrop, there are four main 
challenges to improving governance. These are (i) strengthening the accountability and representative 
institutions that Nepal  has built up at the local government and national level; (ii) improving government 
effectiveness by makmg the c iv i l  service more accountable, disciplined and professional; (iii) restarting 
decentralization so that the government i s  more responsive to the heterogeneous needs and preferences o f  
a diverse people, and (iv) encouraging government and public service providers to  be more inclusive to 
reduce large gender, ethnic and caste based disparities. T o  implement these Nepal can draw on an 
unusually active community involvement - that is, the presence o f  active local social capital -- in 
development witnessed in many areas such as forest, education, roads, irrigation, water and sanitation. 
31. At the civil service level, the Government has several priorities. First, the c i v i l  service has to be 
made more effective and professional through improving i t s  s l u l l  mix, increasing incentives by raising the 
salaries o f  senior managers and professional staff, enforcing tighter discipline, better performance 
evaluation, and more diversity. A related issue i s  clarifying accountability between the c iv i l  service and 
politicians by changing c iv i l  service rules. As part o f  the effort to improve the effectiveness o f  the c iv i l  
service, a second important priority will be to implement measures already outlined in the govemment’s 
“roadmap” to  promote greater gender, caste and ethnic diversity at a l l  levels in the c i v i l  service. 
32. After having achieved a strong start, decentralization has now stalled as the tenure of the last 
local governments expired in 2002 and Government now needs to resolve key pending issues. One 
indication o f  the recent slowdown i s  that although the Government has set up a high level 
Decentralization Implementation and Monitoring Committee (DIMC) this body has not  met for the last 
two  years. One way to restart the process i s  by making the D I M C  resolve key pending issues such as the 
following: consolidating the size and number o f  Local Bodies to ensure that they have adequate revenue 
bases; implementing administrative decentralization through forming a local Government c iv i l  service 
clearly accountable to them; clarifying ambiguity between various polit ical and administrative entities at 
the local level, including DDCs, VDCs, School Management Committees and l ine departments. This 
would require amending the provisions in 21 Acts that contradict the Local Self Governance Act. 
Alongside administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization needs to be strengthened through 
clarifying overlapping and limited expenditure assignments and improving revenue decentralization and 
collection incentives, and bringing more clarity to the fiscal transfer system. 
3 3 ,  With the I O t h  Plan/PRSP there has been explicit recognition of caste and ethnicity as factors 
affecting income and human development outcome, and the importance of social inclusion. Besides 
grassroots development programs, there has been some recent advancement at the pol icy level. Although 
it s t i l l  leaves some issues un-addressed, the passage o f  the 11’ Amendment (known as the Women’s 
Inheritance Bill) in 2002 was a step towards greater legal equality for  women. Progress has been slower 
on caste and ethnic groups. Although there are laws setting punishments for discrimination against 
Dalits, many forms o f  discrimination are commonly practiced throughout the country. A further challenge 
to inclusion i s  to help non-Nepali speaking children f rom ethic and linguistic minorities to transition 
successfully into the Nepali-medium schools by providing bilingual teachers - preferably females f rom 
disadvantaged groups. On a broader front, the government has shown i t s  concern for increasing the 
representation o f  excluded groups not only to the c iv i l  service, but also in elected government (at a l l  
levels) and in health, education and employment. This effort will need strong polit ical backing and expert 
technical advice to look at a range o f  strategies adopted by other countries that have tried to redress 
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historical discrimination without undermining meritocracy or creating rigid and divisive entitlement 
systems. 
Human Development Policies and Social Protection 
34. Nepal has achieved considerable progress in improving human development indicators in the past 
decade but signijkant disparities persist. Init ial results f rom a sub-sample o f  a recent household survey 
shows that the people perceive much improved access to education and health services compared to 8 
years ago. Still, Nepal could fall below MDG targets and the goals o f  the Tenth plan in areas such as 
matemal mortality, chi ld malnutrition, and sanitation. Further, large regional and social group based 
disparities persist. 
35 .  Education funding, quality, management by local communities and secondary and tertiary 
education are issues to be addressed. After achieving 80% net  enrollment rates in primary education 
Nepal faces many challenges in meeting the goal o f  universal primary education (UPE) along with 
ensuring quality. The f i rs t  i s  to provide adequate funding, supplies and teachers for public schools so that 
the poor are not deterred by high costs o f  fees that schools feel compelled to charge to meet these needs. 
Second, faced with school bureaucracy or teachers that are not accountable to local communities, Nepal 
n o w  has embarked o n  a program to empower communities to manage their own schools. This measure 
will have to be implemented with proper legal basis to resolve ambiguity o f  roles. Resistance f rom 
government officials will need to be countered by transferring the authority for hiring teachers to these 
communities. As this i s  a new initiative, there i s  need to monitor and evaluate i t s  impact. Third, while 
major gains have been made in priorit izing primary education, more resources will. be needed for 
secondary and tertiary education. This would require greater private sector participation and cost 
recovery. 
36. Health strategy needs to prioritize public spending and promote greater private sector 
participation. Nepal witnessed many health status improvements in the 1990s. But, given the poor in i t ia l  
conditions and deficiencies in delivery systems, several health indicators (such as matemal mortality, 
chi ld malnutrition) are among lowest in South Asia. There are also considerable differences in access to 
heath services based o n  income group, locality, caste, ethnic group and gender. Communicable diseases, 
maternal mortality, and poor nutrition cause most o f  the burden o f  disease. Although the Government’s 
10th Plan the Health Sector Strategy puts forward an Essential Health Care Program o f  four priority 
interventions, the allocations o f  public funds - mostly more tertiary care -- do not  reflect these priorities. 
Alongside ensuring adequate resources, the other challenge for Government i s  ensuring that the priority 
interventions are well implemented. This will require the Government to fo l low through on i t s  program to 
devolve public health posts to Local  Health Management committees. Government will have to 
formulate a more systematic strategy to mobilize the private sector, which accounts for 70% o f  al l  health 
spending, for providing services for the poor. 
37. Water supply and sanitation coverage has grown but quality has emerged as an issue. In the 
1990s, the sector saw reforms that shifted f rom the supply driven approach to service delivery o f  the 
1980s to a demand driven approach. It also adoptedparticipatory decision malung in delivering rural 
water and sanitation services. In addition, community participation has shifted f rom voluntary labor 
contribution to community empowerment and management. Though this approach had much success and 
officially 80% o f  Nepal’s population has access to safe water, in practice poor maintenance has led to 
poor quality o f  water supply and doubts whether MDG targets can be reached. A host o f  issues need to 
be addressed for further progress in this sector. These include l i t t le coverage in the Eastem regions, poor 
coordination by overlapping sector institutions, unreliability o f  supply and water quality, lack o f  a 
adequate framework for community participation, thinly spread publ ic expenditures, politicization o f  
tar i f f  adjustments for cost recovery and lack o f  good monitoring and evaluation systems. 
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3 8. Social protection require better coordination and avoiding large potential liabilities: Recognizing 
that accelerating economic growth i s  not sufficient for poverty reduction, the loth Plan includes several 
targeted programs intended to protect the most vulnerable as part o f  i t s  social protection pillar. But there 
are questions about the effectiveness of a patchwork o f  Government programs many with small numbers 
o f  actual beneficiaries and relatively high administrative overheads. The origin o f  many o f  these 
programs i s  ad hoc: either when Nepal signs international conventions (e.g. children, disabled etc.) or 
sometimes when they are leftover f rom donor funded programs that have lost external support. The main 
issue about social protection schemes in Nepal i s  that they need coordinating and better evaluation o f  their 
effectiveness to focus on a few effective programs such as the O ld  Age Pension scheme. The second issue 
i s  the potential financial l iabil i ty as well as the labor market rigidities that Nepal’s back-loaded formal 
pension systems create. 
E. Medium Term Prospects 
39. Nepal is at cross roads today between the prospect of sustaining and accelerating appreciable 
gains in human development and poverty reduction and the dangers of serious reversals of these gains. 
The PRSP presents two medium term scenarios - the normal case and the alternative case - to take into 
account the downside r isks  arising from the present conflict and constitutional crisis. Underpinned by a 
prudent fiscal framework that lowers public sector borrowing requirements to less than 1% o f  GDP in the 
final year, the “normal” scenario in the PRSP projects growth rate o f  6.2% p.a. over the next five years - 
with growth rates reaching a maximum o f  7.5% at the end o f  the plan. The alternative low-case scenario 
projects a 4.3% growth rate per annum. It i s  more l ikely that the alternative scenario i s  the relevant one 
given recent developments. M u c h  depends on a return to peace. Otherwise, even the alternative scenario 
may not be feasible. Raising productivity will l ikely be the main driver in accelerating growth rather than 
raising savings and investments. 
40. There are considerable risks in the medium term arising out of the conflict, implementation 
capacity, and external conditions. The r isks  are the following. The first and most important r i s k  comes 
from conflict and the constitutional crisis that have created instability and uncertainty about institutions, 
ru les  and laws. The second risk arises from the tension between the substantial reform agenda and the 
Government’s capacity to implement it. A more competitive external environment brought about by the 
forthcoming phasing out of the MFA and Nepal losing market share in other exports poses the third risk. 
The fourth risk i s  a long term risk, which requires intervention now. At current fe r t i l i t y  rates, there will be 
more than a tripling of population in the next 50 years with tremendous pressure on land and other 
resources. The fifth risk i s  posed by the contingent liabilities o f  the non-performing assets o f  the two  large 
banks whose negative net worth are estimated to be about 7% o f  GDP. 
41. The Development Policy Review has highlighted technical aspects of implementing of three key 
themes of the I Oth Plan/PRSP - accelerating growth, making growth more inclusive, and strengthening 
institutions for good governance. Implementing the specific recommendations will require willingness on 
the part o f  a l l  parties to discuss, evaluate and come to an agreement o n  these specific measures. I t  i s  only 
then that the PRSP/lO* Plan’s normal case can be achieved. 
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Key Recommendations 
Economic Management 
Improve economic management through better high level monitoring o f  economic, trade, transport, and agricultural 
performance and hold regular consultations wi th private sector groups to identify critical areas for policy formulation. 
Address emerging actual and contingent fiscal liabilities. Restructure the two main commercial banks and undertake 
pension reforms to  maintain fiscal soundness and introduce an explicit reporting system on the financial operations, 
guarantees issued and balance sheets o f  public enterprises to  monitor actual and contingent liabilities. 
Raise revenues by devolving more administrative power and budgets to the DGs o f  Inland Revenue Department and 
Customs. Implement a Custom’s modernization plan, computerize tax processing to reduce discretionary power and 
transactions costs. 
Improve public expenditure management by: (i) preparing program budgets that integrate al l  expenditures in the MTEF; 
(ii) raising allocation and implementation o f  expenditures on key economic activities in roads; (iii) raising expenditures o f  
non-salary current expenditures; (iv) tracking expenditure; and (v) increasing fiscal decentralization through transferring 
more functions and budgets for service delivery to local Govemments. 
Agriculture, Trade, and Investment Climate 
Promote the commercialization of agriculture through the development o f  infrastructure, and improved delivery o f  
agricultural services and legislation to make contracts, commercial farming and farmer marketing groups more legally 
secure; ensure supply o f  credit through MFIs  as ADBN is restructured, and introduce matching grants; and secure land 
rights through better land records to remove all remaining ambiguity on the dual tenure system. 
Adopt a comprehensive lagging regions strategy to develop the mid- and far- Westem hi l ls  and mountain areas through 
providing roads, infrastructure, and policies to facilitate private sector and farmer group based commercial agriculture. 
Set up an Apex Trade organization to implement proposals of the Government’s Nepal Trade and Competitiveness 
Study to improve trade policy coordination, reduce customs and transport costs, improve facilities for  standards and market 
access, improve conditions for FDI by reducing SME reservations, and address the specific supply side constraints in 
garments, carpets, tea, and other sectors. Use Nepal’ access to the EU’s EBA facility to  attract capital and expertise from 
India and other countries to locate production in Nepal. 
Amend the labor act to make the labor market more flexible by enabling contracts between employers and 
employees that allow flexible hiring and retrenchment arrangements on agreed terms. Provide exemptions f rom labor 
market constraints within export processing and special economic zones. 
Attract PPI in transport, power and telecommunications sectors with revisions to existing laws such as the Bui ld 
Operate Transfer Ordinance (2003) and Rules (2004) to protect investor rights while ensuring sufficient transparency and 
competition, strengthening capabilities for contract design, bidding and monitoring, and setting up independent regulators. 
Corporatize Nepal Electricity Authority and proceed with unbundling of operations. Set up a formula approach tc 
tariffs to avoid politicizing tariff setting. Ratify the Power Trading Act and the Power Trade Committee. 
Increase transport connectivity by (i) improving road maintenance through increasing allocations to be spent through the 
Roads Board; (ii) extending the road network by completing the three North-South corridors in the Westem regions 
complete the Kathmandu-Terai fast track link and upgrading rural roads; and (iii) reducing transport costs througk 
harmonizing border procedures and documentation wi th India and other neighboring countries for groups to  identify anc 
resolve key policy and implementation issues. 
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Key Recommendations 
Improving Public Services, Empowering Communities and Promoting Inclusion 
Strengthen institutions for accountability and transparency by restoring representative local Governments, financial 
management rules (such as making the Auditor General’s Report accessible to the public) and introducing a Freedom o f  
Information act missing in Nepal 
Improve civil service performance and professionalism through salary decompression and increase in executive 
ranks, tighter enforcement of discipline, making transfers transparent and counter signed, and making civil service more 
inclusive through measures suggested in the report. Clarify accountability o f  political and civ i l  service levels through 
sharper delineation of roles. 
Restart decentralization and strengthen devolution by empowering local governments and communities by making 
service providers responsible to them. Create local Govemment c iv i l  service recruited on a centralized merit basis, but 
employed by local Governments. Transfer greater resources to local Govemments through the D D C  formula and make the 
formula more comprehensive; clarify al l  ambiguity with respect to functional authority o f  local Governments vs. central 
agencies. 
Take advantage of Nepal’s effective community group organizations and local social capital through devolving 
authority, responsibility and resources for service delivery to  water user, road user, water and sanitation, and women’s 
savings associations, school and health management committees. Clarify ambiguities concerning roles between local 
Government and community groups. Transfer recruitment authority o f  teachers to  school management committees and stop 
centralized recruitment. Transfer all water and sanitation project maintenance to user groups after their rehabilitation i s  
complete. 
Introduce better performance evaluation of local Government and senice groups through regular public 
expenditure tracking and core welfare and service delivery surveys to be carried out b y  independent parties and 
make this information available to all user groups. 
Address the main diseases that contribute to the burden of disease b y  extending Essential Health Care package, i n  
phases, w i th  special focus on improving coverage of nursemidwife attended births. Reform regulatory framework to 
encourage greater private and N G O  participation in the delivery o f  basic health services. 
Enforce new laws to increase representation of Janajati, Dal i t  and women in civil service and other public 
institutions. Set up a bilingual education program at the primary level for transition o f  children from non-Nepali to Nepali. 
Rationalize social protection programs through evaluating their impact and cost-benefits. Expand small but good base 
of micro credit organizations to include savings and other micro-life insurance. 
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CHAPTER 1: ASSESSING DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES - 
GROWTH, POVERTY REDUCTION AND SOCIAL INCLUSION 
A. Difficult Initial Conditions and Challenges 
1. Nepal had a late start in development in the 1960s and faced formidable challenges, including a 
difJicult geography and a history that left it extremely poor in terms of physical and human capital 
endowments. In terms of geography, Nepal i s  a landlocked country with a diff icult terrain that rises 
steeply f rom the plains of Terai in the South to the middle h i l l s  and to the Himalayan range in the North. 
Transport costs are very high, hindering the development o f  commerce and markets, and contributing to 
regional disparities in economic and human development. For more than a century after 1846, Nepal was 
ruled by the dynastic Prime Ministerial Rana family, whose principal objective was the extraction of 
resources from the land and the people to support a lavish lifestyle and repress any polit ical or economic 
threat to i t s  continuity. Thus, as late as forty years ago, Nepal had strilungly l o w  levels o f  human and 
physical capital and infrastructure compared to i t s  neighbors. Today Nepal i s  the poorest country in South 
Asia with a per-capita income o f  about $250. 
2. The problem of Nepal’s difficult initial conditions was compounded by the policies that Nepal 
followed in the next two decades until 1985. These policies, based on development thinking o f  those 
times, were interventionist, protectionist, state-led, and resulted, until recently, in a large public sector, 
dominance o f  state corporations, and a closed economy leading to l o w  levels o f  investment and 
productivity. 
3. Thus between 1965 and 1985, the first two decades for which data are available, per-capita 
economic growth was stagnant at round 0.6% (see Table 1.1 next page) but with the additional burden of 
Nepal’s rising population growth rate and without the fruits of the Green Revolution then taking place in 
the countries to the South. With a significantly appreciated real effective exchange rate in the f i r s t  ha l f  o f  
the 1980s, economic growth was heavily concentrated in the non-tradable activities, mainly in 
construction and restaurants and  hotel^.^ Further, suppressed interest rates and the overvalued exchange 
rates led to capital-intensive production and employment growth was too slow to match the growth of 
people entering the labor force. 
4. Private sector investment rates were low during this period (at 9% of GDP, see Table 1.1) and 
the economy remained closed and undiversiJied with agriculture accounting for close to 60% of GDP and 
more than 90% of employment at the end of this period - the mid 1980s. Infrastructure was very l imi ted at 
the end o f  the period. As recently as in 1985, 78% of the worlung age population o f  above 15 years had 
n o  schooling compared to 61% and 63% in India and Bangladesh respectively. Finally, excessive 
Government expenditures and burgeoning deficits pushed Nepal into a fiscal and external crisis in the 
early 1980s. 
T h e  real effective exchange rate i s  def ined as the relat ive pr ice o f  non-tradables to tradables. 
Table 1.1 Economic Performance Indicators in Pre-and Reform Periods, and Recent Years 
Pre- Entire 
Reform Reform Period 
1971- 1981- 1991- 2001 2002 2003 2004 1965-85 1985-2001 1965-2001 
1980 1990 2000 est 
Growth (%) 
Real GDP Per capita Income 
Real GDP 
Population 
Investment and Savings (YO of GDP) 
Investment (Including Stocks) 
Public Fixed Investment 
Private Fixed Investment 
Gross Domestic Savings 
Fiscal Indicators (% of GDP) 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
Deficit 
olw Domestic Financing 
Public Debt 
Public Savings 
External Sector (% of GDP) 
Export to GDP 
Import to GDP 
CAB to GDP 
Gross Official Reserves in Months of Imports 
Money and Credit (YO of GDP) 
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B. Reforms and Response 
5. Responding to balance ofpayments and fiscal crisis, Nepal started implementing economic policy 
reforms around 1985 that progressed over four different phases in the next twenty years. In the f i rs t  
reform episode (1985-1986), public savings rose due to  improvements in expenditure and tax policies. 
Importantly, a 15% step devaluation was undertaken to correct external imbalances that helped to offset a 
significant overvaluation of the exchange rate. Structural reforms made the f i rs t  attempts to liberalize the 
import regime, introduced duty drawback and bonded warehouse schemes, and eased industrial licensing. 
6. I n  the second reform episode, in the early 1990s, the tax base was broadened, revenue 
administration improved and trade and industrial policies were further liberalized. A steady reduction in 
tariffs was launched and quantitative restrictions virtually dismantled. In addition, the foreign exchange 
system was unified and Nepal attained current account convertibility. Interest rates were liberalized and 
banking sector entry was facilitated. The private sector expanded due to liberalization o f  entry through the 
new investment act and privatization. After stalling in the middle 1990s, the third reform episode around 
1997 liberalized the agncultural sector, introduced a neutral VAT and strengthened local governments. In 
2 
the most recent reform episode since 2000, the 1 Figure 1.1 Logarithmic Level of  Per Capita Income4 
Government has improved tax policy and administration, 
introduced a medium-term expenditure framework, 
restructured the management o f  Nepal's troubled two 
main commercial banks and strengthened financial sector 
regulations and anti-corruption efforts. 
7. As evident from Table 1. I on the previous page, 
the economy responded well to these reforms. First per- 
capita income growth accelerated markedly after reforms 
were launched in the mid-1 980s (see also Figure 1.1) and 
the economy diversified (See Table 1.2) as the growth 
was led by industry and services. Second, the share o f  
agriculture fe l l  from 64% of the economy in the mid- 
1970s to less than 40% at the beginning o f  the 20' 
century. The share of industry increased from 12% to 
2 1 % thirty years later. 
I 6.3 
I 
8. Third, this diversification led to significantly 
lower volatility in incomes as evident in Figures 1.1 and 
1.2 As the sources of growth moved away from 
agriculture to industrial and services sectors (finance and 
construction), and irrigation expanded, the dependence o f  
the economy on rainfall declined. The standard deviation 
of  per-capita GDP incomes fe l l  f rom nearly 4 in the 1965 
to 1985 period to around 1.5 in the second period. I t  i s  
evident that achieving successful stabilization and better 
fiscal, financial and extemal sector policies helped to 
improve economic performance. Nevertheless, a 
considerable agenda remains pending. 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1965 1990 1995 2000 
- Log of Per Capita Income - Log of Trend Per Capita lncom 
Source: World Bank estimates from CBS data 
9. Notwithstanding these achievements, three 
signijkant development failures made the 
foundations of Nepal's development fragile, and 
sowed the seeds of the faltering economic 
performance and the violent insurgency in Nepal's 
countryside since 2001. Foremost among the policy 
failures in the 1990s was the exclusion o f  certain 
regions and ethnic groups and castes f rom the 
benefits o f  growth and human development. In 
particular, the Western to Far Western hills region 
accounting for around 22% o f  the population and 
some specific ethnic and caste groups (the Dalits 
and indigenous Janajatis that account for 46% o f  the 
population') were left lagging behind. A 1999 
estimate suggests that incomes in the mid- and far- 
Figure 1.2 Volatility in Incomes 
-0.02 i I 
-004 
65 " '70' " '75 '  ' "80' " 85 " ' 9 0 '  " 95 ' "00 
I I GDPGrowthRates 1 - 
I Source: World Bank estimates from CBS data 
Table 1.2 Nepal: GDP composition (% of GDP, Average of Period) 
Agriculture, fisheries, forestry 64.2 39.0 
Industry 10.6 20.4 
Manufacturing 4.8 9.0 
Electricity, Gas, Water 0.3 0.8 
Construction 5.4 10.1 
Services 25.2 40.7 
Trade, restaurants, hotels 4.1 11.2 
Transport, communications, storage 5.4 8.5 
Financial and real estate 8.5 10.1 
Community and social services 7.2 10.9 
1975-1 977 1999-2001 
Source: Estimated from CBS Data. 
T h e  trend o f  actual and logarithmic per capita GDP i s  derived from applying Hedrick-Prescott filters. T h i s  trend can also be 
seen as representing potential output suggesting that Nepal's economy achieved at or above potential in the 199Os, while 
less than so before that. 
According to the 2001 Census. 
Western hill regions were only one hal f  o f  that in Kathmandu valley and Eastern Terai (Table 1.3). 
Similarly, these areas and excluded ethnic groups have lower education and literacy levels, and higher 
infant and maternal mortality rates.6 Set against the high expectations brought by the advent o f  democracy 
in 1991, this exclusion led to disenchantment among the lagging groups and regions, which became the 
base o f  a violent “Maoist” insurgency. 
Voice and RccountabiJitg 
P o l i t i c a l  S t a b i l i t y  
Governnent Effectiveness 
Regulatory Quality 
Rule o f  Lau 
Control of Corruption 
Table 1.3 Disparity in Incomes and Human Development 
Population Adult Human Per Capita Life expectancy Human 
(%I Illiteracy Poverty Index Income (Yea4 development index 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
- 
Rural 8% 52 41 1094 58.7 446 
East 23 43 42 1073 62.0 
Central 35 52 41 1713 61.3 
West 20 4 40 1022 67.3 
Mid-West 13 5 43 861 53.2 
Far West 9 5 45 899 52 1 ,385 
Source. CBS and httD l l w  UndD or4 nd~ublications/nhdr2OOl/cha~ter2 Ddf 
10. The second policy failure was the inability to provide a policy environment to generate and 
sustain rapid growth to combat poverty. Nepal’s long-term per-capita growth rate o f  1.7% p.a. between 
1965 and 2001 meant that per-capita income grew from US$130 in 1965 to US$240 ($1350 in PPP terms) 
in today’s dollars and exchange rates. Given that at the current trend o f  fertility decline Nepal’s 
population i s  expected to grow to 77 mi l l ion in the next four decades, it i s  clear that the population 
growth wi l l  be putting enormous demand o n  the country’s resources and require a much faster growth in 
the demand for jobs. In the past slow growth also meant that growth o f  jobs was l imi ted and did not keep 
pace with the growth of the labor force dampening the growth o f  wages. Of  particular importance has 
been the lack o f  agriculture sector growth until the second ha l f  o f  the 1990s. On a per-capita basis, per- 
capita agricultural output remained largely stagnant over the thirty-five year period ending in 200 1. As 
85% of the population remains in rural areas and 80% o f  the labor force worked in the agriculture sector 
even as late as 1990, the stagnancy o f  the agricultural incomes largely explains the persistence o f  poverty 
into the mid-1990s. Conversely, the marked increase in agnculture growth, along with remittances, i s  
l ikely the key factor behind poverty declining since 1996. 
11. The thirdpolicy failure lay in low 
Government effectiveness - i.e. the ability 
to implement its own policies -- combined 
with political instability. The insurgency 
and the polit ical conflict are undermining 
the credibility o f  public institutions. 
Comparison o f  measures o f  governance 
with neighboring countries (Figure 1.3) 
shows Nepal to rank poorly in several 
governance indicators but particularly so 
in political stability and government 
effectiveness. Moreover, in the last two 
years these indicators may have got 
worse. 
Figure 1.3 Nepal and Regional Governance Indicators 
NEPFIL (2002) 
I ! I 
E 25 58 75 I E E  
Conparison u i t h  regional average (South Asia) (louer bar) 
Country’s Percenti le Rank (O-lBB) 
Iourcs: D. K a u W “ r  0. Knxls  md R. Ihislruni,  2003: Gouemmce R ~ l l e r s  111: G o u r n m c r  I n d i c a t o r s  #am 1936-2002 
I h l t p : / / u w u . u r r l d b ~ n h . ~ r s n i b i ~ r ~ u ~ m ~ n c ~ n u b ~ ~ ~ ~ u n r l t n l 5 . h i o l I  
See Table 1.8 on page 12. 
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C. Development Under Threat - Recent Developments and Conflict 
12. Due to these policy failures, the 
achievements of the 1990s are now under 
Figure 1.4 Conflict Affected Districts in Nepal 
threat of reversal from several directions 
and pose a considerable challenge to the 
Government. An eight-year long 
insurgency that has claimed more than 
10,000 lives - most o f  i t since 2002 - has 
disrupted development and governance in 
big parts o f  Nepal, infl icting large costs 
o f  war (See Fig. 1.4 and B o x  1.1). A 
more competitive external environment 
brought about by the rescinding o f  the 
MFA and steady loss in the market share 
o f  exports such as carpets suggests that 
the rapid growth in exports and the non- 
agricultural sector in the 1990s cannot be 
sustained. 
FAR .- 
Source: IJN Notification. Januarv 2004 
13. Indeed, in an early indication of Nepal ’s difficult medium term prospect growth has faltered from 
2002 when Nepal was confronted by the conjluence of adverse economic shocks -- excessive rainfall, a 
global slowdown that led to a collapse in exports, and a sharply escalated Maoist insurgency. Nepal’s 
GDP declined in FY 2002 and a modest and fragile recovery i s  underway with GDP growing by around 
2.3 percent in FY 2003 and i s  expected to be close to 4% in FY 2004. Yet, the recovery i s  fragile as it i s  
whol ly  based on a good monsoon and foreign remittances. Private investment - currently at around 12% 
of GDP compared to around 15% in the mid 1990s -- remains shy and key non-agriculture sectors, whose 
growth accounted for three-fourth o f  the growth in the 1990s, are performing significantly below trend. 
Sectors which enjoyed substantial export led growth (e.g. manufactures such as garments and carpets) in 
the 1990s are n o w  facing l o w  demand and adverse medium term prospects. Except for  tourism (4% o f  
GDP), most o f  the’service sector i s  also similarly afflicted. But tourism itself i s  threatened by the 
insurgency and street demonstrations. Regenerating growth will require foremost the restoration o f  peace 
or at least a significant mitigation o f  conflict. But this requires an understanding o f  the origins o f  the 
conflict and i t s  costs. 
Box 1.1 The “Maoist” Insurgency in Nepal - Origins and Costs 
The origins of the “Maoist” insurgenq, which began in 1996 but became intense after 2001, l ie in both ideological issues as 
well as regional, caste and ethnicity related exclusion issues. The ideological aspect i s  more related to Marxist-Maoist class 
conflict against “feudalism”, whose main political demand i s  to hold a constitutional convention that would also consider the 
option o f  creating a republic as an altemative to the current system o f  constitutional monarchy. The caste and ethnicity based 
aspect i s  rooted in the exclusion o f  different caste and ethnic groups based on a specific hierarchy. The regional aspect concems 
the mid and far westem Hill regions that lag behind most development indicators where the Maoists’ conflict originated (see 
Figure 1.4). Resolving the conflict will depend very much on the commitment o f  the different parties to agree to a common set o f  
rules of the game with respect to politics as well as making economic growth more inclusive b y  different means discussed in the 
review. 
The cost of the Conflict on the economy and the people are enormous. Currently the conflict i s  imposing high costs in terms o f  
foregone growth and poverty reduction, through several channels: 
-- dampened private sector investment and confidence due to insecurity and uncertainty; 
-- extortion o f  rents and informal taxes b y  Maoists f rom large and small businesses; (Continued in next page). 
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Box 1.1 T h e  “Maoist” Insurgency in Nepal  - Or ig ins and  Costs (Continued) 
-- lower public investment as development spending i s  curtailed; 
-- lower sales o f  private fm by 20 to  25% to rural markets due to transport disruptions; 
-- increase in transportation costs and time. For  instance the transit t ime between Kathmandu to  BirguanjRaxaul, a 
key economic link, has been doubled due to  the conflict; 
-- direct costs to infrastructure, which i s  estimated at about $250 mil l ion; 
-- human and capital flight away from conflict affected areas. Household survey data shows as many as 20% o f  male 
working age populat ion have l e f l  some o f  the affected districts; and 
-- disruptions in service delivery due to  the dismantling o f  elected local Governments, and disruption o f  specific 
services. Fo r  example, compared to  a national average o f  75% o f  children being vaccinated, less than 37% o f  
children had been done so in two conflict-affected districts surveyed recently. Education sector has suffered in 
particular due to  attacks o n  teachers. 
Overall, if one conservatively estimates that Nepal’s GDP level and growth rates have fallen by 2% points p.a., t h i s  
implies that in the next  5 years then per-capita-GDP will be more than 10% (if peace had been restored in 2002) to  
14% lower (if peace i s  restored in the next few months) than it would b e  otherwise (See Chapter 7). 
H o w  could Nepal  have grown reasonably rapidly, with significant decline in poverty, since 1996, in the midst o f  this 
conflict? The answer to  t h i s  i s  the confl ict has become truly intense since early 2002. Before that year, the confl ict 
was a low-grade insurgency less disruptive than the typical pol i t ical instabil ity and frequent changes in Government 
that takes place in many  developing countries. 
14. Khat can the Government do to mitigate the costs of conflict? In addition to seeking polit ical 
resolution to the conflict, one clear answer l i es  in much greater attention to economic opportunities and 
public services in lagging regions. One insight comes fi-om loolung at income and human development 
indicators in districts grouped according to the intensity o f  conflict (Table 1.4). 
Table 1.4 Income and Human Development Indicators by Intensity of Conflict 
Life Literacy Number of Population Growth Population Population Expectancy 
Districts Rate 2001 Share 
Human 
Index Years % 
Security status 
Phase I 24 3.8 8626156 27.4 1555 0.38 63.3 39.4 
Phase II (moderately 15 3.8 16028936 50.9 1806 0.38 62.1 43.9 
affected) 
Phase 1 1 1  (highly 36 1.6 6836412 21.7 83613 0.27 56.4 35.6 
affected) 
Source: World Bank estimates from various sources and UNDP circular, March 2004. 
15. According to the UN Security class$cation, signijkant conflict is now raging in 36 out of 75 
districts (i.e. Phase 111 districts). All together 51 districts (Phase I1 and I11 districts) are affected (see 
Figure 1.4). As table 1.4 shows the most conflict affected areas o f  Phase 111, lag significantly behind in 
human development indicators such as l i fe  expectancy and literacy. Improving conditions in these 
districts in the Western and Far Eastern areas will require a focused agnculture strategy for these 
primarily hill regions, improvements in infrastructure and access, as wel l  as improvement in public 
services and empowerment through effective decentralization. Since agriculture i s  at the heart o f  these 
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issues, a strategy for  lagging regions i s  discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. More  broadly though, the 
mitigation o f  the conflict will depend on Nepal’s ability to restart growth o f  incomes and employment. 
D. Policy Lessons f r o m  the Sources o f  G r o w t h  
16. Seen from a long term perspective what are the policy lessons that can be drawn from Nepal’s 
growth experience? The stylized facts o f  Nepal’s growth experience are i t s  l o w  average growth rate for 
the past 35 years (1.7% growth p.a. in per capita incomes, the lowest in S. Asia); the sharp acceleration 
that took place between 1985 and 2001 (2.5%) compared to the previous twenty years (0.6%); and the 
muted impact o f  growth on poverty reduction until the mid-1990s. The two proximate explanatory factors 
are l o w  growth o f  the large agriculture sector and productivity. Growth in both cases improved and 
accelerated after 1985, and especially after 1995 in the case o f  agriculture. The underlying factor behind 
this acceleration was policy reforms that took place, starting in 1985, and then deepened, albeit haltingly, 
in the 1990s. 
17. Improvement in Agricultural Performance and Diversification. I n  sectoral terms, the most 
notable feature has been that per-capita agricultural value added has been flat over the thirty-jhe year 
span of 1965-2OOZ. During this period, aggregate GDP grew at just over 4%, the non-agriculture sector 
grew by 5.9%, whi le agriculture sector grew by 2.5%, i.e. roughly the same as population growth rate. 
Given that the importance o f  agnculture in Nepal’s economy - accounting for more than two-thirds o f  
value added in the beginning of the period and more than ha l f  o f  value added on average - i t s  slower rate 
of growth dragged down overall per-capita growth rates. Further, given that 86% o f  the labor force was 
employed in agriculture on average during this period, this also helps to explain the persistence o f  poverty 
until wel l  into the mid-1990s. Conversely, when annual agriculture growth accelerated to 3.7% in the 
second ha l f  o f  the 1990s, or about 1.5% p.a. in per-capita terms, this combined with remittances by 
Nepalese labor abroad, i s  associated with an appreciable drop in rural consumption poverty according to  
preliminary estimates.’ 
18. First, inadequate infrastructure 
development - the lack o f  roads and access to markets and irrigation - raises input and technology costs, 
lowers output prices and dampens commercialization and incentives for growth. The lack o f  infrastructure 
particularly lowers incentives for hills agnculture. Second, the consistent under-funding o f  public 
investment in agriculture and related infrastructure.8 Third, the pol icy environment with restrictions on 
private supply o f  agncultural inputs due to the monopoly position o f  the Agricultural Inputs Corporation 
until 1997 hindered the supply o f  affordable high-yielding inputs. Finally, agriculture sector terms o f  
trade fel l  for most o f  this period, excepting towards the end o f  the 1980s and the second h a l f  o f  1 9 9 0 ~ . ~  
19. Trends in Productivity. Another factor behind low growth in Nepal has been the low growth of 
productivity. Aggregate productivity actually declined in the f i rs t  two decades since 1965 as investments 
on less competitive non-tradable sectors such as construction dominated economic activity. Af ter  
liberalization and stabilization reforms started in 1985 productivity increased significantly by more than 
1.3% point p.a. i.e. from -0.8% in the previous period to 0.5% (see Table 1.5, below). lo Thus, the growth 
in productivity can explain al l  o f  the acceleration o f  GDP growth. 
The reasons for low agriculture growth are the following. 
’ 
* See discussion below in Section E o f  this chapter. Sharma, Shiva and Sonali Deraniyagala, “Agricultural Reforms and the Performance o f  Agriculture”, Chapter 5, in 
Macroeconomics ofPoverty Reduction: The Case Study ofNepal, UNDP, UN House. 
Terms o f  trade movements have been measured via the changes in the ratio o f  agriculture to non-agriculture deflator. Note 
other studies also support this picture o f  the movement in the terms o f  trade. 
The acceleration o f  growth in total factor productivity since the 1990s or the second ha l f  o f  the 1980s and onwards is  found 
by  a number o f  papers using different methodologies: e.g. Khatiwada, Y.R., Suman K. Sharma, Vikash R. Satyal, Ram S. 
Kharel, “Nepal Sources o f  Economic Growth”, Institute for Integrated Development Studies, Nepal, 2002, Table 4.2. , 
Bajracharya, P. and Bajracharya, S. “Total Factor Productivity Growth in Nepal: An Estimate, Economic Journal of 
lo 
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Table 1.5 Growth of Factors and Their Contribution 
Growth Rate Contribution of Growth Rates 
GDP TFP Capital Human Capital Human Capital Labor 
Capital 
1972-1 985 4.2 -0.8 3.3 1.7 6.8 3.3 2.5 
1985-2001 4.9 0.5 2.7 1.7 5.7 3.3 2.5 
1972-2001 4.6 -0.1 3.0 1.7 6.2 3.3 2.5 
Source: Estimates by A. Ahsan, and B. Karmacharya, "Explaining Nepal's Growth", 2004, mimeo. 
20. Why did productivity growth accelerate in the 1990s? Empirical analysis o f  the determinants o f  
growth and productivity suggests the following: the adjustment o f  real effective exchange rates, current 
account liberalization, stabilization as indicated by higher foreign exchange reserves for needed imports, 
and an improvement in the terms of trade, al l  contributed to higher productivity. Trade policy reforms that 
took place steadily over the decade opened the economy to greater competition and exports, while at the 
same time facilitated the imports o f  raw materials and capital goods. Whi le diff icult to capture 
quantitatively, productivity in the 1990s should have also increased in response to regulatory and banlung 
sector reforms that increased factor mobi l i ty  in both real and financial capital. Agriculture sector reforms 
liberalized private sector trade in both agricultural inputs and outputs. 
21. Policy and Institutional Factors. A third insight to the sources of Nepal's growth comes from the 
policy and institutional variables, drawing on the results of more than a decade of research on 
determinants of growth across countries. A good summary o f  the results o f  this research l i s t s  the major 
variables that have affected growth across time and across countries as presented in a variety o f  papers." 
Using this framework, the acceleration o f  per capita growth rates in Nepal f rom 1.1 % during 1972-1985 
to  2.5% during 1985-2001 i s  explained by good fiscal management, financial deepening, and openness o f  
the economy. Conversely, inadequate investments in transport and communications and exchange rate 
overvaluation lowered growth. Chapter 3 discusses developments in these areas. 
E. Poverty Reduction and Millennium Development Goals 
22. There was reduction in poverty but progress was delayed and uneven. During the mid 1990s to  
2001, there has been a significant reduction in poverty indicated by an increase in consumption, in the 
ownership o f  household durables and improvements in human development indicators.'* Rural per capita 
consumption growth appears to have been "pro-poor" in the sense that i t increased more for those in the 
lower d e ~ i l e s ' ~ .  The sources o f  growth in this period, agricultural incomes and remittances from labor, 
could account for the relatively equitable pattern o f  growth. Yet, it i s  noteworthy that inequality between 
the regions has persisted with the mid- and far- Western regions continuing to lag behind. (see B o x  1.2). 
The prevailing social structure, which excludes certain ethnic communities and "low caste" dalits has 
adverse impacts on both poverty reduction and empowerment. A mixed picture emerging with respect to 
Development Issues, 2002, and Ahsan, A. and B. Karmacharya, Explaining Nepal's Growth Performance, Mimeo, World 
Bank, 2004. 
Sources: From World Bank Growth website, downloaded in 2003. 
T h e  evidence comes from the Rural Household Consumption Survey o f  2001, the Demographic household survey of  2001, 
and the preliminary analysis o f  the partial sample from the Nepal Living Standard Survey o f  2003104. A cross-check on the 
robustness of these results is provided by a detailed analysis offood consumption, ownership of durables, and household 
amenities. In FYOl rural households consumed 30% more eggs, 17% more milk, twice as much oil, more vegetables, fruit, 
meat (40%), and fish (60%) than in FY96. Consumption o f  foodgrains, which can be seen as "inferior goods", declined 
slightly. Encouragingly, consumption of  higher-quality food items increased equally or more for people in the bottom four 
deciles of the consumption distribution than for the better-off. Similarly a higher percentage of  households owns radios, 
televisions, telephones, and bicycles 
Note: The figure refers to per capita consumption adjusted for temporal price changes and spatial price differences, with the 
Eastern Terai region being the numeraire. For details, see Lanjouw, Prennushi, and Zaidi (1998) and Prennushi (2004). Data 
sources: 1995196 NLSS I and 2000101 NRHCS. 
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the l ikelihood of Nepal achieving MDGs and underscores that growth must be maintained and service 
delivery must improve to raise achievements. 
23. Significant improvements appear to have taken place in al l  agro-climatic belts and regions, but 
the regional ranking does not seem to have changed. The Western part of the country and the mountains 
remain poorer than the Eastern part.I4 The rural eastern Terai (which comprises the Terai belt of the 
Eastern and Central Development Regions) i s  the area where improvements in consumption levels seem 
most significant. 
Increase in Real Consumption in Rural Nepal 
1995-96 2000-01 
Real per capita 
consumption consumption 
By Area FY96 prices FY96 prices % increase p.a. 
'All rural 5938 6934 3.1% 
Real per capita 
Subjective Perceptions of Poverty 
Mountains 5564 6498 3.1% 
Hills 6095 6734 2.0% 
Terai 5867 71 82 4.1% 
Using survey-based food prices (cumulative increase: 50% over five years) 
,Source: RHCS 2001 
(% of respondents) 199596 2003-04 
To the question during the last month, did your family have 
less than adequate consumption of : 
Western Hills 5316 6214 3.2% 
'Eastern Hills 6771 721 7 1.3% 
~ Western Terai 5444 6245 2.8% 
Eastern Terai 6111 7746 4.9% 
Food 51 32 
Housing 64 41 
Clothing 58 36 
Health Care 59 28 
Children's Schooling 45 21 
During the last month, did your family have 
less than adequate total income : 
73 67 
Source: NLSS I & II 
l4 For an analysis of regional differences based on the 1995/96 Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS I) see the 1998 Poverty 
Assessment (World Bank, 1998) and Prennushi (1999), as well as CBS (1996, 1997). 
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24. These improvements in 
economic well-being are 
mirrored by improvements in 
some social indicators." Data 
from the Nepal Demographic 
and Health Surveys o f  1996 
and 2001 indicate a decline in 
a l l  three malnutrition indicators 
in rural areas: height-for-age, 
weight-for-height, and weight- 
for-age. Infant mortality 
declined f rom 78.5 to 64.4 and 
chi ld mortality fkom 118.3 to 
91.2 per thousand. The total 
fertility rate went down from 
4.6 children per woman to 4.1. 
School attendance increased as 
well, encouragingly more for 
girls than for boys. Some 
Table 1.6 Comparative Human Development Indicators in Four South Asian Countries 
Nepal Bangladesh Pakistan India 
GDP Per Capita PPP 1350 1720 1940 2570 
Child malnutrition (%) 48.3 47.7 38.2 46.7 
Access to safe water (% pop.) 88.0 97.0 90.0 84.0 
Access to sanitation (% pop.) 28.0 48.0 62.0 28.0 
Net primary enrollment ratio 82.2 86.6 66.9 83.3 
% of cohort reaching grade 5 -male 57.2 63.4 59.2 
% of cohort reaching grade 5 -female 69.2 67.8 58.7 
Total fertility rate 4.2 3.0 4.5 2.9 
Maternal mortality ratio 539.0 380.0 500.0 540.0 
%of  births attended by skilled health staff 10.9 11.6 20.0 42.5 
Net primary enroll. ratio gap (M-F) 8.7 -1.8 19.8 15.0 
Secondary school pupils - % females 41 .O 49.7 39.5 39.6 
Under-5 mortality rate 83.0 73.0 101.0 90.0 
Life expectancy at birth, female 59.6 62.7 65.1 64.2 
Source: World Bank, PREM DEC Indicators Data Base. Nepal data has been updated for primary 
enrollment and maternal mortality. 
I 
human development indicators have improved to a point where they are now comparable to those in other 
richer South Asian countries (see Table 1.6 above). But there i s  n o  assurance at a l l  that these gains can be 
sustained without restarting growth. 
F. Accounting for Poverty Trends 
25. A full confirmation and explanation of these trends wi l l  need to wait for the analysis of the 
nationally representative sample of the NLSS I .  which is now ongoing. Nevertheless, three factors can 
help to explain a large part o f  the reduction o f  poverty. The agriculture sector grew at a much faster pace 
between F Y 9 6  and FYOl than before, remittances from Nepalese abroad grew by 30% p.a. and the 2001 
Census showed slower-than-forecast population growth over the previous decade.16 
26. The last two-and-a-halfyears have been difJicult for Nepal. The worldwide recession in 2002 and 
2003 and a more restrictive trade treaty with India weakened demand for Nepal's exports and domestic 
pol icy uncertainty have contributed to a reduction in income growth. The domestic security situation 
worsened considerably, diverting scarce human, financial, and managerial resources to  defense. As a 
result, growth has declined sharply and per capita income level in 2004 i s  less than what i t was in 2001. 
The increase in consumption by the poor could have been reversed. Above al l  the worsened security 
situation has been the dominant factor for the poor performance and i t s  resolution i s  a must to restore 
growth and address poverty reduction. 
l5 
l6 
Th is  i s  noted also in the Tenth P l d o v e r t y  Reduction Strategy Paper 2002-2007 (HMG, 2003) for the Ninth Plan, which 
covers FY98-02. 
The  population growth rate between 1991 and 2001 was 2.27%, based on the 2001 Population Census, lower than the 2.4% 
that had been projected on the basis o f  earlier trends (CBS, 1994). 
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G. Social Exclusion 
27. Poverty reduction and human development in Nepal in the 1990s is marred by continuing social 
exclusion of women and ethnic and caste groups. There i s  considerable evidence that in Nepal social 
exclusion has a major influence on poverty outcomes. In addition to location, social identity in terms o f  
caste, ethnicity and gender also continues to influence access to assets, opportunity and representation. 
Women and people from “ low caste” and disadvantaged indigenous groups have a significantly higher 
risk of having lower human development indicators and o f  falling below the poverty l ine  than other social 
groups. 
28. Gender disparities are wide in Nepal. Govemment efforts have been focused on empowering 
women, but gender-based social exclusion remains strong. In terms o f  consumption poverty, since 
consumption i s  measured at the household rather than at the individual level, i t  i s  diff icult to establish 
directly that women as a group are poorer than men. However, household survey data show that women 
receive lower wages in comparable jobs with males, spend less on self-consumption and have litt le or n o  
access to credit. The majority s t i l l  does not eam an identifiable individual income; women’s basic needs 
are generally met f rom pooled family income, but married women are conditioned to eat last. By social 
circumstances, women consume less of any available “luxury” foods, such as meat. 
29. Human development indicators continue to show gender disparities even though Nepal has made 
rapid progress in reducing maternal mortality rates and increasing female life expectancy as well as 
improving female literacy levels and years of schooling. At the aggregate level, female l i fe  expectancy 
surpassed that o f  males and Nepal i s  n o  longer among those few countries in the wor ld  where men outlive 
women; but in rural areas (especially in the hills and mountains) women s t i l l  die earlier than men. And 
despite the improvement in female educational indicators the large gender gaps in literacy and years o f  
schooling remain (Table 1.7). 
Table 1.7 Gender Disparities in Key Human Development Indicators, 1996 and 2000 
Life Expectancy (years) Adult Literacy (Yo) Average School Going Years 
1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Mountain 52.7 50.4 48.6 51.1 44.2 11.8 61.9 26.6 2.27 0.71 3.71 1.33 
Hill 58.0 55.5 65.4 64.7 58.4 24.3 72.3 39.5 3.42 1.61 3:97 2.18 
Terai 59.5 57.0 61.7 63.2 52.3 19.9 60.2 32.5 3.10 1.25 3.71 1.93 
Urban 63.2 60.3 71.4 70.8 76.7 51.5 81.2 56.9 5.63 3.88 6.01 3.80 
Rural 53.7 51.3 58.2 59.3 52.0 19.5 63.6 32.3 2.93 1.15 3.40 1.66 
Nepal 55.0 52.4 59.3 59.8 54.3 21.3 65.8 35.4 2.55 1.13 4.45 2.25 
~ ~ - 
Source: Nepal Human Development Reports, 1996 and 2001, 
30. I n  terms of empowerment, Nepali women are still largely without voice and influence in the 
public domain. Their representation in Nepal’s influential c iv i l  service and in al l  three levels o f  elected 
government lags far behind men’s: women make up somewhat less than 8 percent o f  the overall staff o f  
the c iv i l  service and only 4 percent o f  the officer level staff, lower than other South Asian countries. 
Women are also under-represented in Nepal’s elected government. Af ter  the last elections they made up 
only about 6 percent of the lower house and 15 percent o f  the upper house (where some o f  the seats can 
be nominated by the King). In the lower District and Vil lage level bodies, women have even less voice. 
3 1. Caste and ethnicity-based disparities are widely prevalent. At the top o f  the social hierarchy are 
the priestly Bahuns or Brahmins, the warrior or ru le r  Chetris or Kshatriya, closely followed by the 
Newars or the people from the Kathmandu valley. The indigenous peoples o f  Nepal, many o f  whom l i ve  
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in the middle or high hills were assigned the middle rung. The indigenous groups who call themselves 
Janajati are at the middle group. Below them are ranked the occupational castes called the Dalit, meaning 
literally “the oppressed”. Janajatis and Dalits make up a considerable proportion o f  Nepal’s population: 
some 3 1  and 16 percent respectively.” Table 1.8 reports Human Development Indicators for these 
different groups and shows that, on every indicator, Janajati groups fal l  below the national average and 
well below the Brahmins, Chetris and the Newars, and the situation o f  the Hill Dalits i s  even worse. 
Table 1.8 Human Development by Caste and Ethnicity 
~ 
Human Dev. 
Indicators 
Life expectancy (yrs) 
Adult literacy (%) 
Mean yrs schooling 
Per capita income (NR) 
Per capita PPP (US$) 
1, Life expectancy index 
2, Educational 
attainment index 
3. Income index 
Human Dev. Index 
Ratio of national HDI 
Average 
Nepal 
55.0 
36.7 
2.3 
7,673 
1,186 
0.500 
0.295 
0.179 
0.325 
100 
Bahunl 
Brahmin 
60.8 
58.0 
4.7 
9,921 
1,533 
0.597 
0.490 
0.237 
0.441 
135.9 
Chhetri Newar 
0.181 0.289 
-- I 
Source: ESP, “A Strategy to Empower Nepal’s Disadvantaged Groups”, Document 
from the Nepal Human Development Report, NESAC, 1999. 
Hill 
Janajatis 
53.0 
35.2 
2.0 
6,607 
1,021 
0.467 
0.280 
0.152 
0.299 
92.2 
Hill 
Dalit 
50.3 
23.8 
1.2 
4,940 
764 
0.422 
0.186 
0.1 10 
0.239 
73.6 
- 
- 
page 7 (based on data 
32. Even relatively well off ethnic groups lack access to power. Some Janajati groups l ike the 
Gurungs, Magars and Rais who traditionally went for army service in the Indian or British army have 
higher educational and income indicators as do groups l ike the Thakali and Sherpas who have done wel l  
in trading, tourism and other businesses. But in terms o f  empowerment, neither Janajati nor Dalits have 
been very successful in joining the c iv i l  service. 
H. Progress towards the MDGs 
33 .  The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a set of goals on poverty reduction, education, 
health, and the environment, that the international community agreed to try to achieve by the year 201.5.” 
For each goal, indicators have been selected and numerical targets to be achieved by 2015 have been set. 
The Nepal Tenth P l a f l o v e r t y  Reduction Strategy 2002-2007 also contains a set o f  targets for 2007 for 
some o f  these indicators. Table 1.9 presents selected indicators with baseline data and targets. 
” Not surprisingly there i s  considerable controversy about these figures and different data sources - as well as different 
interest groups - give different figures. We have used the 2001 Census figures. I t  may be better to think o f  the Janajatis as 
making up 3 1 to 37 percent of the population and the Dalits accounting for between 12 and 16 percent - though certain Dalit 
organizations claim 20 percent o f  the population. 
T h e  MDGs come from the Millennium Declaration, which was signed by 150 heads o f  state at the Millennium Summit in 
New York in September 2000. T h e  MDGs draw on the agreement reached at the UN global conferences o f  the 1990s. 
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Table 1.9 MDGlPRSP Selected Indicators 
PRSP’ loth MDG target 1990 mid-1990s 2ooo 
Poverty and malnutrition 
Population below national poverty line 
Prevalence of child malnutrition (% of children under 3 years of age whose 
weight-for-age is low) 
Universal primary education 
Net primary enrollment ratio (% of relevant age group) (survey data) 
Net primary enrollment ratio (% of relevant age group) (MOES data) 
Gender equality 
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%) 
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education (GER %) (MOES data) 
Ratio of girls to boys in lower sec. education (GER YO) (MOES data) 
Ratio of girls to boys in higher sec. education (GER %) (MOES data) 
Life expectancy (note: PRSP, not MDG indicator) 
Adult literacy (15+) (note: PRSP, not MDG indicator) 
Average years of schooling (note: PRSP, not MDG indicator) 
Infant and child mortality 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000) 
Share of I-yr-old children immunized against measles 
Maternal mortality 
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) 
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) 
Reproductive health 
Contraceptive prevalence rate (% or women ages 15-49) 
Environment 
- 
57 
- 
644 
564 
414 
161.1 
7.42 
24.12 
42’ 
46.92 
57’ 
78.52 
11 8.32 
452 
53Ci2 
28A2 
- 
43.62 
65.83 
82.4 
863 
864 
814 
X4 
64.42 
91.22 
63.62 
1 32 
38.g2 
30 
- 
90 
90 
- 
- 
- 
__ 
65 
63 
- 
45 
72 
300 
__ 
47 
20 
28.5 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
- 
- 
- 
54 
100 
_- 
- 
- 
Access to an improved water source (% of population) 462 802 85 100 
Source: Source 1 is NLSS I,; 2. Nepal Family Health Survey and DHSs, 3. BCHIMES, 4. MOES data are for 2002. Cells where the source is 
not given (and are not targets) are from the UNDP MDG country report. See: CBS (1996); HMGIMOH, New ERA and ORC Macro (2002); CBS 
and UNICEF (2001); HMGlMOES (2002); and UNDP (2002). 
34. As discussed earlier, sufficiently fast progress has been made with some indicators to achieve the 
MDG target on current trends in those areas. Figure 1.5, at the end o f  this chapter, presents projections 
based on extrapolating linearly the trends o f  the second ha l f  o f  the 1990s whi le i t s  implications are 
summarized in the next paragraph. But these trends may not be sustained if growth were to falter, service 
delivery remained disrupted due to conflict, and social exclusion continued. Further, in general, it 
becomes progressively more diff icult to raise human development indicators as the poorer groups are 
harder to reach. 
35. 
follows: 
With these qualifications, the prospects for  achieving the MDG targets can be summarized as 
0 The poverty target may be achieved, while the target o f  halving malnutrition would not, despite 
recent progress. 
The education targets may or may not  be achieved, as current trends vary by data source. 
According to the Ministry o f  Education and Sports data, the target o f  universal net primary 
enrollment would be reached on current trends; according to household survey data, i t would not. 
Further, given that many o f  the out-of-school children are f rom socially excluded groups, 
reaching them will require extra efforts. 
0 
13 
0 
0 
0 
e 
0 
36. 
The gender education equality indicators would be met, according to M O E S  data. 
The infant and chi ld mortality targets may be achievable, but projecting current trends out to 20 15 
i s  not  very reliable in this case because improvements become more diff icult as rates decline. The 
vaccination targets could be achieved; the percentage o f  children aged 12-23 months who are 
fully immunized by 12 months o f  age (which i s  an intermediate indicator for infant and child 
health) has increased, according to the N D H S s ,  f rom 36 percent in 1996 to  60 percent in 2001.’’ 
Data on maternal mortality are not sufficient to assess l ikelihood o f  achievement. 
The PRSP target o f  contraceptive prevalence (47%) may be achieved (there i s  no set MDG target 
for this indicator). Note that there was an acceleration in the diffusion o f  modem contraceptive 
methods in the second ha l f  o f  the 1990s compared to the f i rs t  ha l f  (based on NDHS data), as 
evidenced in the greater slope o f  the second segment o f  the l ine in chart 6. 
The target for  access to drinking water (100%) may be achieved given the current definition o f  
access to water. But water quality has declined due to lack o f  maintenance o f  drinlung water 
facilities, so the data would need to be revised. Universal access to safe water i s  unlikely to be 
attained unless measures are taken to improve maintenance alongside coverage. 
I. Summingup 
At the end of this period of nearly two decades of betterpe$ormance, four outcomes stand out as 
policy issues. First, overall growth rates were neither fast enough to  make a significant dent on poverty 
until the second ha l f  o f  the 1990s, nor could they be sustained as per capita income fel l  over the past three 
years. Growth has to be restarted and accelerated. Even a respectable 2.5% per-capita economic growth 
between 1985 and 2001 has not been able to increase per-capita incomes significantly or reduce poverty 
measurably. The improvement in poverty reduction indicated by the N L S S  I1 data would have reversed 
after 2003. Second, economic growth was uneven across different regions and for a long while excluded 
agriculture. Growth has to  be more pro-poor and spatially even by focusing o n  agriculture and lagging 
regions. Despite plans to the contrary, investment in infrastructure in the poorer and lagging Western 
regions fe l l  considerably short o f  targets resulting in lower economic opportunities. Over-centralization o f  
government in an ethnically and culturally diverse country also meant that service delivery was poor in 
the remote regions. A violent insurgency, which spread across Nepal, has planted i t s  base firmly in those 
remote Western regions. I t  provides a substantial threat to further progress in pol icy reform, service 
delivery and effective govemance in general. On the other hand, deepening economic reforms, providing 
greater opportunities to the socially excluded and improved service delivery to  a l l  groups and parts o f  the 
country are the essential ingredients for a return to economic, polit ical and social progress and stability. 
37. Third, unless appropriate policies and adjustments are made, as discussed in other chapters in 
this review, to increase Nepal’s competitiveness and restore the investment climate, Nepal is unlikely to 
repeat even the modest achievements of the 1990s. A reversal o f  both income growth and human 
development i s  more l ikely. But most important, the current conflict and polit ical uncertainty have to be 
resolved or at least significantly mitigated as it i s  severely taxing economic activity, development, and 
threatening the gains o f  the last two decades. 
38. Fourth, social exclusion had a major, adverse, influence on poverty outcomes and empowerment. 
In addition to location, social identity in terms o f  caste, ethnicity and gender also continues to  influence 
access to assets, opportunity and representation. Women and people f rom “low caste” and disadvantaged 
indigenous groups have a significantly higher risk o f  having lower human development indicators and o f  
l 9  Note that the MDG indicator i s  vaccination against measles, but separate data on this vaccination are not consistently 
available. 
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falling below the poverty l ine  than other social groups. Even relatively wel l  o f f  ethnic groups lack access 
to power. Neither the Janajati nor Dalits have been notably successful in joining the c iv i l  service or 
gaining elected office. With respect to the attainment o f  MDG, progress has been made in some areas but 
not  in others. Thus while halving of poverty could be achieved (by restarting growth) but not halving o f  
malnutrition; whi le  the education target may be achieved but not the coverage o f  children from 
disadvantaged groups; the target for drinking water could be achieved but water quality will remain poor. 
But even these achievements may not be sustained if growth were to falter, service delivery remained 
disrupted due to conflict, and social exclusion continued. 
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Figure 1.5 Trends and Projections of Millennium Development Goals 
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CHAPTER 2: IMPROVING MACROECONOMIC POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY 
REDUCTION 
A. Introduction: The Challenge of Restoring Growth 
1. Afer attaining a per capita income growth rate of 2.6% in the 1990s, Nepal’s per-capita fel l  by - 
0.5% between 2001 and 2003. While a modest recovery i s  underway, per-capita income in 2004 will s t i l l  
not  be restored to  i t s  2001 level. The medium term outlook i s  cloudy. A violent insurgency covers large 
parts o f  the country and imposes steep costs on economic activity. Alongside the forthcoming rescinding 
o f  the MFA, Nepal’s significant loss in the global market share o f  carpets and garments in recent years 
indicates Nepal’s slipping position in an increasingly competitive global economy. I t  i s  clear from the 
discussion o f  the sources of growth in Chapter 1, Nepal - a small open economy, highly dependent o n  
trade and exports -- will need important policy adjustments to increase trade and competitiveness to 
restore growth. Restoring economic growth rates to the trend o f  the 1990s, l e t  alone achieving the 10” 
Plan/PRSP’s target per-capita growth rate o f  4% and i t s  human development goals, will be a formidable 
challenge. 
2. Sustained poverty reduction and human development, however, wi l l  require going one step 
further than just raising mean incomes: it wi l l  require a pro-poor pattern of growth, i.e. one, which raises 
incomes of poorer deciles, through higher agricultural incomes, j ob  creation, and wages. I t  wil l mean 
providing opportunities and better public services in Nepal’s Western regions where the poor are 
disproportionately located. It wil l also require a special focus o n  Dal i t  (“the oppressed”) and Janajati 
(indigenous) groups who lag systematically behind in human development (See Chapter 1). Finally, the 
experience o f  the 1990s also suggests that a pro-poor growth strategy will need to reduce income 
volatility as these have asymmetrically adverse effects on the poor. Towards these ends government 
strategy has to focus o n  fiscal, trade, and economic management issues 
B. The Government’s Strategy and Policy Issues 
3 .  The Government’s I O t h  Five Year Plan, whose summary is Nepal’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, 
makes the achievement of broad-based growth, especially in the rural economy, one of the key pillars for 
achieving its targets. Nepal’s development policy agenda i s  wel l  articulated in Nepal’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (PRSP). I t  lays out a coherent four-pillar strategy consisting of: “i) broad based 
growth with special emphasis on agriculture; ii) accelerating human development through renewed 
emphasis on effective delivery o f  basic social services and economic infrastructure; iii) ensuring social 
and economic inclusion of the poor, marginalized groups and backward regions; and iv) vigorously 
pursuing good governance both as a means of delivering better development results and to ensure social 
and economic justice.” The strategy i s  wel l  anchored in a medium term fiscal framework that focuses 
resources on human development and physical infrastructure. 
4. I n  sectoral terms, the strategy envisages that more than 3/4‘h of growth wil l  come from the non- 
agriculture sector, but also a robust agriculture sector growth of 4%p.a. A “quick rebound” o f  economic 
activity fo l lowing peace and especially o f  non-agriculture sectors such as manufacturing, exports, 
construction and tourism wil l account for the growth of the private sector. The recovery o f  private sector 
investment (rising to 19% of GDP by 2007, compared to 12% currently) and trade and exports will lead 
the way to growth. Public investments in power, roads, and telecommunications are the instruments for  
encouraging private sector investment. In the rural sector, the implementation o f  the Agricultural 
Perspective Plan (APP), including ensuring the supply o f  fertilizer, irrigation, and the development o f  
livestock, horticulture and high value crops in the hill regions wil l dnve agriculture growth. Expansion of  
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rural roads, electricity and marketing networks, expansion and rehabilitation o f  irrigation networks and 
small-scale surface irrigation schemes in the hill regions wil l  be the drivers behind agricultural growth. 
1991- 1997- 
1996 2001 2000 2001 2002 2003 
(% of GDP) 
,Deficit (-) or Surplus (incl. Grants) -5.4 -4.0 -3.5 4.5 -6.2 -1.6 
Deficit (-) or Surplus (excl. Grants) -7.0 -5.7 -5.0 -6.1 -8.3 -3.7 
Revenue 9.3 10.2 10.7 11.4 9.3 12.4 
Grants Received 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.1 
Expenditure 16.7 16.4 15.7 17.5 17.2 16.1 
Financing 
Domestic borrowing (net) 1.9 1.4 0.9 2.7 4.8 0.9 
Foreign borrowing (net) 3.5 2.7 2.6 1.8 1.4 0.7 
5. But the PRSP depicts this picture somewhat broadly. First, the strategies for  accelerating growth 
need more specificity. Second, policies need to be better prioritized. Another challenge will be to improve 
the institutions o f  economic management for better policy coordination along with improving monitoring 
so that mid-course corrections in policies could be made. Based on this, this review focuses on three key 
pol icy issues: (i) the strategy for restarting and accelerating growth, with especial emphasis on trade and 
agriculture as two  key policy levers; (ii) improving public service delivery and governance; and (iii) 
strengthening social protection and inclusion policies. The rest o f  this chapter focuses on three strategic 
issues: fiscal management to raise resources and use them effectively for development, external sector 
policies to increase competitiveness and trade, and strengthening institutions for improving economic 
management, including aid coordination. 
C. Fiscal and Fiduciary Management Issues 
6. Nepal’s fiscal management has been prudent in the 1990s (Table 2.1). Aggregate public sector 
debt has been relatively stable at 
around the 66% of GDP, though 
mainly because o f  negative growth in 
GDP in 2002 i t  increased to 69% in 
recent years. The share o f  short-term 
debt in public debt i s  less than 1% and 
debt servicing i s  about 1.5% o f  GDP. 
Analysis o f  public debt dynamics 
shows public debt to GDP ratios to 
fall rapidly in the next four years f rom 
68% o f  GDP to around 54% o f  GDP 
by 2007, under relatively modest 
growth assumptions, l o w  interest rates 
(negative real interest rates for public 
borrowing on top o f  large volume o f  
grant financing) and a declining share 
o f  gross external financing need. A 
variety of stress tests suggest that, 
short o f  a major depreciation, public 
debt to GDP ratios wi l l  be contained 
to 60% o f  GDP or less.20 
Debt 
Domestic debt 
Foreign debt 
15.0 13.8 14.3 14.6 17.4 
64.7 64.0 64.6 63.7 69.6 66. 
49.7 50.2 50.2 49.1 52.1 48. 
Public Savings (From NAS) 0.7 1.0 1.1 0.2 0.2 0,81 
Source: IFS and IMF. 
7. But three major challenges to fiscal stability have emerged. These are contingent liabilities in the 
financial sector and possibly hidden ones in the public enterprise sector, the growing pension obligation, 
and the l o w  tax collection. First, the most significant contingent l iabil i ty threat comes f rom the financial 
sector. The two large wholly or  partly owned Govemment banks have a negative net worth o f  around 7% 
o f  GDP. Additional liabilities also arise f rom the need to restructure the Agricultural Development Bank 
of Nepal. Thus a clear fiscal priority i s  that these Banks be restructured and privatized in an orderly 
manner and with external help, as otherwise these liabilities can increase the fiscal burden by as much as 
10% o f  GDP - or roughly of the same order as tax revenue collection. A related issue here i s  the need to  
improve management of public enterprises. Currently, public enterprises (PES) in Nepal, unlike in other 
2o IMF, Nepal - Staff Report for the 2003 Article IV  Consultations, August, 2003, Table 5. 
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South Asian countries, have l imi ted borrowing requirements o f  less than 1% o f  GDP. Whi le there are 
known contingent liabilities in the form o f  overdue wages, pension contributions, severance pay and other 
benefits that amount to $300 mi l l ion or 4.5 % o f  GDP, they are more than offset by assets estimated to be 
worth more than $1.2 bil l ion. However, the poor quality o f  auditing o f  these enterprises and delays in 
producing financial reports suggests that dangers may be lurking. 
8. The second challenge to fiscal sustainability is posed by the rapid growth in pension liabilities. 
The pension bill in 2003-04 i s  close to Rs. 3.3 billion, rising from 3.1 b i l l ion in 2002-03 excluding 
teachers’ pensions.21 This i s  financed directly f rom the budget and i s  n o w  more than 20 percent o f  
salaries and allowances. This fiscal burden will grow in the next decade due to the internal demographics 
of the different groups covered, the rapid turnover o f  mil itary and police personnel and the maturation o f  
the teachers’ scheme. Preliminary estimates o f  the unfunded pension l iabi l i ty  for  core c i v i l  servants only 
i s  close to 6 percent o f  GDP suggesting that the net-present value o f  the total l iabil i ty lies in the range o f  
10-15 percent o f  GDP, effectively implying that public debt i s  higher by this margin. As Chapter 6 
discusses, the Government has started formulating a reform plan that would introduce a contributory 
pension scheme and accumulated funds towards offsetting this liability. 
9. The third cause offiscal vulnerability is low revenue collection, which makes Nepal’s dependence 
on external assistance acute and constrains public services, growth and future revenues in a vicious 
circle. With a tax to GDP ratio o f  around 9% o f  GDP, Nepal’s tax effort is, (alongside Bangladesh), the 
lowest in the region. An indicative analysis o f  resource requirements for  MDG goals show there i s  a 
considerable resource shortfall in terms o f  requirements to meet the MDG (3 to 5% o f  GDP), which 
cannot be fully met by foreign assistance. Hence, raising revenues i s  a major priority. 
10. Nepal has made considerable progress with tax policy and administrative reforms in recent 
years. Overall revenue collection remains l o w  and two issues have to be addressed. First, improving tax 
administration to further strengthen the revenue effort and make the tax department more private sector 
friendly. The second i s  removing loopholes and price distortions arising f rom exemptions o f  some 
products and services and taxes and duties on others that create a bias against foreign trade. Some o f  these 
“other duties and charges” have to be removed over the medium term as part o f  Nepal’s entry agreement 
into the Wor ld  Trade Organization. Concerning administrative reforms, strengthening the administrative 
authority o f  the Director Generals o f  the IRD and the C D  over their staff are important next steps. 
Currently they have n o  authority over appointments and transfers at the officer levels and their 
operational budget (e.g. 0.8% o f  collection in the case o f  the Inland Revenue Department) i s  significantly 
lower in comparison to international norms (3 to 4% for developing countries) and need to be increased. 
11. Several expenditure issues remain to be addressed. First, on the allocation side there i s  an 
overemphasis o n  the development budget to  the detriment o f  operations and maintenance expenditures. 
Non-salary regular budget expenditures o n  road maintenance and education are much lower in 
comparison to needs (See Chapters 3 and 6 for more details). Within the development budget, the shift 
away from economic expenditures such as agnculture, irrigation, and transportation to social sectors and 
security and its possible adverse impact on growth prospects needs a crit ical scrutiny. Second, budget 
implementation i s  affected by unrealistically large development budgets that regularly fa l l  short in actual 
expenditures. 
12. The introduction of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) has also helped to better 
implement the development budget in a clear, prioritized expenditure framework in harmony with the 
PRSP, but there are several pending issues. First, the MTEF needs to  be extended to cover regular as wel l  
as development expenditures to  make it a truly program budget, which for  n o w  can be loosely tied to a 
’’ Tn is  excludes spending on teachers’ pensions, w h i c h  are no t  available immediate ly  
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parsimonious set o f  performance indicators. Second, a related issue i s  to improve the classification o f  
expenditures by reclassifying the regular and development expenditures into current and capital 
expenditures and present these together as integrated program budgets. Third, performance indicators 
need to gauge actual progress rather than just spending. Strengthening the MTEF through program 
budgets will also help to improve donor coordination, a high priority for Nepal. Fortunately, important 
progress has been made by the Government in this respect as presented in B o x  2.1 below. 
Box 2.1 Donor and Aid Harmonization Efforts 
Donor coordination i s  particularly important for Nepal given the large role aid plays in financing development. 
Accounting for 5% of GDP and more than a third of Govemment expenditures, aid affects budget realism, its execution and 
public expenditure effectiveness. 
Budget Implementation: T h e  availability of this funding can make or break a budget in any given year. Because aid decisions 
are often made without cooridinating it with the national budget, aid projections are necessarily based on indicative aid 
commitments and activities in the pipeline. Th is  results in budget unrealism. These projections consistently overestimate 
availability o f  aid money and in absence of domestic sources (domestic revenue and borrowing) to close the funding gap; budget 
underperformance averages 10 percent each year. This delays investment projects from being completed, resulting not only in 
lower benefits but also weakened accountability of ministries. Aggregate budget implementation i s  also adversely affected. In an 
environment where there i s  little or no revenue surplus, any shortfall in aid flow results into either more domestic borrowing or 
failure to implement budget activities, both having economic costs. 
Public Expenditure Effectiveness: A second issue is lack of aid coordination lowers public expenditure efectiveness. T h e  aid 
that Nepal receives finances a large number of projects and programs, widely dispersed across sectors, and, again, with inadequate 
coordination with the budget. As Nepalese Govemment agencies and institutions by themselves have little incentives to refuse 
aid, donor suggested projects get ad-hoc scrutiny, often taken place outside the budget, and without adequate accounting. This  
leads to a very high degree of aid fragmentation, estimated to be among the highest in the world, and a lowering of public 
expenditure effectiveness. 
What can the Government do about it? T h e  Govemment can use sector program budgets and the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework to integrate donor support more effectively into the budget cycle. Very recently, the Govemment has undertaken an 
important initiative to harmonize donor activities at program levels as well as on financial management aspects. On their side, 
donors need to commit to the discipline of financing programs only after the MTEF provides these priorities. 
The three tier Aid Harmonization Program: This process of improving aid coordination got a good boost during the the 
National Development Forum 2004, where development partners committed to align aid with the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework in a three-tier harmonization program. The main purpose of harmonization i s  
to improve aid effectiveness, reduce transaction costs of aid delivery, and better align aid with national strategies. The three broad 
levels of harmonization are: a. harmonization at the overall program level - aligning donor support with govemment’s own 
strategy and priorities underpinned by MTEF; b. harmonization at the individual program level - programmatic approach on a 
well thought out sectoral implementation plan and use of govemment’s own financial procedures and reporting system; c. 
harmonization at the financial modality level - movement away from the activity based budgets to program budgets that not only 
reduces transaction costs significantly but also gives the govemment greater flexibility to adjust budget to priorities. This strategy 
i s  being implemented through presenting five sectoral business plans in the first ever donor harmonization meeting to be held in 
early 2005 as part of FY 2006 budget preparation. 
Implementation Challenges: Implementation challenges remain however. Fiduciary concems, weak accountability and 
monitoring system, aid agencies’ need to identify their contributions during budget execution, low absorption capacity, and 
absence o f  sector strategy with prioritization of activities will be important challenges to implementing the harmonization plan. 
Donors have genuine concem about these issues and a reluctance to completely transfer to Government systems. Nevertheless, 
there i s  no clear evidence that direct involvement of development partners in project implementation have either enhanced 
sustainability or strengthened implementation capacity to better outcome results. T h e  answer to donors’ concems l ies in 
strengthening country’s existing institutions implementation capacity and expenditure management and service delivery reforms-- 
- owned and lead by the country. A patient implementation of the three tier approach will catalyze processes within the 
govemment to produce sound strategies (business plan), rational spending programs (MTEF) and effective services as highlighted 
in the World Development Report, 2004, Improving Public Sewices,for the Poor.  
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13. Fiduciary Management: Nepal‘s legal and regulatory framework for ensuring public financial 
management is good for a country at its level of economic development, but unsatisfactory 
implementation in the past as well as the current suspension of many of its provisions appears to be 
increasing irregularities. The Constitution and financial ru les requires the Ministry o f  Finance to submit a 
detailed comparison o f  the financial results and budgets; it also accords the Auditor General (AG) 
complete legal and professional independence. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) headed by a 
member o f  the main opposition party in Parliament used to be proactive, meeting year round, discussing 
public accounts and the Auditor General’s (AG) annual report and recommendations as wel l  as al l  aspects 
of public sector financial management. But more recently, the AG’s annual report, which used to receive 
a wide public coverage both through the PAC and the media, has not been released in the last two years. 
Annual reports for 2002 and 2003 were prepared in a timely fashion by the Auditor General, and were 
forwarded to H i s  Majesty the King, as required by the Constitution. But these reports n o w  remain shelved 
perhaps due to the absence o f  parliament without any public disclosure and reports are that the volume o f  
irregularities had increased. In addition to the suspension o f  financial rules, weak compliance o f  financial 
management ru les  due to l o w  penalties, the lack o f  financial management trained personnel, and 
inadequate monitoring o f  actual implementation undermines financial management. Another pending 
issue i s  for the government to reform procurement laws to increase efficiency and transparency in 
procurement. 
D. External Sector Issues 
14. With a trade to GDP ratio of about 50% and external remittances now accounting for 12% of 
GDP the role of the external sector is, after agriculture, the most important for growth and poverty 
reduction in Nepal. While trade pol icy reforms led to the reduction in tar i f f  rates f rom 32% in the early 
1990s to around 14% in 200022 new duties and charges were added in the last three years to raise nominal 
protection to around 18%. However, it i s  noteworthy that there has been a nearly complete dismantling o f  
quantitative restrictions. These reforms combined with achieving current account convertibility, easing 
entry, and the benefits o f  pegging o f  the Nepalese rupee to the Indian rupee led  to rapid export growth at 
15% per annum in the 1990s. Consequently, Nepal doubled i ts  share in global exports while exports 
became more diversified as the share o f  manufactures increased to 66% f rom 30%. The growth o f  
remittances in recent years and the rise in tourism earnings helped to  increase the current account position 
and reserves. The growth o f  foreign exchange earnings enabled steady increase in the imports o f  capital 
goods at a steady annual rate o f  10% per annum. 
15. Some trade policy reforms remain pending. First, one feature o f  Nepal’s tar i f f  structure i s  that it 
has cascading rates. That is, tar i f f  rates are higher, the higher the level o f  processing. This creates a bias 
against high value added activities, which means that in a labor abundant economy, a cascading tar i f f  
structure discriminates against employment. I t  i s  also t rue that raising domestic value added through 
opposite means (i.e. having lower tariffs on l o w  levels o f  value added and high tariffs o n  high value added 
activities) can be equally distortionary and go against the country’s comparative advantage. Second, 
exports continue to be disadvantaged due to the bias inherent in import tariffs not  adequately off-set 
through duty drawback and easier customs procedures. The passbook scheme for duty drawbacks i s  not  
working well. In fact some exporters do not even claim duty drawback o n  their imported inputs because 
of the high transactions costs involved in claiming duty drawbacks. Similarly, export clearance processes 
22 Note that in the last three years Nepal has added 5 to 10% points o f  other duties and charges as agricultural and security 
levy, etc and raise nominal protection to around 18%. These include a local development fee o f  1.5%, special fee o f  1 .O% 
when customs duties are equal or below 5% and 3% when customs duties exceed 5%. In addition, there i s  a 10% tax on cars 
and bicycles and a fee o f  5% on some processed agricultural products such as rice o f  10%. These taxes and duties (referred 
to as para-tariffs in WTO parlance) discriminate against foreign trade similar to general tariffs since they are not levied on 
domestic production. They raise protection o f  domestic production and act as a tax on exports. 
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are cumbersome. N o r  i s  customs clearance o f  imports satisfactory, which raises transaction costs and 
curtails competition. 
8% in 2003 compared to 15% growth in the 
1990s. A particular issue i s  that export 
performance o f  the last few months and current 
policy inertia makes i t  a l l  but certain that the 
garments exports - with i t s  50,000 jobs - could 
collapse after the MFA’s phase out in January 
2005 unless emergency actions are taken to 
increase competitiveness. These would include 
lowering transport costs sharply through 
activating the container-train running from 
16. Addressing trade and exchange rate issues have become important because the positive 
developments of the 1990s are now being reversed and even show signs of decline. A combination o f  
domestic conflict, increasing transport costsz3 and uncertainty, the appreciation o f  the Nepali rupee over 
the past year, persistent regulatory and infi-astructural weakness and general lack o f  confidence in placing 
orders in Nepal have hit exports hard. In the current more competitive environment Nepal’s exchange rate 
Birgunj, providing export processing zone 
facilities at border points such as Birgunj, 
Figure 2.1 Actual and Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate pegging arrangement to the Indian Rupee and i t s  level will reauire continuous review (see 
- 
Source: De Soto, R. “Estimating the Misalignment o f  the Real 
Exchan e Rate in Ne al”, mimeo, 2003 
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do-& port handling time in Kolkata with support f rom Indian authorities, speeding up Customs 
transactions and inviting foreign collaboration to improve market access in Europe and the West. 
17. Despite short term problems discussed above, in the medium term Nepal has several assets, 
which would make Nepal potentially more competitive. These include: (i) having comparative advantage 
in a number o f  apcu l tu re  and manufacturing products (garments, carpets, pashmina, food products, 
being the main products); (ii) proximity to the large and fast growing Indian and Chinese economies; (iii) 
the availability o f  preferential access to Europe and India; (iv) i t s  hydroelectric resources that provide the 
potential for  power exports to the supply constrained Indian markets; (v) i t s  natural beauty and important 
religions and cultural sites that draw tourists (4% o f  GDP); (vi) i t s  growing pool  o f  educated labor, and 
(vii) “catch up opportunities” to raise productivity. In particular, preferential treatment for duty free entry 
to Europe under the EBA initiative and to India, combined with lower wages and better investment 
climate than some neighboring states, can attract foreign and Indian investment with their know-how and 
market access for export oriented activities. There has already been jo in t  investment or advanced 
proposals for large scale Indian and foreign investment in sectors such as garments and power. Given 
these factors, Nepal, with i t s  small share in the world market, should be able to enter major markets 
without much resistance. 
18. As the Nepal Trade and Competitiveness Study identi9es in detail, important policy and 
institutional reforms are needed for Nepal to exploit these opportunities. I t s  recommendations adopted 
by the Government, are grouped under six areas: strengthening trade pol icy and implementation 
institutions, trade facilitation in Customs and transport, improving labor market f lexibil i ty especially in 
25 
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Trucks from Kathmandu to the Birgunj container port and border now take two days due to the inability to travel at night. 
The  real exchange rate i s  defined as the ratio o f  prices o f  tradable to non-tradable goods. T h e  equilibrium real effective 
exchange rate i s  one which, for given sustainable values o f  other relevant variables such as taxes, te rms for trade, capital and 
aid flows, results in the joint attainment o f  intemal and extemal equilibrium. 
His Majesty’s Government o f  Nepal, Nepal Trade and Competitiveness Study, MOICS, 2004. 25 
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employment policies, improving the investment climate especially in FDI, and sector specific policies. 
Beyond these policies there are two other key variables in the external sector - Nepal’s economic 
relationship with India and the employment o f  Nepalese labor abroad - that have significant bearing on 
Nepal’s development. 
19. The nature of Nepal’s economic relationship 
with India is a key factor in Nepal’s development. 
India i s  the destination of more than 50% o f  i t s  exports 
and the source o f  half of i t s  imports.26 About 70% o f  
Nepal’s labor force abroad works in India. The 1750 
kilometers o f  porous borders means that in addition to 
formal trade, there i s  a considerable volume o f  
unrecorded trade in goods, exchange o f  labor and, 
accordingly, a close correlation o f  prices in Nepal, 
India and the neighboring states o f  Bihar, UP, and 
West Bengal (see Table 2.2). By some estimates, the 
Table 2.2 Correlation of Prices in Nepal and India 
Nepal Log(CP1) with AR(1) 
Agricultural R S q  Coefficient T-st 1 
Laborers 
India 0.997 0.477 2.9 
I Bihar 0.998 0.399 
Uttar Pradesh 0.994 1.022 
West Bengal 0.998 0.501 
India - CPI 0.996 1.094 
India - WPI 0.996 0.514 
Source: World Bank estimates from various sources. 
265 jo in t  ventures with India accounts for more than a third o f  a l l  FDI in Nepal. 
20. Nepal has attempted to maintain close relationship with India and cement it in bilateral treaties 
on trade and transit and an agreement to control unauthorized trade. The f i rs t  trade treaty and transit 
with India was signed in 1950 and subsequently renewed in 1960, 1971, 1978 (when trade was de-linked 
from transit), 1991, 1996, and 2002. These treaties provided duty free access o f  primary exports, for 
selected Nepalese manufactured exports, preferences to Indian manufacturing exports, and agreements o n  
transit and transshipment. The most recent Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty renewed in March  2002, however, 
introduced several new restrictions in tighter rules o f  origin requirements and documentation, and the use 
of trade related quotas that will be triggered by export volume. 27 
21. Given the importance of the Indian economy for Nepal, a key question is what are some policies 
that Nepal can adopt to benefit from its proximity to the large and fast growing Indian economy. First, 
Nepal needs to broaden i t s  agreement with India to include and attract Indian investment. The a im should 
be to forge Indian capital, technology and market access to Nepalese capital, labor, and resources. T o  this 
end, Nepal could pursue the proposed Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement to 
provide further assurance on investment and trade rights to investors (including Indians). Efforts to  forge 
formal agreement should be further complemented by advertising efforts to attract investment f rom India. 
Thus, Nepal should make a special effort to advertise i t s  preferential access to Europe through the EBA. 
Second, economic diplomacy with the central Government needs to be extended to the neighboring Indian 
states, for ensuring market access and easing transit rights. This i s  important as State Governments wie ld  
discretionary powers that often disrupt trade. Third, Nepal needs to harmonize border procedures, 
documentation, special economic zones (SEZ) rules, product standards and Customs software with India 
such that Indo-Nepal trade and transit i s  easily facilitated and third country oriented exports can also 
proceed with minimal transactions costs. Fourth, Nepal could facilitate Indian interests in Nepal by 
proceeding to build the Tibet-India transit routes and in return request more transit routes and shipping 
facilities at a variety o f  Indian ports including the efficient Mumbai  port.28 
26 Nepalese exports to India includes edible oil, toiletries and cosmetics, jute goods, polyester yam, and a variety o f  
agricultural goods such as pulses, hides and skins, herbs, cardamom, r ice bran oil, ginger. Imports from India include 
mechanical equipment and spare parts, cotton textile, camber, cotton thread, chemicals, electrical equipment, agricultural 
equipment, etc. (source:www.south-asia.comiEmbassy-India/indeprel.htm). 
See, HMGN, Nepal Trade and Competitiveness Study, MOICS, 2004, Box 2.1 
A study has shown that in the case o f  high value products such as carpets and the greater efficiency o f  the Mumbai port can 
more than off-set the higher costs o f  land transport. 
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22. A major economic development in the 1990s has been the growth of foreign employment of 
Nepalese labor abroad and private transfers. Currently about 800,000 Nepalese are employed abroad 
who together remit  to Nepal approximately $800 mi l l ion (12% o f  GDP) compared to $ 633 mi l l ion in 
merchandise exports and $155 mi l l ion in tourism receipts. Given that these remittance earnings have 
grown at a rate o f  30% p.a., this implies that GNP growth has been significantly faster than GDP growth, 
with i t s  concomitant effects on consumption and demand side effects on GDP growth. Increasing demand 
for labor abroad both due to higher incomes in the Far East, Middle East, and India, a tendency to switch 
demand to Nepalese labor instead o f  labor f rom traditional sources o f  labor supply, and the rising 
education o f  Nepalese labor have increased demand abroad. On the supply side, the lack o f  opportunities 
at home, and, perversely, the “push” factor due to the war, and the switch f rom informal to formal sources 
o f  transferring money home have al l  led to this higher recorded increase. 
23. A crucial challenge for Nepal now is to sustain the level of the current remittance eamings, 
which now account for about 12% of GDP. Government i s  now preparing a new ActPol icy  guideline 
relating to Migrat ion and Foreign Employment. A formal memorandum o f  understanding has been signed 
with Malaysia and ratified. Talks are under process with Qatar, UAE, Hong K o n g  and Korea. Nepal could 
take three other measures to sustain foreign employment and remittances. First, most important, for the 
long run i s  the need for continued investments in education, with special emphasis o n  the English 
language, to increase the demand for Nepalese labor abroad. Second, employment-seeking talks also need 
to be extended to countries such as Japan, where aging o f  i t s  population will require the import o f  more 
foreign labor. Third, if the private sector i s  not forthcoming, Nepal needs to provide attractive financial 
instruments for Nepalese labor to transfer their salaries via formal channels. In general, service standards 
in the transfer o f  remittances that allow a quick and fast transfer o f  funds i s  important. Finally, 
Government also needs to ensure a jo in t  public and private sector oversight body to  ensure that Nepal’s 
business reputation as a reliable source o f  educated and disciplined labor i s  maintained. Conversely, this 
oversight should also ensure that unscrupulous private sector operators do not defraud the hard-earned 
remittances by workers. 
E. Strengthening Economic Management 
24. Strengthening Economic Management Institutions. While many of the modern institutions and 
policies for economic management exist in Nepal, implementation is undermined by lack of adequate 
coordination and inadequate attention to monitoring and evaluation. Lines o f  responsibility between 
multiple organizations are often very unclear, adversely affecting implementation. Policy coordination at 
the Cabinet level  appears to be weak partly due to the lack o f  substantive pol icy discussions (see Chapter 
5) resulting in overall coordination problems. Whi le the National Planning Commission (NPC) has a 
wider v iew o f  economic issues, i t s  role i s  focused on development planning and it does not have 
executive powers. Recently the use of results oriented instruments such as the Immediate Act ion Plan 
and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework to prioritize policies and budgets show improvements in 
pol icy coordination. But, as widely recognized two areas, coordination and monitoring need further 
strengthening. The failure to implement the Agricultural Perspective Plan’s (APP) H i l l s  strategy, as it 
depended on the inter-sectoral coordination between agriculture, transport, commerce, finance and several 
other agencies i s  one example o f  this. A second i s  the inabil ity to resolve the laws, the 21 Acts that 
inconsistently impinge o n  decentralization. 
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25. Weak coordination is also the result of inadequate attention to monitoring of results and progress 
and need addressing at several levels. Critical priorities are improving the weak national income accounts 
29 These include institutions and laws concerning property rights, contract enforcement, regulatory bodies, monetary and fiscal 
institutions, prudential regulations and supervision. 
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through support for the national statistical capacity building plan. Second, monitoring and evaluation o f  
service delivery indicators such as immunization, enrollment, the provision o f  medicine, school supplies, 
absenteeism, also need to be implemented as part o f  the government’s new monitoring plans. Lastly, more 
attention i s  needed for conducting periodic household surveys, and equally important, developing the 
capacity to use these surveys to inform pol icy making and poverty reducing interventions. 
F. Summingup 
26. With respect to the government’s strategy for restarting growth, this chapter has analyzed and 
made recommendations on the following strategic areas: Jiscal management, external sector reforms and 
economic management. In the first case, measures recommended included policies to increase revenue 
collection, monitor and manage contingent liabilities, and improve the effectiveness o f  public 
expenditures. Opportunities to increase revenues through interim but significant improvements in tax 
administration were, highlighted. The threat to fiscal sustainability o f  liabilities posed by the insolvent 
banking sector and the growing pension obligations and their remedies were highlighted. 
27. I n  the case of the external sector, the need for increasing competitiveness through higher 
productivity was stressed. The priority i s  for the Government to implement the recommendations o f  the 
Nepal Trade and Competitiveness Study, which it has adopted. T w o  related areas were stressed: forging 
closer economic ties with India, and especially, inviting Indian investment to avail o f  Nepal’s EBA 
preferences in Europe. Second, the importance of short term regulatory policies and long term education 
investment policies to sustain the foreign employment o f  labor was also highlighted. In addition, there i s  a 
trade agenda to be addressed including reducing tariffs to bring them closer to competitors’ levels and 
reducing the tar i f f  escalation. 
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CHAPTER 3: IMPROVING THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE 
A. Introduction - Restoring the Investment Climate 
1. Poverty reduction in Nepal depends primarily on accelerating broad-based, labor intensive 
growth. In keeping with the trend o f  the 1990s, the loth Plan projects close to three-fourth o f  future 
growth in Nepal to come from the non-agricultural sector. This sector i s  assumed to grow at the rate o f  6 
to 7% p. a., with the private sector being the source o f  most o f  this growth. But as the developments in the 
last three years -- when non-agriculture sector growth, exports and private investment rates have dropped 
significantly - show Nepal’s investment climate has worsened with the conflict in the near term. In the 
medium term not  only will Nepal need to restore i t s  investment climate, it has to go the extra mi le  to 
improve it significantly to offset i t s  inherent geographical disadvantages o f  being landlocked, having 
relatively less developed human capital, and a perception o f  being investor unfnendly. 
2. Aside from restoring peace, or at least signijkantly mitigating the conflict, improving the 
investment climate wi l l  depend on three factors. First, the regulatory framework governing private sector 
activity needs to be addressed in areas that lead to bureaucratic delays and high transactions costs, 
especially those concerning tax administration, inadequate bankruptcy laws, highly restrictive labor 
market regulations, and enforcing contracts. Second, Government wil l need to sustain the financial 
deepening that has been closely associated with economic growth in Nepal; here the biggest challenge 
wil l be to prevent an incipient banking crisis. Third, infrastructure will need to  be improved. Whi le there 
has been considerable progress in developing infrastructure in the 1990s, including through private 
participation, Nepal remains an infrastructure-constrained country, with considerable unmet demand, poor 
reliabil i ty and high costs. As infrastructure requirements and demands on scarce public resources are 
large, a key task will be to prioritize public expenditures. A particular challenge will be to improve 
connectivity and rural infrastructure. A closely related challenge will be to set up regulatory frameworks 
that can attract private participation in infrastructure. 
B. The Regulatory Environment 
3 .  The investment climate of Nepal was improving until the escalation of the insurgency in 2002, but 
serious problems remain. The liberalization o f  the trade regime since the early 1990s, the easing o f  entry 
regulations, the opening up o f  infrastructure investment to the private sector, relatively l o w  tax rates and a 
robust growth in credit a l l  helped to improve the investment climate (see Table 3.1 next page). Domestic 
private investment rates increased to 15% o f  GDP in the mid-1990s compared to 9% in the 1980s. But 
private sector perception o f  the investment climate continues to  v iew it as unfriendly and Government 
policies to be the most important obstacle to business. A 1999/00 survey showed many o f  the f i r m s  (36%) 
specifically identified red tape, time delay and corruption as key obstacles. Beyond that, cumbersome and 
discretionary tax administration, lack o f  clarity and predictability o f  Government policies and labor 
regulations were cited as other key issues. 30 
30 T h e  Business Environment and Manufacturing Performance survey in Nepal, World Bank, Biggs (2000), for instance 
reported that 36% of f i rms viewed Govemment to be the biggest obstacle. 
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4. Entry and Exit Policies: I n  
terms of the law, it is not too difficult 
to invest and to enter an industry in 
Nepal but in practice, multiple 
agencies that are responsible for 
investment approval do not 
coordinate and raise the costs of 
entry. Together, the Amended 
Industrial Act  o f  1992 and the 
Foreign Investment and Technology 
Ac t  o f  1992 provide an adequate 
legal framework as wel l  as incentives 
for investment. However, 
implementation has been 
problematical since responsibilities 
for implementation are diffused 
among a number o f  entities. They 
Nepal Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Figure 3.1 Exit  and Entry Policies 
Cost to Start a Business (%of income per capita 
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Source: Estimated from Doing Business Report 2004, T h e  World Bank 
include the Ministry of Industry, One Window Committee, the Industrial Promotion Board and the Board 
of Investment and Fast Track Committees. Some o f  the important elements o f  these acts that created these 
institutions have been over ridden by other acts such as the Income Tax A c t  o f  M a y  2002. Industrial 
licensing, tax authorities and local authorities do not work together with the result the “one stop” entry 
process i s  stretched over many steps. This may explain Nepal’s unusually high costs o f  starting a business 
and the country having the lowest amount o f  foreign direct investment in the sub-continent (see Figure 
3.1). 
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5. Conduct Policies. Frequent and unexpected changes in the policy regime such as import tariff 
schedules, customs valuation and classijication processes create an uncertain business environment. 
Industrial licensing, tax authorities and local authorities do not work together. Examples o f  inadequate 
consultations and poor coordination are plenty. Many f i r m s  find it diff icult to operate in the present 
environment given the economic uncertainty that adds to the already uncertain security environment. 
M a n y  of them remain in l imbo with n o  plans to expand operations or simply exit. 
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6. A reform agenda for the regulatory environment needs to comprise the following. First, improve 
the regulatory framework through the rationalization o f  institutions (to allow less conflict and 
duplication), c lar i fy and simplify implementation by reducing the number o f  institutions involved and by 
adopting automatic clearances (e.g. 
company registration could be l inked to the 
tax system). There i s  also scope to improve 
business and HMGN relations through jo int  
committee approaches where the business 
community participates in the design o f  
policies. Second, the bankruptcy l aw  must 
be modernized through the new Company 
and Insolvency Acts to allow easier and less 
time-consuming exit policies. Finally, labor 
market rigidities need to be addressed. 
Legislative reforms are needed to make 
labor l aw  consistent with labor contracts 
(see Figure 3.2). And, Government should 
al low dismissal with reasonable 
compensation. In fact rigid labor laws 
encourage extra-legal contracts and hiring 
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Figure 3.2 Flexibility of Labor Markets 
Source: Estimated from Doing Business Report 2004, T h e  World Bank 
many foreign nationals because they are easy to get rid of. Given that some o f  these reforms may be time 
consuming due to polit ical opposition, Government should proceed to implement the setting up o f  Special 
Economic Zones and the Export Processing Zones where the current restrictive labor regulations can be 
relaxed. 
C. Financial Sector 
7.  The first task for the Government is to prevent a potential banking crisis by prudently 
restructuring the two Banks that account for SO% of banking sector assets. Gross non-performing loans 
make up 60% o f  the assets o f  the RBB and the NBL, while together their negative net wor th i s  estimated 
to be in the range o f  7% o f  GDP. Thus, their insolvency endangers the banking sector as a whole, and 
with it future growth prospects. Government has set in process strong loan recovery mechanisms through 
the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the recent appointment o f  a Judge for the Appellate Court (redress 
mechanism). Whi le efforts by the RBB and the NBL had some success in recovering loans and improving 
portfolios, they are currently running into strong “political” resistance as large willful defaulters continue 
to take refuge behind the weak judiciary system (in the form o f  stay orders by the courts) precluding the 
banks f rom taking further legal action for an indefinite period. Immediate priority i s  t o  stay the course in 
implementing banking sector reforms. This entails, first, amending the l a w  concerning the Debt Recovery 
Tribunal to limit the scope o f  the courts in issuing stay orders. Second, encouraging the NRl3 to enforce 
the Blacklisting Directive more rigorously as there are instances o f  banks fail ing to carry out their duties 
as required under the Directive, and third, complete the restructuring o f  the assets o f  the two banks 
through setting up an Asset Management company. 
31 However, this aspect could be remedied with the WTO entry process underway. 
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8. The second task ahead is to implement the banking supervision and regulatory reforms, 
including, most crucially, strengthening the role of Nepal Rastra Bank by providing it with autonomy in 
the conduct of monetary policy, banking system regulation and supervision, and the licensing of banks 
and non-bank. Alongside amending Article 86 o f  the NRB Act  to this end, the Government needs to 
increase the capacity o f  the NRB. For this it has to persist with the implementation o f  human resource 
management changes including rationalizing the staff through the VRS program to make it a more 
professional body. A second requirement would be to upgrade the N R B ' s  archaic management and 
information system by introducing an automated clearing-house system, among other measures. 
9. The two major development banks need restructuring or liquidation. Agricultural Development 
Bank o f  Nepal (ADB/N) i s  facing a number o f  challenges from i t s  past performance and f rom the Maoist 
insurgency that has led to the closure o f  some 45 offices in the last five years. Similarly, Nepal Industrial 
Development Corporation has to be liquidated or privatized. ADB/N i s  one o f  the largest financial 
institutions in the country and has some 38%-48% o f  loans in the non-performance category. The bank 
has been a conduit for cheap credit in the past with long maturity periods involv ing huge subsidies for 
relatively large borrowers. It followed the past policy o f  meeting credit targets irrespective o f  financial 
viabil ity and had l i t t l e  incentive to mobilize saving deposits or recover funds. I t  also lacked r i s k  
evaluation and monitoring capability. HMGN should also be mindful o f  the need to improve the 
profitability o f  the ADB/N and the very real limitations on the ability to operate branch networks outside 
the Kathmandu Valley due to the deteriorated security situation. The Nepal Industrial Development 
Corporation (NIDC), on the other hand, i s  a candidate for liquidation. Detailed analysis o f  the portfolio 
and the availability o f  trained staff suggest that i t i s  unviable. 
D. Infrastructure (Transport, Power and Telecommunications) 
10. Along with improving the policy environment in trade, regulation and financial sector policies, 
further efforts are necessary to use the current and limited infrastructure better and to create 
infrastructure that supports private sector development. Given the country's geography and diff icult 
terrain, access to infrastructure i s  the worst in South Asia by most indicators (Table 3.2). Transport, which 
i s  a key to private sector activities as wel l  as the delivery o f  public services, remains limited. Of  
particular importance i s  inadequate road connectivity in Nepal. 
Table 3.2 Comparative Infrastructure Indicators 
Year Nepal Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Paved Roads, % of Total (1 999) 30.8 9.5 45.7 43.0 95.0 
Internet Users (thousands) (2000) 50.0 100.0 5000.0 133.9 121.5 
Electricity Consumption per Capita (Kwh) (1 999) 47.1 89.0 379.2 321.2 255.3 
Telephones Mainlines per Employee (1 997) 37.2 14.7 33.7 48.3 30.4 
Road Density (Kml sq. km of land) (1 999) 0.1 1.4 1 .o 0.3 1.5 
GDP per unii energy use (PPP $ per kg oil 
An, ,;,Fin"+\ (1 999) 3.5 10.8 4.7 4.2 8.1 cquivaici i t )  
Note (I): Data for telephone mainlines per employee for Bangladesh is for the year 1995, and for India is for the year 1996. 
Source (I): World Development Indicators for paved roads, internet users, electricity consumption per capita, road density and GDP per 
unit energy use. 
Source (ii) Social Indicators and Fixed Factors, for telephone mainlines per employee and radios per 1000 people 
Transport - Mainly Roads 
11. Transport remains a defining constraint to growth, public services, and poverty reduction in 
Nepal as recognized in the I O t h  Plan/Poverty Reduction Strategy. Nepal has one o f  the lowest road 
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densities for a landlocked country. As roads are the main arteries o f  the economy in Nepal’s terrain, the 
lack o f  roads makes connectivity a significant constraint. An estimated 3.5 mi l l ion people (15% o f  the 
population) do not have road access in Nepal; some villages can be up to 13 days walk to  the nearest road 
head. The Government’s strategy for the transport sector i s  outlined in the Tenth Plan, which includes: (a) 
maintaining the road network in serviceable condition; (b) expanding the road network to link 10 district 
headquarters with a motorable road; (c) improving rural access and decentralizing the management and 
financing o f  rural  roads to local bodies; (d) improving sector management; (e) encouraging private sector 
participation in road construction and operation; and (f) facilitating trade and transit. However, achieving 
the targets i s  l ike ly  to be difficult in the current security environment and if the Government cannot 
address the issues in the following paragraph. 
12. The Government currently funds only half of road maintenance requirements endangering the 
maintenance of this key asset. The proportion o f  the strategic road network in good and fair condition had 
increased f rom less than 50% in 1992 to 90% in 2001 but that has deteriorated again to 69% in recent 
years due to  lack o f  maintenance. Reversing this trend i s  an urgent priority. HMGN has recently 
established an autonomous Roads Board and Road Fund to provide stable funding for road maintenance 
f rom user fees. The Roads Board has this year generated about NRs500 mi l l ion f rom fuel levies and other 
user charges, but this i s  only about ha l f  o f  what i s  required to  fully fund Nepal’s Strategic Road Network 
(SRN). 32 The maintenance gap could be met by increasing the fuel levy o n  At the current 
consumption level this could raise about NRs1.8 bi l l ion (US$25 million), with the small shortfall met by 
counterpart funds f rom districts and municipalities. 
13. Increasing and prioritizing investment through revamping the priority investment plan is needed. 
Nepal currently invests far less on roads program in comparison to i t s  needs. In order to facilitate the 
6.3% GDP growth anticipated in the Tenth Plan, Nepal needs to invest about 2.5% o f  i t s  GDP (about 
US$145 mi l l ion a year) in expanding and maintaining i t s  road assets34. These estimates are substantially 
higher than the current $ 55 mil l ion expenditure in the road sector. Another way to look at the shortage o f  
investment i s  at i t s  current resource allocation o f  about US$30 mi l l ion investment on new construction, it 
wil l take HMGN 19 years to complete the Tenth Plan targets and recent initiatives in the road sector. 
Three actions are implicit: increasing road expenditure allocation, priorit izing these more carefully, and, 
when possible, setting up regulatory frameworks for private sector participation. 
14. Expanding the road network and completing the North-South corridors are a high priority. The 
road network in Nepal has increased from 7000 km in 1990 to 16000 km in 2003 (of  which 4627 km are 
black top roads). But there are three priority areas for h r the r  road expansion, Nor th  South Corridors, a 
fast track Kathmandu-Terai link, and expanding and upgrading village roads. Perhaps most important, the 
Nor th South Corridors and roads to several Westem districts remain incomplete. The hill districts in 
Nepal are accessed through major North-South Corridors that link them to  the East West Highway, which 
would in turn connect them to the Terai, India and to the rest o f  the country35. The total length required to 
complete road links in western Nepal i s  about 1184 km, o f  which only 581 km has already been opened 
into a track or i s  under construction for init ial opening. Hence, completing these roads i s  a high priority. 
32 
33 
34 
S R N  includes the main highway and feeder roads, 
The current fuel levy transferred to the Roads Board i s  NRsl.5 on petrol and NRs 1 on diesel. to NRs5.5 (or 7 cents) per 
liter of petrol and to NRs5 per liter of diesel. 
The estimates are only for the road sub-sector; air transport i s  not included. For comparison with other countries, China 
currently invests about 4 to 5% of i t s  GDP on expanding and maintaining its transport system, while Korea, during i t s  
development stage, used to spend about 5.2% o f  i t s  GDP. Brazil spends about 2.4% o f  i t s  GDP, and Bangladesh spends 
about 2.5% of its GDP. Most OECD countries, with mature transport network, invest about 3% o f  their GDP on maintaining 
their transport assets. 
Of the 17 district headquarters not served by road, 12 are in western Nepal, while the five are in the east. Road connection 
for eastern Nepal i s  progressing with assistance from DFID, RAP and own HMGN funding. 
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15. Transferring rural road network development to decentralized management but with appropriate 
technical support will be key for rural development. There are currently about 14,000 km o f  rural roads. 
Mos t  o f  these are under the management o f  the respective DDCs; an estimated 4000 km o f  district roads, 
n o w  under the Department o f  Roads management, will be transferred to district government management. 
But technical support to local Governments are needed to ensure that road planning i s  economically 
viable and avoid the mistakes of the past. Many unsustainable and environmentally damaging roads have 
been built or many lulometers of roads have been built for which there i s  l i tt le vehicular demand as the 
road may not be connected to the remainder o f  the network. 
16. Government needs to attach much more urgency to transport and trade transit issues. Ninety 
percent o f  Nepal's foreign trade route depends on access to India's transportation system, where the 
nearest seaport, Kolkata, i s  located 1056 kilometers away in India. W h i l e  the Government has built three 
Inland Container Depots (ICDs) in the border towns with India and focused on improving and 
harmonizing transit and customs procedures, the pace o f  implementation has been slow. Although, the 
road-based ICDs are operating effectively under a lease hold contract with a private Terminal 
Management Company, the rail-linked I C D  has just commenced operations three years after a l l  physical 
work, including ra i l  spur l ine  f rom Raxaul, has been completed. Aside from the direct financial costs, 
delays l ike this raises costs for f irms, and more critically, creates policy uncertainty for  f i r m s  preventing 
them from investing to increase their competitiveness. 
Power Sector 
17. Nepal has vast hydro resources, which present a source ofpotential wealth and exports to India, 
but currently access to power is very limited in rural areas and power costs are among the highest in 
South Asia. Despite this potential (estimated at 43,000 MW), and a doubling o f  capacity in the last five 
years, only 522 MW of generation capacity has been developed so far. Based on the 2001 census, 40% o f  
Nepalese households have access to electricity. Recognizing the critical importance o f  energy access to 
poverty reduction, HMGN has made environmentally and socially sustainable development o f  Nepal's 
hydroelectric potential one of i t s  key developmental objectives. The emphasis on power development 
follows the adoption of the Hydro Power Policy in the early 1990s and the revisions to this pol icy in 
200 1/02. T h i s  policy envisages increased and competitive involvement o f  private investors in the 
production, distribution, and management o f  electricity, whi le recognizing the need for institutional and 
structural changes in the power industry to meet the sector's development objectives. Development o f  
small hydro projects and district level projects under decentralized schemes in hilly and remote areas has 
also been highlighted. In the meantime, private sector generation has increased in some areas while in 
other parts o f  the country Maoists activities have led to the closure o f  some plants. 
18. But while considerable progress has been made on many fronts, many issues and challenges 
remain that constrain the power sector's ability to support poverty reduction efforts to its full potential. 
First, despite the efforts o f  NEA, the systems losses are s t i l l  high at about 24%, considerable efficiency 
and revenue gains can be made in this area. More  work  i s  needed to examine alternative restructuring 
options to lower costs of the power sector in the context o f  greater private sector participation and 
growing prospect o f  power trading. 
19. Second, Government needs to have a more focused policy in attracting private sector 
participation in thepower sector, including in rural areas. On the financing side, the long t e r m  financing 
facility, which the Government aims to create under the Power Development Fund (PDF) can play a 
critical role in mobilizing private investments in Nepal's power sector and should be implemented o n  an 
urgent basis. But at least equally important will be the need for institutional and regulatory reforms. Here 
Government needs to remove overlaps in the power sector further in policy, regulatory, and operational 
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functions o f  public sector institutions operating in the power sector that create conflict o f  interest and send 
confusing signals to the private sector. 
20. Setting up a competent and effective independent regulatory body is perhaps the highest priority 
for attracting efficient private investment as there is no such body at present. The Electricity Tar i f f  Fixing 
Committee (ETFC) that has been established falls wel l  short o f  a full fledged regulator. Partially because 
o f  the lack o f  a competent regulatory agency, the IPP costs in Nepal are very high, and the IPP's generate 
power in the l o w  value wet season when already there i s  surplus energy. Although the prevailing polit ical 
environment in Nepal i s  delaying the passage o f  the regulatory act, there are several actions that HMGN 
can take in the transition period. These include: widen the role o f  the EFTC in areas where the existing 
order can be used as a base; improve the quality o f  staff o f  the ETFC by attracting with suitable 
compensation packages the best available technically competent candidates; and draft the regulatory act 
based on best practice experience from other countries with similar country and sector situations. When 
Parliament i s  restored, these transition efforts would facilitate the establishment o f  a competent and 
independent regulatory authority, which can perform the functions o f  setting and enforcing rules under 
which the sector operates, including the important role o f  setting power tariffs. 
21. Third, to ensure demand for new capacity, more needs to be done to promote power trade with 
India, which is very limited at present. In 2002, Nepal exported only 10% o f  i t s  output t o  India. At 
present there i s  l i tt le or n o  commercial orientation to power exchanges and the Power Trading Agreement 
between India and Nepal has not been ratified by the Parliament. Whi le  recent developments include 
formation o f  a jo int  technical committee between India's Power Trading Corporation and HMGNNEA; 
and preparation o f  term sheets on the volume o f  power and energy to be traded between Nepal and India, 
agreements and decisions on power trading transmission link with India need to be expedited. 
Telecommunications 
22. I n  the last seven years, the telecommunications sector in Nepal grew at a rapid pace, but there is 
still considerable unmet demand and the need to increase competition. The number o f  f ixed l ine 
customers increased f rom about 84,000 in 1995 to about 350,000 in 2003, bringing f ixed l ine penetration 
to over 1.8% (see Table 3.3 below). The introduction o f  prepaid mobile services by NTC and the start o f  
services by the second fixed l ine operator, UTL also increased teledensity. The liberalization o f  the ISP 
and V S A T  market has led to  a rapid diffusion o f  internet services in Nepal, although mainly in 
Kathmandu and other bigger urban areas. There are approximately 1500 Internet hosts and about 35,000 
Table 3.3 Comparative Telecommunications Indicators 
Cellular Fixed teledensity Total teledensity Estimated internet Telephone Cost of a 3 Minute Call to 
teledensity (%) (%) (Yo) users (thousands) Mainlines per the US (In US$) and utility 
Employee providing the service. 
Bang lades h 0.81 0.46 1.27 204 55 1.24 BTTB 
India 1.22 3.98 5.20 16,580 108 0.6 BSNL 
Nepal 0.09 1.77 2.77 175 92 3.0411.27 NTC1 Budget 
Calls 
Pakistan 0.85 2.50 3.35 1,500 73 1.35 PTCL 
Sri Lanka 4.92 4.65 9.57 200 131 0.7 SLT 
Source, World Telecommunications Development Report 2003. ITU, Nepal's numbers were updated by HMGN in October 2004. 
Intemet subscribers, with the number of users estimated to be two  or three times higher. Despite the 
growth o f  telecommunications, there i s  considerable unmet demand and costs are high. In particular, there 
i s  a waiting l i s t  for fixed services estimated at 200,000 subscribers (February 2004). Also, unlike 
33 
neighboring countries, the cellular market did not witness higher growth despite the entry o f  few private 
operators owing mainly to the lack o f  competition in the mobile market and the delayed introduction o f  
prepaid mobile services in mid-2003. 
23. Developing telecommunications is a key to increasing connectivity and external competitiveness. 
A reform agenda would involve increasing competition in the sector, rebalancing o f  tariffs to reduce cross 
subsidization, expanding access to the rural areas, reforming institutions in the sector to clarify regulatory 
authority between the N T C  and FMD and commercializing the N T C  perhaps with a v iew to privatization 
o f  the services. There i s  also the need to clearly separate the government’s policy-making and operational 
roles in the sector, with the restructuring and increased private ownership o f  NTC. 
E. Summingup 
24. Nepal has to act on a number offronts to raise its investment rate, particularly private investment 
to restart growth. Towards this end, i t  has to improve the regulatory environment and adopt investment 
regime that i s  more friendly to private investment than perceived by the private sector at present. 
Restructuring and reforming the financial sector would be necessary to increase access to credit and also 
to  increase efficiency in the financial sector. Infrastructure, particularly the lack o f  connectivity, has been 
a factor in l o w  private sector participation as well as HMGN’s abil ity to provide public services to the 
different parts of the country. It has retarded growth as wel l  as skewed development to the detriment o f  
welfare o f  different parts o f  the country. Roads wil l  play a crucial role to increase connectivity and to 
facilitate trade both internally and with the rest  o f  the world. Nepal has large power potential and this 
needs to  be exploited with power exports to India. Similarly there i s  a pol icy agenda to be addressed in 
the telecommunications sector to allow the private sector to play a larger role by improving the regulatory 
environment for that purpose. 
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CHAPTER 4: FOSTERING GROWTH IN AGRICULTURE AND LAGGING REGIONS 
A. The Central Role o f  Agriculture and Emerging Dynamism 
1. Agriculture and rural development are central to poverty reduction and growth in Nepal. 
Although the sector’s contribution to GDP has declined to about 40% in 2001, i t employs more than two- 
thirds o f  the labor force and i s  the main source o f  income for 83% o f  the population. Agriculture in Nepal 
i s  to a large extent subsistence and smallholder-based. About 96% o f  land owned by agricultural 
households and 83% o f  the operational landholdings are less than 3 hectares. Agriculture i s  especially 
important for  the poor, as i t  i s  the main source o f  income for the poorest households (90% o f  the bottom 
consumption quartile). Hence, agriculture’s performance has widespread implications for the overall 
welfare o f  Nepal. Unsurprisingly, stagnant per-capita agncultural incomes o f  the last few decades were 
associated with Nepal’s persistently stubborn high poverty rates until the mid-1 990s. Conversely, 
acceleration in the growth o f  agricultural incomes from 1.5% in 1991-95 to 3.7% in 1996-2001, alongside 
the rapid growth o f  remittances, i s  associated with significant poverty reduction and demonstrates the 
sector’s potential contribution to poverty reduction. 
2. Increasing productivity, cropping intensity and diversification to higher value products (i.e. 
crops, livestock), stimulated by a number of demand- and supply-side developments, contributed to 
agriculture’s improved pe$ormance in the second half of the 1990s. Rising incomes increasing domestic 
demand and improved export opportunities expanded markets for agricultural products. Indeed, the share 
of agricultural exports in total production value increased fkom 20% to 35% f rom the f i rs t  to the second 
half o f  the 1990s. The agncultural sector’s supply response was in turn facilitated by the Government 
Agricultural Perspective Plan (APP) led expansion o f  infrastructure - in particular, roads, which 
facilitated marketing and irrigation, which facilitated increased productivity - and credit, which facilitated 
farm investments. In addition important pol icy reforms contributed to improving the incentive 
environment for agricultural commodity and input markets. These included trade pol icy reform, which 
enabled increased agricultural exports, increased internal commodity market deregulation that encouraged 
greater private sector participation and investments, and input market deregulation particularly for 
fertilizer, which enabled improved farmer access and use. These pol icy reforms and investments 
contributed to improving the competitiveness o f  Nepal’s agnculture and improved production incentives 
by farmers. The agricultural sector grew despite the lowering o f  import tariffs36 and the removal o f  
subsidies on fertilizer and on shallow tube wells.37 
3. Despite substantial constraints such as a difJicult terrain and poor connectivity, there are 
opportunities on which to build. Nepal i s  blessed with a broad range o f  ago-ecological zones and 
proximity to vast markets in India, Bangladesh, and China. The mountains have a natural advantage in 
animal production and livestock products, while the hills have comparative advantage in a variety of 
crops, such as off-season vegetables, tea, citrus, seed production, and spices. Despite the Terai’s similarity 
to growing conditions in northern India (and the fact that Indian farmers are subsidised), this area i s  
considered to have growth potential in vegetables, fruits, oilseeds, betel nuts, and some cereals. Another 
important asset i s  a culture of active community groups in Nepal’s hills - in forest management, water 
and road user groups -- indicating the presence o f  significant social capital at the community level, 
36 
37 
Nepal’s agricultural tariff rates o f  around 14% are the lowest in the South Asia region. 
Budgetary subsidies totalling about 0.2% o f  GDP exist in a few areas such as transport subsidies on fertilizer, a transport 
subsidy on food supply in the remote districts o f  the country, an irrigation subsidy for some surface schemes, interest 
subsidies on small loans extended by the Agricultural Development Bank, and a capital subsidy on bio-gas and small 
irrigation projects. 
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4. Sustaining and improving on the agricultural sector’s performance over the longer term, to 
maximize its contribution to rural growth and poverty reduction in Nepal would need government 
commitment to foster an enabling environment for the development of a high productivity, diversified, and 
commercialized agricultural sector. This would be in l ine  with the Government’s 10’ Five Year Plan 
(2002-2007), wh ich  assigns a central role to the development o f  agnculture and the rural economy in 
poverty reduction. T h i s  i s  also in l ine  with the Agricultural Perspective Plan’s (APP) broad thrust, but 
differing in i t s  greater emphasis on policy and institutional issues and a broader approach in i t s  h i l l s  
strategy. Achieving these goals would require measures to increase farm productivity and agricultural 
marketing efficiency by strengthening farmer capacity to take advantage o f  growing domestic and 
international market opportunities. These will require actions in two major areas. First, policy and 
regulatory reforms are needed to reduce the barriers to private sector participation and investments in the 
agricultural sector. These would include reforms o f  land and credit policies and o f  the multiple laws, 
rules and executive orders governing agricultural trade. Second, fostering increased public and private 
investments in rura l  infrastructure (roads, markets, electrification) and rural services (credit, agncultural 
research and extension, land administration, market information, export promotion, phyto-sanitary 
services, grading and quality control) will be critical. Integral to the revival o f  the govemment’s 
investment program will be institutional reforms o f  government agencies to ensure the improved delivery 
of rural-related public goods and services, including through greater participation o f  users and 
communities. 
5. Recognizing the diverse agro-ecological conditions in Nepal (Terai, hills and mountains), 
regionally differentiated rural development strategies would be critical. For example, the mid and far 
Western regions o f  Nepal lag significantly behind in infrastructure, incomes and human development than 
other parts o f  Nepal. Their characteristics and endowments offer unique potentials, opportunities and 
challenges, and will need special focus. 
B. Government Strategy and Policies 
6. The Agricultural Perspective Plan (APP), launched in 1995, is the government’s key policy on 
agricultural and rural development. This Plan was launched during the 9th Plan Period but was only 
partially implemented. The APP strategy was expected to lead to a technology-based green revolution in 
agriculture, which would raise outputs, and incomes through increased use o f  yield increasing inputs 
(fertilizer, improved seed, reliable irrigation) and promotion o f  off-farm activities. T h e  strategy was 
regionally differentiated between the Terai, which would focus o n  high yielding input based food grain 
production, and the h i l l s  and mountains, which would focus o n  horticulture and livestock production in 
prioritized pocket programs. The APP envisaged significant increases in public and private investments 
and an integrated package approach to exploit complementarities between public and private investments 
and with other sectors such as transport and energy. The APP included explicit investment targets focused 
on four priority inputs: fertilizer, irrigation, technology, and infrastructure. 
7. The IOth Plan’s growth strategies for agriculture sector are to modernize, diversify and 
commercialize crop and livestock production by expanding the use of technology, and increasing the 
access of farmers to modern agricultural inputs and credit. Similarly, promoting the participation o f  the 
private sector and NGOs/INGOs in service delivery, market promotion and infrastructure development 
are other major strategies. T o  diversify and commercialize agriculture, the Plan intends to mobilize 
private and non-government service providers in partnership and o n  a contract basis; promoting 
cooperative and contract farming; devolving local agncultural programs to local bodies; strengthening 
agriculture stations as resource centers to ensure the supply o f  quality seeds, saplings, and breeds for 
subsequent multiplication for local needs; and providing technical backstopping. 
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8. Going by the experience of the 9th Plan (FY 1997 to ZOOZ), the key challenge for Government wi l l  
be implementation. In the past the promise o f  the APP was impeded, first, by actual investments which 
fe l l  short o f  targets: on average only two-thirds o f  the planned development expenditures were realized. 
Second, inter-departmental coordination to implement the APP was weak. Beyond implementation, the 
APP suffered f rom the inadequate attention to incentives, marketing and demand issues, and the 
commercialization o f  agriculture. While the 10* Plan touches on these issues, i t needs more specificity on 
the commercialization strategy as wel l  as on addressing the continuing problems o f  coordination o f  the 
different agencies concerned with agriculture. The issues in output and factor markets that impede the 
growth of agnculture are described next. 
Growth Rates Growth Rates Share of 
1990191 to 1995196 to 1995196 to 
199495 1999100 1999100 
Agriculture, Fishery, 1.75 2.97 100.00 
and Forestry 
Food grains 0.88 2.32 34.70 
Cash Crops 3.44 5.55 7.56 
Other Crops 5.41 3.02 18.73 
Livestock 1.62 3.57 28.97 
Fishery 2.51 0.26 8.70 
Value Added 
Forestry 3.33 9.66 1.35 
C. Output Markets and Marketing 
t 
9. Output Trends: The agricultural 
sector’s growth pe$ormance improved 
markedly between theJirst and second half of 
the 1990s. This improved performance was 
mainly l ed  by a much faster growth o f  food 
grains (Table 4.1) as irrigation expanded which 
made output less volatile, fertilizer used 
increased, and new roads and markets improved 
incentives and facilitated private sector entry. 
Growth o f  livestock, a significant part o f  
agnculture, also accelerated. 
10. Regional variation: There is 
considerable variation in Nepal’s agriculture 
among the d ie ren t  ecological zones and 
physiographic regions of the country: i.e. 
between the plains of the Terai, the central Hil ls 
(called the Shivaliks and middle 
mountains in Figure 4.1). Terai 
plains, accounting for only 17% 
of total land area accounts for 
nearly 50% o f  total crop land. T h e  
most striking characteristic o f  the 
Hills and Mountains i s  their 
diversity o f  agro-ecological zones 
and their potential as a source o f  
high-value crops. Livestock i s  
more important than cereals. All 
these drive home the need to take 
a differentiated approach to 
agriculture in Nepal and to take 
into account the special features 
of i t s  hills and mountains. 
Table 4.1 Growth of Agriculture Sector and Composition 
Figure 4.1 Ecological Zones of Nepal 
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1 1. Low Agricultural ProductiviQ. 
Because Nepal missed the Green Revolution 
that tookplace in most of South Asia in the 
1970s and 1980s, productivity remains low 
for a number of crops compared to 
neighboring Indian states and Bangladesh 
(Table 4.2). Limi ted availability and use o f  
irrigation and inputs, such as improved seeds, 
fertilizer and technical advice contributed to 
l o w  agncultural productivity. Only about two- 
fifths o f  the cropped land i s  irrigated and less 
than ha l f  o f  the irrigated land benefits f rom 
demand potentially 
exists, scarcity o f  market 
infrastructure such as 
collection centres, 
storage facilities and 
organised market places 
limit opportunities for 
Table 4.2. Low Agricultural Productivity 
% of households % of households % of output 
producing selling sold 
wet dry 
season season 
Padd 75 22 7.4 
Cerells, including paddy 98 84 24 8.8 
Other crops 75 79 29 12.9 
’ Any crop 100 100 46 13 
~ 
Crop Yields in Nepal and its Neighbors 
Wheat Rice paddy Sugarcane Pulses Maite 
mffha mffha mffha Mt/ha W h a  
Nepal 1.8 2.7 37.2 0.77 1.8 
India 
Uttar Pradesh 2.7 2.0 54.8 0.8 1.6 
Bihar 2.1 1.5 42.4 0.8 2.3 
West Bengal 2.5 2.3 67.9 0.7 2.5 
Bangladesh 2.2 3.5 40 0.83 1.5 
Source: F A 0  
year round irrigation. Until recently, input monopolies raised prices o f  modern inputs. In addition, 
diff icult terrain - a large share o f  Nepal’s agnculture i s  in terraced hills, also makes agricultural 
production more complex. These factors l imited yield growth. Between the early 1960s and the late 
1990s, paddy yields in Nepal only grew at 0.6% per year, while neighboring countries achieved growth 
rates between 1.4% and 2% per year. 
13. Recent indications are marketing and commercialization are increasing even in the hills regions 
as evident from the growth of production of off-season vegetables, vegetable seeds, lentil, honey, spices, 
milk, and livestock. In particular, agncultural exports have been increasing rapidly with their share 
increasing from an average o f  14% in the f i rst  ha l f  o f  the 1990s to 19% in the second ha l f  o f  the 1990s. 
During the same period, growth o f  export o f  agncultural products increased dramatically f rom 20% to 
35%. M u c h  o f  the growth in agncultural exports was the result o f  increased trade with India, which i s  the 
destination for 90% o f  Nepal’s agricultural exports. Four constraints have to be addressed, however, to 
build on this potential for commercializing agnculture. 
38 See the discussion on Transport in Chapter 3. 
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14. First, the lack of connectivity and especially roads is probably the single-most important 
constraint to agricultural growth, especially in the mid and far western regions. Even though nearly 
1,000 local haat bazaars and Government built up urban markets are operational in different parts o f  the 
country, particularly in the eastem, central and western regions, distance to markets remains a major 
issue. T h i s  exerts a strong impact on crop choice and diversification, use o f  inputs and the balance 
between farm and non-farm activity. Thus, the 1995-96 survey finds that vegetable production tends to 
occur within 3 hours’ distance from an urban market. Cereals and pulses dominate production in areas 
within 8 hours’ f rom markets. Beyond 8 hours travel time, the local economy i s  self-contained 
(subsistence based), showing l i t t l e  interaction with the market. Chemical and fertilizer inputs tend not  be 
used beyond a distance o f  5 hours. These distances raise transport costs, increase products losses during 
transit and create thin and segmented markets. Thus, transport and village to market roads wil l p lay a 
pivotal ro le in the move away from subsistence faming to high-value crops. 
15. Second, market facilities - markets, storage, processing and drying centres - are grossly 
inadequate in the mid- and far-western regions compared to the other regions. All these contribute to  
l imi ted markets, l o w  prices and l o w  productivity. Priority needs to be given to developing market 
infrastructures in these regions, especially in commodities, which have revealed their potential for 
commercialisation. 
16. Third, regulatory and legal reforms are needed to promote private sector and community 
organization participation in commercial activities, the developments of markets, and the introduction of 
standards. Thus, there i s  a need to extensively streamline 66 laws, 38 rules and regulations, 39 executive 
orders and 39 by-laws that impinge on commercial and contract farming into a more manageable set. 
Fourth, experienced NGO or private sector based assistance in the formation and operation o f  a group 
approach to production, processing, and marketing o f  high value commodities will be useful given the 
small scale o f  Nepal’s agnculture. 
D. Factor Markets 
17. There is signiJicant scope and need to improve policies and eficiency in land, waterhrigation, 
and credit markets. Although there was significant expansion o f  irrigation and credit in the 1990s, which 
helped to boost agriculture, market rigidities (land), inefficient pricing and weak institutional incentives 
(water), and inadequate and unsustainable coverage (credit) pose major constraints at present. 
18. Labor. Currently, more than two-thirds of the labor force in Nepal is employed in agriculture. 
This i s  significantly higher than other South Asia neighbors such as India (58%), Bangladesh (55%) and 
Pakistan (47%). This share of the labor force in agriculture, however, declined rapidly in the 1990s f rom 
more than 80% to 66%, with significant growth in the share o f  industrial employment (currently 13%) 
and employment abroad (approximately 9% of the labor force). Within the agriculture sector, self- 
employment dominates. There were only 180,000 permanent agriculture laborers - or less than 3% o f  the 
labor force in agnculture. Overall, less than 3% o f  households employed both permanent and casual 
workers. In the absence of employment opportunities and lacking assets, a good proportion o f  the farm 
labor pledge their services to land owners for long periods - effectively working as bonded labor. In 
Western Nepal, this practice becomes more formal with labor being tied to the land as Kamaiya 
(indentured) labor. Whi le this practice was declared illegal and abolished in 2000, it continues in reality in 
the absence o f  other opportunities or programs to provide them with other assets. Wage data in Nepal i s  
extremely weak. However, f ie ld visi ts and the household survey data suggests that the tightening o f  labor 
market has resulted in an increase in agriculture wage rates. Despite this, real wages in agriculture remain 
l o w  relative to neighboring countries. This suggests employment intensive growth that would foster more 
rapid wage increases in rural areas wil l be critical to rural  poverty reduction. 
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19. Land. The agrarian structure in Nepal is dominated by small-land holdings. The average size o f  
land owned i s  about 0.8 ha, which i s  frequently fragmented, averaging 3.3 parcels. This i s  in part due to 
Nepal’s Land  A c t  o f  1962, which imposes a stringent limit on land holdings. It allows for a maximum o f  
17 ha per holding in Terai, and 4 ha in the h i l l s  and mountains. In addition, cropping intensity i s  relatively 
low, and increases only slightly as farm size decreases. The small landholdings and their l o w  productivity 
pose difficulties for  many agriculture-based households in generating an adequate income and livelihood 
and are important determinants o f  poverty. 
irrigation, Nepal irrigation Strategy needs to be 
regionally differentiated (Table 4.4). In Terai, the 
strategy for expanding irrigation should include a 
combination o f  surface and groundwater irrigation 
development. Large irrigation schemes (greater than 
10,000 ha) can be developed with surface water sources. 
Groundwater development could be focused on crop 
20. Land rental and sales markets are constrained by land policy relating to land leasing and weak 
land administration systems. Nepal’s dual tenure system allowed both tenant and owners to lay claim on 
the same land. Lack  of clear ownership rights thus discourages investments or renting o f  land to more 
productive users and can pose limits on the use o f  land as collateral. Only 9% o f  the land area was rented 
in 1994, but there i s  also considerable hidden tenancy. In a much welcomed move that would improve the 
functioning o f  land rental markets, this provision was repealed through an amendment o f  the Land Ac t  in 
1998. But i t s  implementation and positive impact will take time. Land ownership records are very 
rudimentary. Measures to improve land administration systems, particularly cadastral and land title 
records, to provide greater security o f  ownership and reduce transactions costs will also be needed. 
Irrigated Area Surface Ground Total 
(ha) by system Water Water 
~ O v ~ r n m e n t  290,000 30,000 320,000 
operated 
Farmer operated 690~000 190800 880,000 
Total 980,000 220,000 1,200,000 
and Source 
22. Many surface irrigation systems are plagued by low eflciency. In many cases, only about two- 
thirds o f  the irrigation command area actually receives irrigation. Moreover, many surface irrigation 
systems suffer from inadequate maintenance leading to their rapid deterioration. Poor irrigation 
maintenance arises from inadequate budget allocation exacerbated by poor cost recovery, and lack o f  
incentives and accountability for maintenance by irrigation agencies. At one level, the average cost 
recovery for operations and maintenance in the Government Agency Managed schemes i s  estimated at 
only 1.3%, and the pricing i s  seriously distorted by makmg it tied to the size o f  landholding rather than 
actual use o f  water. The cycle of deferred-maintenance and consequent costly rehabilitation undermines 
the quality o f  irrigation service delivery. Institutionally, participatory water user’s associations have done 
much better than government agency managed systems at cost recovery and maintenance. But some large 
size surface irrigation facilities, which have a strong public good component, wil l continue to need 
Government management. 
23. With these considerations, Government can unbundle the maintenance strategy in the following 
manner: (a) maintenance of the head-works and big structures should remain under government 
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responsibility. The Govemment can fund these works through an adequate budget appropriation for 
operations and maintenance; (b) maintenance o f  the secondary level (main canals) depending on their 
size, complexity and capacity o f  user groups could be taken over by federations o f  W A S  (as they do in 
the Hil ls),  co-financed by the Government and W A S .  Collection o f  fees will o f  course require a clear 
link to  quality o f  services delivered. The tertiary level (minor canals and watercourses) should be whol ly 
transferred to water users. Adequate capacity will need to be built at the WUA level to ensure a smooth 
transfer and sustainability. WUAs would collect fees for the O&M o f  their scheme from their members 
and put in place the organizational structure and incentives for water distribution and management at their 
level. They would contract any services themselves. 
Fertilizer Application Rate 
Formal source Informal Source Total 
(kg nutrientslha) (kg nutrientslha) (kg nutrientslha) 
Before 
deregulation 
1996197 25 3 28 
1996/97 22 4 26 
After 
deregulation 
1997198 15 5 20 
1998199 38 6 44 
I999100 35 7 42 
1992193 - 
24. Fertilizer. Although increasing, fertilizer use remains low in Nepal. During the 1965-1 990 
period, fertilizer consumption increased by over 22%. Usage dropped in the early 1990s but increased 
significantly in the second half of the 1990s. Data from a 2001/02 household survey indicate fertilizer 
consumption o f  56 kg per hectare o f  cultivated land; the Amcul ture Sector Performance Review found 
similar results at 58 kgha .  Nevertheless, fertilizer consumption per unit o f  arable land i s  four to six times 
lower than Pakistan, which similarly does not provide fertilizer price subsidies (Table 4.5). 
25. I n  1997, the government removed the fertilizer 
distribution and import monopoly of the Agricultural 
Inputs Corporation. The entry o f  the private sector in 
both imports and distribution improved the domestic 
availability o f  fertilizers considerably. At the same 
time, the government also phased out fertilizer 
subsidies, and the prices o f  fertilizers were 
decontrolled at the wholesale and retail level. Notably, 
despite the elimination o f  fertilizer subsidies, fertilizer 
consumption s t i l l  increased. Improved market 
incentives and expanding use o f  irrigation and access 
to credit also l ike ly  contributed to  enhance the 
incentives for increased fertilizer use. 
Source: Shrestha (2000) 
26. Credit. The growth of agriculture in the second half of the 1990s was underpinned by a 
significant growth in agricultural credit from formal sources though its coverage is still limited and its 
sustainability is in question. After being stagnant in the f irst half, the share o f  credit in agricultural GDP 
grew from 6% in 1994 to  more than 10% by 2001, implying a doubling in real terms. But i t s  coverage 
remains limited, especially for  the poor. Only 8% o f  the households at the bottom income quartile had 
loans from formal sources, compared to  26% in each o f  the wealthier quartiles. On average, only 14% o f  
households had access to formal credit (including provision by other banks and Grameen-type 
institutions. One major source o f  formal credit i s  the ADBN. The recent financial audit o f  the ADBN, the 
source o f  more than 85% o f  formal credit, has revealed that the ADBN’s assets have sharply deteriorated 
in quality, placing future lending in jeopardy. 
39 Note: 1. I t  i s  conservatively assumed that 10 percent and 15 percent o f  the total fertilizer imported and distributed from formal 
source may additionally have been illegally brought in to Nepal from India before deregulation for the period o f  1992193 - 
1996197 and FY 1996197. 
2. The differences in the proportion o f  informal source o f  fertilizer are guided b y  the pricing structure adopted in Nepal. 
The higher the price o f  third country imported fertilizer i s  greater the tendency o f  farmers to purchase illegal cross border 
fertilizer. For instance, there was relatively a smaller contribution (1 0-1 5 percent) o f  informal source to total fertilizer application 
before fertilizer deregulation since the price differentiation between the imported fertilizer and illegal cross border fertilizer was 
small (10-12 percent). 
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27. n e  challenge for the future is expanding access to credit especially to the poorer farmers. There 
are three approaches for addressing the issue on ensuring adequate credit. First, Government, with the 
technical assistance from the Asian Development Bank, has begun the restructuring o f  the ADBN with 
the goal o f  separating i t s  development lending from commercial banking and refocusing the development 
lending to medium and larger borrowers. This i s  being accompanied by a rationalization o f  the branch 
network and o f  the business processes and expansion o f  financial products. The restructuring o f  ADBN 
should have a beneficial fiscal impact and may indeed succeed in supporting the target group o f  
commercially viable medium and larger borrowers. Second, the Government will need to provide more 
focus o n  expanding and ensuring a sound business environment for micro finance intermediaries (MFIs) 
and other rural  finance intermediaries (trade credit providers and other informal sources). Third, 
Government has to consider addressing the issue o f  credit market failures - i.e. the less than optimal 
supply o f  credit for viable capital project and investments and maintenance - with the use o f  matching 
grants. Under these schemes, farmers can be partly reimbursed for capital costs they incur for a variety o f  
agricultural implements - tubewells, to surface water canal maintenance, implements etc. T h i s  approach 
has the merit o f  being economically sound and better targeted for productive use. Nepal  can draw o n  the 
considerable experience o f  using matching grants in the South Asian Region and elsewhere (see B o x  4.1). 
Box 4.1: Suggested guidelines for providing matching grants for income-generating activities 
Target matching grant assistance to very poor communities or groups that are beyond the current reach of micro-finance 
institutions. One way to do this i s  to make the grant amount large enough to be useful to the poorest, but too small to be 
worthwhile for better off groups. 
The income generating activities financed must be cost-effective ways of reducing poverty. Th is  can be 
demonstrated by impact and cost-effectiveness indicators. 
The investments should not compete directly with private investment (existing or likely). 
Beneficiaries should always contribute at least partly in cash (no less than 5% o f  the total project cost), which will 
demonstrate commitment and can serve toward the initial working capital to operate the activity. 
Over generous subsidies may create false positive demand (even where beneficiaries contribute in the form o f  labor or cash). 
T h i s  may jeopardize future maintenance of the investment by beneficiaries. Subsidies used without tied commitments for 
repayment, user fees, or maintenance, may create perverse incentives for greater rent-seeking by beneficiaries. 
Grants should be combined with training and support to establish local savings and credit associations to capture increased 
income flows and finance future economic activities (group or individual) on a sustainable basis. 
Subsidies based on percentage cost-sharing o f  subprojects create an unknown contingent liability for govemment. Th is  can 
be avoided by basing these on per capita amounts, or fixing a ceiling for govemment contributions with excess being met by 
beneficiaries. 
Source World Bank, Agricultural Sourcebook, 2004. 
E. Development of the Western Lagging Regions - Challenge and Potential 
28. The Challenge. The challenge of promoting more rapid rural growth and development and 
reducing poverty remains large in Nepal. The mid-Western development region (MWDR) and the far- 
Western development region (FWDR) provide an important illustrative example. They lag significantly 
behind the rest o f  Nepal in terms o f  most development indicators. Poverty i s  much more acute in these 
regions with about 48% o f  the population below poverty l ine in the Terai and over 70% in the hills and 
mountains. Nine o f  the 10 hill districts produce less than required for minimum self-sufficiency and a l l  8 
mountain districts have chronic food deficits. In terms o f  various development indicators, the bottom 13 
districts o f  Nepal’s 75 districts4’ l ie  in these two regions.41 Further, the people o f  these regions have a 
40 ICIMODISNV, study of 1997. 
41 Agro-Enterprises Center, “Agriculture Development Programme for Hills o f  Mid-Westem and Far-Westem Development 
Regions o f  Nepal: A Concept Paper”, Background Paper, May, 2004. 
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distinct sense o f  being marginal and excluded from a Kathmandu driven development process. 
Unsurprisingly, these regions now constitute the heartland o f  the Maoist insurgency. As the loth Five 
Year Plan recognizes, a special effort i s  needed to develop these regions. This section sketches an outline 
o f  such a development strategy. 
29. The Potential. While the MWDR and the FWDR are backward, these regions have considerable 
economic potential - and in particular two assets -- waiting to be tapped. If uti l ized properly, these assets 
and regions can become not only a driver o f  poverty reduction for the people in these regions, but an asset 
for  Nepal’s growth in general. The f i rs t  asset comes from the ago-ecological diversity o f  these regions 
with i t s  astonishingly large range o f  height. This leads to comparative advantage in high value 
horticulture and crops at different seasons. These include high quality f ru i ts  and vegetables, both seasonal 
and off-season, ginger (drylfresh), lentil, vegetable seed, products such as vegetable ghee, medicinal and 
aromatic plant products, non-forest timber products such as rosin turpentine and some agricultural by- 
products, honey production, as wel l  as livestock and forestry products. Several success stories have 
already emerged: e.g. bee keeping and the production o f  lenti l in Dang, off-season vegetable in Dhankuta 
and Makwanpur; sunflower in the FWDR; tea and coffee, in many parts o f  Nepal f rom East to Far-West 
Development Regions. Another interesting feature i s  that in many o f  these cases, farmer organizations 
(groups, cooperatives, associations) consisting mostly o f  smallholder farmers have been active and are 
among the most productive farmers. 
30. This brings up the second asset of the hills: the traditionally strong community spirit - i.e. social 
capital -- that one witnesses in this area, the driving force behind an unusual success of community and 
user groups in forestly, irrigation, roads, and water and sanitation sectors. Perhaps, the most acclaimed 
example on this comes from the one mi l l ion hectares o f  previously degraded forestland (about 18% o f  the 
total forest area o f  Nepal) that was brought under successful community forestry program. More  than 
13000 user groups have been formed to manage forest areas where 1.45 mi l l ion households or 35% o f  the 
population o f  Nepal are involved. This activity has been particularly intense in the MWDR and the 
FWDR by reportedly more than 3200 Community Forest groups who covered an area o f  about 278,750 ha 
of forestland and benefited almost 320000  household^.^^ 
Elements of a Strategy 
3 1, As these two areas are predominantly rural and agriculture dominates economic activity, 
agricultural and rural growth built primarily on connectivity and commercialization is the key to 
development. The poor development outcomes in the MWDR and FWDR can be largely attributed to 
subsistence farming and poor access to infrastructure. Despite the growth o f  the road network in 
and a general increase in rural mobility, the extreme northwest (the Karnali Zone) and much o f  the 
MWDR and FWDR s t i l l  remains extremely isolated. 
32. While the Government has already identiJied the key strategic thrusts required for economic 
development of Hills and mountain regions in its IOth Plan and the Agricultural Perspective Plan“, it is 
not yet clear to commercial stakeholders in the MWDR and FWDR what strategies are currently in place 
to intens@ agricultural production and its commercialization. T w o  issues lower expectations in 
particular. First, as most dramatically illustrated by the lack o f  investment in rural  roads in Chapter 2, the 
strategy o f  the APP has yet to be properly implemented in these regions. Second, more emphasis i s  
needed on marketing and generating demand. One example o f  the lack thereof i s  the Crop Diversification 
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43 See Chapter 3. 
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Baral, S.R. and B. Karki, (2002), “A Baseline Study on Non-timber forest products in Far Westem Development Region, 
Neapl. Agro-Enterprises Center, Kathmandu. 
T h e  identification of pocket areas for leading commodities, development o f  infrastructure, technology development and 
institutional upliftment 
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Project4’ -- one o f  t h e  main projects particularly designed for MWDR and FWDR -- has no component on 
development o f  of f - farm value adding programs and product marketing. 
33.  Given these considerations, a more focused and comprehensive strategy is needed to speed up the 
development and commercializing agriculture in MWDR and F WDR by combining some elements of the 
APP with commercialization. Such a strategy would consist o f  the following elements: (a) regulatory and 
pol icy reforms that facilitate private sector entry and the development o f  cooperative marketing; (b) 
improvement in infrastructure - roads, rural electrification and micro-irrigation; in particular development 
o f  north-south highway corridors that can link areas o f  products o f  identified potential to markets; and (c) 
developing market promotion strategies. 
34. Regulatoly and legal reforms to promote private sector participation wil l  be key. Global 
experience with regional development programs clearly indicate that successful programs are those that 
are private investment led, with the role of the Government being to provide confidence and policy 
credibility, and public goods such as infrastructure and research, and some risk mitigation measures 
such as providing credit and seed capital.46 But the first requirement for this i s  that the approximately 66 
laws, 3 8  rules and regulations, 39 executive orders and 39 by-laws4’ that impinge o n  agncultural activities 
and trade and private sector investment be reformed. In particular laws to support contract, commercial 
and cooperating farming, and removing domestic barriers to trading will be particularly i m ~ o r t a n t . ~ ’  The 
first i s  the Draft  Bill for Commercial Agriculture Contract Act-2060 with the provisions for private sector 
or farmers to take government or local body owned land and other privately owned land into lease for a 
certain period for commercial agncultural production and also for  legal validity o f  agreements for 
contract farming. The second i s  reforms in the Cooperative Act-2048 for the purpose o f  registration and 
management o f  cooperatives in the country. The cooperative approach in input marketing and easy access 
to credit has also been possible through different forms o f  saving and credit cooperatives. But, there have 
been few cooperatives, which are directly geared towards collective production and product marketing, 
partly because the existing Cooperative Act  i s  si lent on the legality o f  Marketing Cooperatives and nor 
does it allow cooperatives to function as a commercial entity. Finally, private sector participation will be 
boosted i f standards can be fostered. Thus another priority i s  the Plant Protection Act-2060 under which 
plant quarantine offices across the country will be enforcing quarantine rules in compatible to SPS 
Agreement under WTO. Currently, both capacity and capability o f  Plant and Livestock Quarantine offices 
and Department o f  Food Technology and Quality Control for inspectiodtesting and issuing phyto- 
sanitary/quality certificates are limited. 
35. Improving connectivity and infrastructure in the MWDR and the FWDR by completing a few key 
road networks under construction wi l l  be necessary for connecting high value crop areas and markets 
and inviting more private sector participation. The connectivity potential f rom these roads i s  sketched out 
in Table 4.6. Community projects would help, given the high social capital potential o f  region. But a 
particular issue here i s  the institutional vacuum created by the absence o f  local Governments. In the past 
T h i s  i s  a project o f  the Ministry o f  Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) and funded by the ADB. 
Anwar Shah, “Bridging the Economic Divide Within Countries: A Scorecard on the Performance o f  Regional Policies in 
Reducing Regional Income Disparities”, World Development, Vol. 3 1,2003. 
Pesticides Act-2048, Pesticides Rules-2050, Plant Protection Act-2029, Plant Protection Rule-203 1, Seeds Act-2045, Seeds 
Rule-2054, Food Act-2023, Food Rules-2027, Nepal Standards (Certification Mark) Act-2036 and Rules-2039, Contract 
Act-2056, Local Self-Govemance Act-2055, Local Self-Govemance Rule-2056, Animal Health and Livestock Services Act- 
2055, Animal Health and Livestock Services Rule-2056, Cooperative Act-2048, Cooperatives Rule-2049 are some of the 
Acts and Rules promulgated by the govemment o f  Nepal that have been playing vital role in the agricultural development o f  
Nepal. 
Contract farming i s  a forward agreement between farmers and processing and/or marketing f i rms  for the supply of 
agricultural products, frequently at predetermined prices. T h e  purchaser provides a number o f  support measures to the 
farmers such as supply of inputs, and provision of technical advice, loan and transportation. T h e  farmer provides a specific 
commodity, quantity and quality standards ofwhich i s  determined by the purchaser (FA0 2001). 
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the Div is ion o f  Local  Infrastructure Development and Rural Roads and Agricultural Roads ( D o L D A R )  
o f  MOLD and i t s  regional and district level units - which have the technical responsibility for the 
development o f  rural  transport network - has worked with DDCsNDCs.  But now given their absence 
progress has slowed down. 
36. Irrigation. The lack of 
dry season irrigation is the 
greatest constraint faced by 
majority of the smallholder 
farmers engaged in upland 
farming in the hills of Nepal, 
particularly in the Western parts 
of Nepal where annual average 
rainfall is halfthat of the eastern 
parts of Nepal. Here, the 
seasonaVperennia1 springs and 
Table 4.6 Potential Pocket Areas for Production and Non-Farm Activities in Three 
Highway Corridors of MWDR & FWDR 
District 
streams or rainwater are the 
potential sources o f  irrigation and 
a wide variety o f  innovative 
irrigation schemes that are 
already in use, needs to be 
disseminated for efficient 
irrigation sources. Without such 
Pockets Numbers 
3 6 \ 4 1  1181131141 1 1 4  1 1  0 1 3  1 1 4 ( 1 2 (  0 1121 1 
to develop 10,000 ha irrigation through the adoption o f  these modem technology for the production o f  
high-value crops will not be met. Among these practices are the drip and sprinkler technology promoted 
have proven to have water application efficiency in an order o f  75% or more compared to  20 to 50% in 
other conventional surface irrigation (DE, 2002). 
37. Extension and Research Services. Agronomic and horticultural development in the H i l l  regions 
wi l l  depend on high quality extension and research activities to deliver improved seedshaplings, farming 
technology, management practices etc. Agriculture extension system wil l also have to  address the needs 
o f  a wide range o f  clients from small farmers to large-scale commercial enterprises. There i s  also need to 
broaden the concept of extension to include support for development o f  input and output marketing, social 
mobilization, H V C  farming, f a d o r c h a r d  managements, business planning, natural resource 
management, post harvest handling and primary value addition. There i s  also growing concern with 
pesticide residues in agncultural products. Most  o f  the WTO member countries, including recently the 
GOI, introduce stringent SPS measures to control the use o f  chemical pesticides in farming. Lately, even 
the GO1 has adopted a SPS Measure to control the import o f  f ru i ts  and vegetables, tea etc. Hence, 
successful exports to India, and potentially, the Middle East and the Far East will require that farmers be 
thoroughly trained to use the pesticides judiciously by introducing PM techniques. Given these varied 
and sophisticated demands a key need here i s  to improve the quality o f  extension and research services 
and it i s  clear that the incentive structure will be key. 
38. One important implication of this is that public sector institutions like DADO and NARC cannot 
be the sole or predominant extension service provider and there is a need to bring the private sector and 
NGOs in these activities. Analysis o f  lessons o f  many projects and programs show widespread farmer 
dissatisfaction with the weakness o f  the research and extension system to provide effective services to 
commercial agnculture stakeholders. Experienced local and international private extension companies can 
be contracted to set up and run farmers' schools as we l l  as providing improved training for extension 
workers (i.e. for junior technicians or junior technical assistants). Such training has to be purely 
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performance based. In addition, public agencies, private companies and NGOs can be give performance 
based contracts with farmer groups and local government to provide extension services to the farmers. 
39. Developing Market Promotion Activities. The commercialization of agriculture is occurring but 
there is considerable potential to expand this. As commercialization o f  agnculture i s  relatively recent in 
the MWDR and the FWDR, programs for market promotion will be needed. The support activities will 
need to include activities such as: (i) strengthening o f  government quality testing/certifying units and 
quarantine inspection/certification units in MWDR and FWDR; (ii) facilitating the export o f  products 
through organizing agriculture trade fairs organization and participation in similar fairs in other countries; 
(iii) introduction o f  temporary support measures in the form o f  schemedmatching grant to assist value 
addition activities consistent with the export requirements (grading, packaging, quality certification, and 
sample exports); (iv) export counseling and international market information services; (v) training o n  
agriculture product export practices, packaginglpost-harvest handling, quality requirements; and (vi) 
organizing periodic interactions programs between importers and exporters for establishing marketing 
linkages, particularly bringing in importers f rom India. 
F. Summingup 
40. The review of Government policies and strategy suggests that a wide range of policy reforms are 
needed to improve the eficiency of output and factor markets in order to sustain agricultural growth. K e y  
among these i s  the reforms o f  laws and regulations that restrain private sector investment and trade, 
contract farming and the development o f  cooperative farming in the sector. The importance o f  improving 
road connections o f  various hnds and marketing facilities i s  clear. On factor markets, the need to further 
strengthen land property rights by improving land records and removing the harm caused by dual tenure 
system and facilitating land exchange was emphasized. A need to link water charges more carefully t o  
actual use and improving maintenance arrangements by increasing the role o f  farmer managed systems in 
al l  but large scale irrigation systems has emerged. The issue o f  sustaining and increasing access to credit 
became clear. A recommendation to use matching grants scheme to meet capital costs and investment 
requirements by farmers also becomes clear. 
41. Elements offocused strategy on the lagging mid- and far- Western regions that have considerable 
potential. A common theme across a l l  recommendations i s  the need to use Nepal’s proven effectiveness 
o f  community and user groups to manage agricultural growth and the need to promote more private sector 
participation. Beyond this the importance o f  reviving and strengthening local governments to promote 
agncultural development becomes paramount. Thus, for instance, even the design o f  any Western regions 
development strategy, let alone i t s  implementation, will need to be done by the local and regional 
governments. This issue o f  decentralization i s  addressed in the discussion o n  Governance in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5: IMPROVING INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE 
DELIVERY 
A. Challenges to Good Governance 
1. Nepal succeeded in building up a wide range of good government institutions -- a system of laws 
and organizations, checks and balances -- in a short span of time, though their relative lack of history 
and tradition has inevitably also made these fragile. Policies, infrastructure and economic and human 
development outcomes have steadily improved under these institutions, though clearly not  fast enough to 
meet the tide o f  r is ing expectations that accompanied the advent o f  democracy in 1991. But Nepal can 
draw upon a number o f  important strengths in advancing i t s  governance and public management reform 
agenda. The administrative and accountability framework i s  in place; a l ively press and nascent but 
growing c i v i l  society are creating additional pressures for change. In this setting, HMGN should be able 
to take forward radical reform. However, set against these dynamics are the tremendous challenges 
confronting HMGN at the present time, whose severity cannot be over-estimated. 
2. n e  Challenge of History and Geography. Nepal’s history and geography contributes 
significantly t o  contemporary governance challenges. The high degree o f  ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and the isolation o f  mountain and hill communities make it hard to consolidate services 
and realize the gains from economies o f  scale.49 I t  has also complicated efforts to form a unified state in 
which a l l  citizens are able to participate to  their ful lest potential. Historically, polit ical and economic 
power has rested in the Kathmandu valley and has been concentrated in a small group o f  upper caste 
elites. Consistent with this tradition, the c iv i l  service has historically been heavily dominated by high- 
caste Nepalese f rom the Kathmandu valley. 
3 .  A Compressed History of Development. From i t s  background as an isolated, feudal state locked 
between India and China in the 1950s, with extremely l o w  human development indicators, Nepal has 
made considerable progress in establishing the elements o f  a modem parliamentary democracy and public 
administration. Unl ike most o f  South Asia, where the legal and administrative roots o f  Public 
Administration were established in the middle o f  the 19th Century, it was only in 1951 that the c i v i l  
service was established. T h e  Constitution o f  1990 accorded the Auditor General complete legal and 
professional independence and created a Commission for the Investigation o f  Abuse o f  Authority, the 
only independent anti-corruption agency in South Asia. The Nepal i  Parliament’s Public Accounts 
Committee, headed by an opposition member and with open public access, has served as a vocal 
institution o f  a c c o ~ n t a b i l i t y . ~ ~  Government financial management systems functions relatively wel l  and i s  
more computerized than many neighboring countries. 
4. Political Instability throughout the 1990s. Nepal’s twelve year experience with parliamentary 
democracy has been characterized by chronic polit ical instability, including n o  fewer than twelve pr ime 
ministers throughout this period. Ministerial positions have been uti l ized as a key reward for potential 
coalition partners, resulting in frequent changes at the top and corresponding changes in the bureaucracy. 
One study o f  Nepali politics from 1994 to 1998 revealed that, out o f  265 members in Parliament, 121 
were able to  become ministers. This constant turnover has fundamentally affected implementation and 
made public administration hostage to electoral and polit ical interests. 
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I t  would, for example, take a witness, litigant or victim in the remote regions o f  Nepal’s Dolpa district seventeen days to 
reach the nearest district court. 
Although the PAC, though proactive in the past, has lacked authority to take actions against non-compliance or to enforce its 
directives. One assessment in 1998, for example, revealed that the majority o f  ministries complied with less than 30 percent 
of PAC’s directives. See, PAC Ninth Anuual Report, June 1998, cited from Surya Prakash Shrestha 
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5. A State in Conflict. Political f lux and the inability o f  the state to solve the violent insurgency that 
has claimed over 10,000 lives have also led to a growing disappointment with the polit ical and 
developmental processes. Government i s  widely viewed as having failed to meet the aspirations o f  the 
people, which could lead to a crisis o f  legitimacy. T h e  Maoist insurgency has gained strength from the 
failure o f  institutions to deliver basic public services, to include the poor in accessing growth and services 
and to prevent corruption and instability. The insurgency has compounded the problems o f  reach and has 
meant that the remit  of the government has shrunk largely to urban and semi-urban areas. Weak 
legitimacy can reduce the willingness o f  the public to comply with government directives or support 
polit ical initiatives. It will also raise the risk that some o f  the administrative gains in recent years could be 
weakened or reversed by broader political developments. At worst, it could lead to regime collapse and 
the problem o f  a “failed state.” 
6. Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses four main issues for good governance. The f i rs t  i s  
restoring and strengthening the accountability and representative institutions that Nepal had built up at 
both national and local government levels under which Nepal has achieved good progress. Their absence 
and that o f  alternative institutions have created a vacuum that i s  undermining the legitimacy o f  the State. 
The second issue i s  improving the government effectiveness - i.e. the ability to implement i t s  own 
policies. The key task here i s  to make the c iv i l  service more accountable, disciplined, and professional. 
The third issue concerns restarting decentralization to make Government more responsive to the 
heterogeneous needs and preferences o f  a diverse people. Decentralization o f  power and devolution o f  
public services to local Governments and community groups i s  vital for bringing the Government closer 
to Nepal’s widely dispersed people. This shortens the “long route o f  accountability” and enables service 
users and communities to monitor their governments, discipline their service providers, and have their 
voices heard. The fourth issue to make government and public services more inclusive to reduce the large 
gender, ethnic and caste based disparities n o w  prevalent in Nepal. 
B. Strengthening Central Government Institutions 
7.  Parliamentary Oversight and Transparency: For a l l  i t s  shortcomings and instability, the 
dissolution o f  Parliament in October 2002 has meant that a fundamental pil lar o f  accountability and 
pol icy making has been weakened. This i s  most evident in the long queue o f  bills that l i e  pending, and the 
current lack o f  a functioning Public Accounts Committee. The Auditor General’s annual report i s  n o w  
sent to the King, as per the Constitution, but it i s  not la id  before Parliament-reducing the benefits o f  
transparency and diminishing scrutiny. Nepal will need to  re-establish this mechanism and ensure 
Parliamentary oversight o f  public expenditure. 
8. Judiciary: Nepal has an independent Judiciary with three tiers including the Supreme Court, 16 
Appellate Courts and District Courts in each o f  Nepal’s 75 districts. In comparison with other countries in 
South Asia, Nepal’s judiciary does not fare badly. According to a recent study by Transparency 
International, 42 percent o f  citizens who had regular interaction with the judiciary reported encountering 
corruption, as opposed to 100 percent in India and Sri Lanka; 96 percent in Pakistan; and 75 percent in 
Bangladesh.s’ A number o f  leading scholars have argued that Nepal’s problems with legal and judic ia l  
reform are in fact much less intractable than those confronting i t s  neighbors.s2 Dysfunctional practices are 
not  so deeply entrenched and the number o f  cases pending i s  a fraction o f  what i t  i s  in India and Palustan. 
There i s  stronger supervision o f  lower courts and data i s  better maintained and more accessible. The 
language o f  Justice i s  Nepali, which makes justice more accessible. W h i l e  these findings provide reason 
for hope, much can be done to improve the functioning o f  the legal system. A detailed assessment o f  
5 1  
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Nepal Law Society, pp. 11-12. Other survey data has placed the incidence o f  corruption even lower, at around 30 percent. 
Erik Jensen, Robert Moog and Shahid Kardar, Understanding and Reforming the Nepalese Legal System, Asia Foundation, 
2001, pp. 5-6. 
48 
gender issues, for  example, found consistent patterns o f  discrimination o n  the part o f  the judiciary - over 
98% o f  whom are,maleS3 indicating the need for substantive training and professional development. The 
Supreme Court has recently approved a five-year plan formulated for the comprehensive development o f  
the judiciary. An important priority i s  the amendment o f  inconsistent legislation. 
9. Anti-Corruption: Although comparative survey data by Transparency International indicates 
that, in comparison with other South Asian countries, the actual day-to-day experience of citizens with 
corruption is lower in Nepal (Table 5.1),54 the data still paints a disturbing picture of a public sector 
corruption. For instance, the average cost o f  bribes paid to the police was N R s  1,637 (around $US 22), or 
just under 10 percent of annual per capita GDP.” 
Table 5.1 Comparative Corruption Scorecard for the Sectors 
(Percentage of respondents reporting corruption in their interaction with the agenq) 
Country School Health Power land Admin Tax Police Judiciary 
Bangladesh 40 58 32 73 19 84 75 
India 34 15 30 47 15 100 100 
Pakistan 92 96 96 100 99 100 96 
Sri lanka 61 92 NA 98 NA 100 100 
Source: Transparency International Report, 2003. 
10. During the last two years, HMGN has taken a number of impressive initiatives to combat 
corruption. A National Vigilance Centre was set up located in the Prime Minister’s office in 2002 to co- 
ordinate the anti-corruption function within the executive branch. Important pieces o f  legislation were 
passed in 2002, including the Commission for Investigation o f  Abuse o f  Authority (CIAA) Second 
Amendment Bill. Collectively, these laws clarified the procedures surrounding the impeachment o f  high- 
ranking politicians, government officials and the heads o f  constitutional bodies. 
11. The CIAA is the only constitutionally independent anticorruption body in South Asia and has the 
power to initiate cases against all top oficials, including the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. There has 
been a quantum leap in the number o f  complaints coming to the CIAA as we l l  as in the disposal o f  cases. 
Act ion i s  being taken against over 600 public officials. This initiative i s  an important effort to attack 
corruption through the vehicle o f  disproportionate assets.56 The anticorruption agenda has been one o f  the 
bright spots in Nepal’s governance reforms. Considerable work remains in improving the capacity and 
professionalism o f  these units o f  both the CIAA and the NVC; in expanding the CIAA’s presence into the 
districts; in expeditiously processing anticorruption cases and departmental disciplinary proceedings; and 
in strengthening the NVC and ensuring that i t  plays an appropriate role in helping to prevent corruption 
and facilitating public outreach. 
12. The National Human Rights Commission: There i s  a broad consensus among many human 
rights groups that the situation within the country improved markedly after the establishment o f  multi- 
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A Study of Gender and Judges, Kathmandu: Pro Public, 1999. In nearly 60% o f  rape cases reviewed by researchers, the 
court declared a verdict o f  not guilty. 
Transparency Intemational, Corruption in South Asia: Insights and Benchmarks for Citizen Feedback Surveys in Five 
Countries 2003. I t  should be noted that, as a region, South Asia does not fare particularly well in global anticorruption 
surveys conducted by Transparency Intemational and other organizations. 
Transparency Intemational, 2002, pp. 33-34. 
See Keshab Poudel, “A Political Gimmick,” Spotlight, Vol. 22, No. 8 (16 August, 2002). See also Transparency 
Intemational Nepal, Newsletter Vol. 5, No. 1 (April, 2003). 
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party democracy in 1990. Nepal has ratified major international human rights agreements, passed the 
1997 National Human Rights Commission Act, and set up commissions to address the rights o f  
historically disadvantaged groups such as women, Janajatis and Dalits. The National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) was established as an autonomous and statutory body in 2000 and has the authority 
to probe incidents o f  human rights violations, present recommendations and guidelines. The Commission 
wields considerable power and authority and i t s  status report o f  2003 presents a comprehensive and 
balanced attempt to catalogue the status o f  human rights issues in Nepal. Still, there continue to be a 
number o f  legal contradictions between the Constitution, domestic legislation, and several o f  the 
international agreements to which Nepal i s  a signatory. Many  human rights groups allege that efforts to 
achieve rights-based governance have been hampered by entrenched discriminatory practices and an 
administrative culture in which legal rights are often ignored or only weakly enforced.” These 
weaknesses in institutions are particularly highlighted in times o f  conflict and both the police and the 
Maoists are alleged to engage in human rights violations. 
13. Information and Transparency. Since the restoration o f  a multiparty system in 1990, Nepal has 
enjoyed a major expansion in the circulation and dissemination o f  information, but there are i s  n o  Right to 
Information legislation. There has been a rapid growth in the number o f  newspapers, radio stations and 
television operators and email service providers.” Some concerns remain though. After the proclamation 
of emergency in 2002, apprehension has multiplied regarding censorship and attacks upon journalists. 
Bo th  the Army and the Maoists have been accused o f  harassing and even murdering journalists, 
prohibiting the gathering o f  news in areas under their control, and imposing cens~rship. ’~ N o  Right to 
Information legislation currently exists within Nepal, although some discussion about the need for such a 
legal framework has recently taken place within government. A second concern centers on the state’s 
lingering role in the media and the nascent capacity o f  many private sector news organizations. 
Key Executive Branch Institutions and Functions. 
14. Cabinet: Nepal’s cabinet is relatively small and the distribution of functions is reasonable. I t s  21 
Cabinet ministries i s  significantly less than that in India and Bangladesh and less than hal f  the number in 
Sri Lanka. Nepal i s  noteworthy in that it has largely resisted to temptation to fragment administrative 
units to accommodate the requirements o f  coalition politics. 
15. Policy Coordination: Although Nepal has procedures in place for a formal Cabinet system, 
policy coordination, monitoring and implementation are weak. Policy coordination has improved in the 
last few years through the efforts o f  the Government to  prioritize i t s  policies and expenditures in a 
consistent manner. The Immediate Act ion Plan, the Med ium Term Expenditure Framework and the 
PRSP’s preparation and implementation have helped to improve coordination and responsiveness. The 
merger o f  the Prime Minister’s Office with the Cabinet Secretariat has created clearer functional 
responsibilities including tracking how directives are being implemented and coordinating HMGN’s 
“good governance” agenda. Nevertheless, pol icy coordination in some key areas such as trade policy, 
implementing the APP, and monitoring and evaluation remains weak and needs addressing. 
16. Civil Service: Relatively small, Nepal’s civil service effectiveness is hampered by inappropriate 
skill mix, poor incentives both in terms of pay and lax discipline, and its exclusiveness. The core c i v i l  
57 A variety o f  human rights organizations have criticized the “culture o f  impunity” within government, including the National 
Human Rights Commission, Amnesty Intemational, the Asian Human Rights Commission, the Damocles Network and 
Reporters Without Borders. 
See U.S. Department o f  States, Background Note: Nepal, 2001. 
For example, see the National Human Rights Commission, Human Rights in Nepal: A Status Report 2003 (Kathmandu: The 
Asia Foundation, 2003), pp. 18-24; U.S. Department o f  State, Nepal: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2002), 
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pp 10-11. 
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service in Nepal comprises 99,264 (of which 87,000 are filled) positions, or roughly 0.43 c iv i l  servants 
per hundred population, which in per capita terms i s  one o f  the smallest in both South Asia and the 
developing world. Total public employment including teachers, police, and employees o f  municipal, 
district and local government i s  approximately 27 1,000 or 1.17 employees per 100 population. By way o f  
contrast, Sri Lanka’s total civil ian government employment i s  nearly three and a ha l f  times larger than 
Nepal’s on a per capita basis. But while public employment i s  not  overly large, i t  suffers f rom problems 
o f  inappropriate s k i l l s  mix, heavy wage compression, and l o w  productivity. The composition o f  Nepal’s 
c i v i l  service i s  particularly skewed towards the lower unskilled tiers.60 The vast majority of employees 
(approximately 55 percent) are in the Administrative Service, followed by Health (1 8 percent), 
Engineering (9.6 percent) and Agriculture (5.5 percent). 
17. Recognizing the need to improve the skill mix of the civil service, the Government has made 
substantial improvements in human resource management in recent years. A Personnel Information 
System (PIS) has been developed that, for the f irst time, i s  capable o f  providing accurate, real-time 
information o n  the size and composition o f  the c iv i l  service. The PIS will shortly be l inked to  the payroll 
system to create a comprehensive human resource database (essential for traclung posts, vacancies, 
transfers, and forecasting future salary and pension liabilities). 
18. The civil service’s performance incentives are undermined by a heavily compressed wage 
structure, the worst in both South Asia and the developing world, and relatively very low salaries at 
professional and managerial levels in comparison to the private sector though this is not true at other 
levels. The compression ratio (defined as the ratio o f  highest to lowest paid) in the Nepalese core c iv i l  
service i s  3.6 (for salary) and 3.3 (for total net compensation), which means that a ministry secretary i s  
pa id only three and a half times more than a peon in the same ministry.6’ In contrast, the compression 
ratio in Sri Lanka i s  around 7; in Bangladesh it i s  10; and among various Indian states it varies f rom 5.6 t o  
11.7. Similarly, salary remuneration at senior levels (between US$160 to $225 for Joint Secretaries and 
Secretaries) can be less than a fifth of that in the private sector. These pay structures do not  motivate 
employees or help to attract the best talent and increase the r isks o f  corruption. 
19. Problems with performance evaluation also hinder performance and incentives for service 
delivery. The current system i s  cumbersome and lacks transparency; i t does not al low for intermediate 
feedback to enable corrective action. Clear j o b  descriptions do not exist against which performance can be 
measured. Increasing the capacity and role o f  performance assessment i s  l o w  and there i s  l i tt le 
understanding o f  i t s  value as a managerial tool for performance improvement and staff development.62 
20. A related problem is the ineffective disciplinary procedures that make it difficult to expeditiously 
sanction staff for malfeasance or poor performance. Only about 581 staff was subject to formal 
disciplinary procedures during the twenty-seven year period f rom 1976 through 2003. Only 6 c i v i l  
servants were suspended and one dismissed from service throughout the entire twenty-seven year 
period.63 Simplification of punitive measures and streamlining o f  the appeals processes i s  an important 
agenda for reform. 
21. Recent Administrative Reforms: Over the past Jive years, HMGN has implemented a number of 
important administrative reforms. An Administrative reform Monitor ing and Coordination Committee 
headed by the Prime Minister has been established to lead the govemance reform program and take major 
pol icy decisions. A number of  government organizations in areas such as aviation, telecommunication 
6o 
61 
Source: IMF ‘The Civil Service Sector: Key Issues and Reform Plans ’ Nepal Selected Issues Paper, 2002. 
See IMF The Civil Service Sector: Key Issues and Reform Plans, p. 4. 
For an analysis o f  the issues around Performance Evaluation In Nepal see Dr. Surya Prakash Shrestha, Governance Study: 
Nepal (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1999), p. 42. 
T h i s  data i s  derived from HMGN’s computerized Personnel Information System. 63 
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and tourism have been transformed into autonomous bodies. Within the c iv i l  service, vacant positions 
have been frozen since 2001 and about 7500 of the 17,000 vacancies in the c iv i l  service have been 
abolished. Efforts are underway to standardize job descriptions, and clarify codes o f  conduct and 
punishment provisions for c iv i l  servants. 
22. The Government has recently put together an excellent road map of reforms to be implemented 
under the Governance Reform Program that cover a range of issues linked with ethics, capacity, 
efJiciency and transparency. The program contains 67 proposed reforms to be implemented under a 
variety o f  headings. Three of the most prominent recommendations include a draft Governance Act  that 
seeks to clarify the division of responsibility between ministers and c iv i l  servants with regard to c iv i l  
service transfers (among other initiatives); proposed amendments to the 1993 Civil Service Act; and the 
creation o f  a Local  C iv i l  Service, recruited into a national pool  f rom which Local  Governments would be 
free to hire staff. The latter represents an innovative approach to empower the DDCs and VDCs to 
employ their own staff while trying to ensure some quality control. T o  operate smoothly the program wil l  
need to ensure that information flows smoothly between the local governments and the new Local Civ i l  
Service Commission. The Commission would have to take up the challenge o f  having a pool  o f  credible 
staff and improving career progression and salary incentives. 
23. 
forward and implement its design for public administration reform. This could be done by: 
Within this context, Nepal w i l l  require to focus reform on a number of critical areas to move 
(i) Implementing selected Civil Service reforms in Personnel Management and Administration to 
increase accountability and incentives. Procedures for monitoring staff performance need to be revised 
and updated to introduce greater transparency, feedback mechanisms and a stronger focus upon results. 
Disciplinary procedures need to be streamlined and made more effective. The salary structure needs to be 
overhauled and i t s  heavily compressed structure rectified to increase incentives for i t s  professional and 
executive ranks. 
(ii) Making the Civil Service more representative. Information derived from the Public Service 
Commission f rom 1999-2001 underscores the non-representative nature of Nepal’s civil service. Around 
97 percent o f  those accepted for the senior c iv i l  service ranks were Brahmins, Chettris and Newars, even 
though these groups constitute only about 35 percent o f  the population. At the same time only 5 percent 
of those recommended for recruitment were women. A variety o f  initiatives should be implemented to 
make the c iv i l  service more representative o f  Nepali society as a whole. Barriers that have traditionally 
made it diff icult for various caste andor ethnic groups to enter the c iv i l  service need to be assessed and 
eliminated. This could include reforming the c iv i l  service examination to use a more vernacular version o f  
Nepali or even some local languages; expanding the number o f  locations where the c iv i l  service 
examinations i s  offered; and tracking and malung available public data o n  the ethnic caste and gender 
composition o f  new recruits. 
(iii) Defining Clear Boundaries between the Political and Administrative Spheres: Civil service rules 
need to clarify responsibility and accountability between c iv i l  servants and the polit ical level. At present 
one of the most dysfunctional features o f  Nepal’s administration has been the polit ically motivated 
frequent transfers and lack o f  stable tenure within the bureaucracy. This had led  to politicization o f  the 
c iv i l  service. 
C. Making Government More Responsive: 
Restarting Decentralization and Empowering Communities 
24. Strengthening central institutions like the Parliament, the Judiciary and the Civi l  Service are 
critical to improving the accountability and service delivery. However, i f  Nepal i s  to address the needs o f  
heterogeneous and widely distributed population, i t will also have to address demands for 
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decentralization, equality and inclusion. With 70 languages and dialects and more than a hundred caste 
and ethnic groups, Nepal has a very diverse population and one o f  the highest ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization comparable to many Sub-Saharan African countries. By bringing government closer to 
the people, decentralization allows better reflection o f  local preferences, needs and constraints in public 
decision-making. Administrative and political decentralization i s  also a necessary condition for making 
the c iv i l  service more inclusive and for bringing issues o f  “voice” into planning and monitoring o f  service 
delivery. Given this, the Government considers decentralization as key to improving service delivery. 
25. The Local Self Government Act and Raising Voice: While different forms o f  local governments 
have existed in Nepal for more than four decades, the enactment o f  the Local Self Government A c t  
(LSGA) in 1999 was, by far, the strongest attempt to establish roles and functions for service delivery and 
local decision making at the sub-national level o f  government. The L S G A  defines three types o f  local 
bodies, municipalities for urban areas, Vil lage Development Committees (VDCs) for rural areas and 
District Development Committees (DDCs) at the district level. The A c t  further defines functions and 
sectoral assignments for these bodies and endows them with revenue powers. In January 2004 there were 
3913 VDCs, 58 municipalities and 75 DDCs in Nepal (See Figure 5.1). That this polit ical structure was 
Figure 5.1 The Structure of Local Bodies in Nepal, 2004 
75 District 
Development 
Committees 
DDC 
3913 Vil lage 
Development 
Committees: VDC L 58 Municipalities 
Div ided in: 
1)Municipal 
Corporation-1 ; 
2)Sub-municipal 
corporation-4 ; 
3)Municipality-53 
Wards:VDCs-9 equal in population 
Municipalit ies at least 9(maximum i s  35) equal in population 
put in place after consultations by nine different governments (including six coalitions between 1994 and 
2000), with near unanimous support, demonstrates the national consensus behind it. Unfortunately, after 
having achieved a strong start, decentralization has n o w  stalled as the tenure o f  the last local 
Governments expired in 2002. One indication o f  this i s  although the Government has set up a high power 
Decentralization Implementation and Monitoring Committee (DIMC) this body has not met for the last 
two years. One way to restart the process i s  by malung the D I M C  focus o n  resolving key pending issues 
note below. 
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Issues and Next Steps for Restarting Decentralization 
vaccinationslfamily planning; arrange medication supply. 
26. Consolidate size and number of local bodies. Some VDCs and DDCs, particularly those in more 
remote areas, have very small populations or revenue base 64 raising the issue o f  whether they can be 
effective centers for provision o f  services. Thus, there i s  a need to reduce the number of VDCs and 
DDCs by consolidating them into functionally viable units. 
1 
27. Implement administrative decentralization through resolving administrative ambiguity and 
forming a Local Government Civil Service. The second and related issue i s  the ongoing division o f  
responsibilities between various political and administrative entities at the local level, including DDCs, 
VDCs, School Management Committees, l ine departments, etc (see Table 5.2). This would require 
Table 5.2 Functional and Revenue Assignments of Local Bodies 
Agriculture 
Drinking Water 
Transport 
Education 
Waterllrrigation 
Physical development 
Health Services 
Forest 
Language and Culture 
Tourism and Cottage 
industries 
Varia 
Villages and Wards 
Provide marketslveterinary services/ pasture. 
Implement water projects, clean ponds, wells. 
Buildlmaintain trails, roads, bridges, culverts. 
Establish pre-primary schools; superviselmanage 
schools; offer adulffinformal education, sports and 
libraries. 
Buildloperate irrigation, soil erosion and electricity 
projects, canals and dams. 
Build community buildings, prepare land use plan/ 
issue building permits plan; provide solid waste 
sanitation. 
Operatelmanage health postslsub-post(HP/SHP); 
Assist in Management. 
Plant trees protect forest and environment. 
Preserve religious placeslrest houses;preserve 
languages, cultures, religions, inventory 
Preserve /develop tourism areas cottage industries. 
Encourage employment; assist cooperativeness; keep 
birthldeath registry; help helplessldisabled; women 
/disadvantaged groups; encourage industry; prevent 
1 natural calamities. 
1 Yes-75% House /Land Tax/ IPT 
land/ land revenue tax 
Market fees 
Businesslcommerciallrent 
Yes 
Yes 
tax 
Natural resource tax I 35% of revenue collected to VDC of origin 
I, Road tolls I yes 
Entertainment tax 1 Cinemas 
Source: LSGA. Ward: article 25;VDC: article 28; Municipality: article 96; DDC: article 18: 
Districts and Municipalities. 
Ensure supply of seeds and fertilizers. 
Multi VDCs project, Operate Projects. 
Build/ maintain district roads l suspension bridges. 
Prioritize schools; superviselmonitor schools; formulate 
policies for adult education and sports; Pre-primary 
Schools 
Multi VDCs projects. Buildloperate irrigationlsolid waste 
disposallelectricity facilities. Control waterlairlnoise 
pollution. 
Protect unregistered land; 
Buildloperate small hydro projects. Prepare land use 
planslhousing . 
Operatelmanage district HPISHP, hospitals Help with 
Preserve archeological objects; promotel 
languageslreligionsl cultures. 
Develop industrial zone; Protect naturallculturallhistorical 
tourism sites cottage industries. 
Determine the district wage rates ;fight child labor 
Approve cinemas; Open libraries. 
25% of VDC collected revenues. 100% in the case of 
Municipalities 
No for districts, Yes for Municipalities 
No for districts, Yes for Municipalities 
~ 
Yes 65%, No for Municipalities 
Yes on district roads, None for municipalities 
Rafting, boating, fishing, and cinemas 
T h e  least populated district, Manang, has a population of 9,587 while the largest, Katmandu has 1,081,845 residents. The 
average population per VDC in Manang i s  737 while in Nepal as a whole, i t  i s  almost 5 100. Yet Manang with an area o f  
2,246 i s  not much larger than the average district in Nepal at 1,962 square Km. 
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amending the provisions in various acts, which contradict the Local Self Governance 
28. ClarifL overlapping and limited expenditure assignments. Past legislation has made a reasonable 
j ob  in defining the functions and roles o f  local bodies (Table 5.2). However, the roles o f  VDCs, 
municipalities, and DDCs remain somewhat confusing without clear separation o f  powers between the 
local bodies and l ine ministries, even for functions that have been devolved.66 This i s  because key 
legislations have not been amended and are in conflict with the LGSA. This results in overlaps, excuses 
not  to devolve resources and staff and undermined accountability to the public. Further local bodies 
expenditure i s  limited. For fiscal year 2003-2004, the share o f  local bodies in public spending was around 
5%, largely financed by transfers from the central government. International best practice indicates that 
for a country with characteristics o f  Nepal, it should be at least twice the amount. 
29. Improve revenue decentralization and collection incentives: With local government revenue 
constituting only 3% o f  a l l  revenues, tax assignments and revenue efforts seem inadequate. For instance, 
the design of revenue sources for DDCs, based substantially on revenue sharing in other LGs taxes and 
central government taxes limits fiscal autonomy and accountability, since DDCs do not decide the 
corresponding tax rates. Currently DDCs in Nepal seem dependent on external sources with at least 60% 
of their financial resources coming from non-own-sources. Both VDCs and municipalities have been 
given independent revenue raising powers, but in neither case has it been effectively 
30. Improve the fiscal transfer system: The distribution arrangement o f  Central Government transfers 
to local bodies are improving but need to be improved further and made more predictable (see B o x  5.1) to 
enable local bodies carry out their assignments effectively. Among these transfers, b lock grants constitute 
more than 65% o f  the income o f  local bodies (LBs) in 2000-2001, however the released amounts to local 
bodies were substantially lower in part due to the fiscal situation, and in part because o f  the conflict. 
There i s  need to increase transparency in transfers. At present transfers are based on import levy funded 
octroi replacement for districts, LDF grants for municipalities determined by posts, VDC’s 
municipalities-salary grants and an amount set by HMGN districts and VDCs and municipalities 
development grants al l  allocated using different set o f  rules or formula. Lack o f  predictability and 
transparency reduces the incentive for a realistic budget, hampers implementation, and reduces 
accountability o f  the local bodies to their constituents. Further, the current design o f  the fiscal transfer 
system does not create incentives for local revenue mobilization, in part because o f  the lack o f  hard 
budget constraints. The transparency o f  transfers can be increased by replacing the historical octroi 
replacement by a formula that integrates al l  transfers (LDF, salaries, development) to municipalities and 
takes into account population and tax base (see B o x  5.1). 
31. It i s  generally claimed by the central 
government (MOF and l ine ministries) that local governments’ institutional capacity i s  weak and 
constitutes one o f  the main constraints to fiscal decentralization. However, the assignment o f  both 
expenditure and revenue raising authority does not generate a real need for developing this capacity. 
Decentralization policy would include putting in place the following: a capacity window for funding 
capacity building for Local  Bodies; a system to monitor fiscal decentralization and service delivery to 
facilitate redesign; a plan to increase central government capacity to manage and support decentralization; 
and a policy to ensure that donor funds f l ow  according to the fiscal rules rather than through parallel 
mechanisms. Otherwise, donor financing for local governments wil l increase the dependency of local 
Create incentives for local capacity development: 
At present 23 Acts create conflicts or ambiguity with the LSGA. Fourteen acts have been redrafted but not enacted. 
For example, in 2000-2001 for functions devolved to local bodies (agriculture extension, livestock, education and health), 
only half of the total expenditures were through the local bodies (total expenditure was Rs. 10.5 billion). 
These include house and land taxes, property taxes (municipalities), vehicle and other local fees and taxes. 67 
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governments o n  donors replacing dependency on the central government and wil l  relax local hard budget 
constraints. 
I Box 5.1 The New District Fiscal Transfer Formula, Possible Improvements and Extending it to VDCs 
A fiscal transfer formula has been put in place in 2003-2004 for the general block grant to DDC. This grant i s  
allocated according to the following criterion; (i) 50% according to the inverse o f  the1996 Human Development 
Index produced by UNDP; (ii) 20% according to the official population (2001 Census); (iii) 20% according to a 
transport cost factor using food transportation cost data; and (iv) 10% according to the area o f  the district. This 
formula i s  a good f i rs t  step, except it does not take into account fiscal effort. Further improvements can be made by 
combining salaries and development transfers into one formula based transfer. In the case o f  the VDCs the salaries 
transfers could remain unchanged but the equal-per-VDC development grants should be replaced by grants that take 
into account population size and density (implicitly district size) and the tax potential o f  the district (using the 
classification provision allowed under article 20 o f  the LSGA and thus modifying the  criteria currently used in 
LSGA). Transfers reflect horizontal disparities in needs and revenue potential help enforce hard budget constraints 
and not provide disincentives for local revenue mobilization. For public services o f  a national nature, such as 
education and health, block grants with some additional amount conditional on performance (e.g. girl attendance at 
schools) could be considered. 
32. Develop a comprehensive plan for decentralization: Finally, a decentralization plan needs to be 
developed with a l l  the necessary components, including both administrative and fiscal decentralization 
arrangements, and based on the objectives that the Government has set. The plan can be implemented in 
an asymmetrical manner, proceed faster in areas where more capacity exists. To this end, HMGN needs to 
begin upgrading the s h l l s  o f  the Central Fiscal Commission to lead and monitor the reform program. 
33. Empower communities and user groups: Despite being wracked by polit ical strife for the past 
eight years, Nepal has been able to achieve MDG targets comparable to other South Asian countries 
which have been less conflict-affected. Although, service delivery by the central Government has been 
severely affected by the conflict, this has been mitigated in part by the large pool  o f  community-based 
organizations andor  user groups that assure that community based services s t i l l  function. Representing 
member interests, these local groups are wel l  placed to assure the accountability relationship between the 
member and the service provider. These groups have been successful at extracting better services out o f  
poorly managed Government provided public services. One nascent example i s  the performance o f  the 
publicly funded but locally managed community schools. These user groups are active in every sector 
from natural resource management to schools to micro-credit to governance and c iv i l  rights. They have 
been able to compensate for the administrative and financial weakness o f  the centrally managed and 
provided services despite the conflict. They have also managed to draw in external funds by providing 
successful development models to donors who are looking to get the best results f rom their resources. 
T h o u g h  support to the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) HMGN can further harness the strengths o f  
Nepal’s vibrant community groups 
D. Addressing Social Inclusion 
34. ?$%le the government has been concerned about gender disparities since the 15’~ Five-Year Plan 
in 1982, it is only with the I O f h  Plan/PRSP that there has been explicit recognition of caste and ethnicity 
as factors affecting income and human development outcomes. Although the government does not as yet 
have a coherent “strategy” for  overcoming it, the identification o f  social exclusion as a development 
problem and the accompanying commitment to social inclusion as one o f  the four pillars o f  the PRSP i s  a 
significant step. 
35. Recent programs and policy developments in gender rights: In terms o f  development efforts, 
women’s issues have been popular with the donors and over the last 20 years there have been many 
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donor-supported government projects and programs for women. These have to a large extent reflected the 
shifts in development community perspectives, moving from the view o f  women as chi ld bearers and 
providers o f  health care in the ‘60s and  OS, to a slow realization o f  women’s critical productive role in 
Nepal’s rural economy in the %Os, to the recognition o f  women as citizens in need o f  equal legal and 
polit ical rights in the ‘90s. Many o f  these programs use a group-based approach, f i r s t  developed in Nepal 
through the government-sponsored Production Credit for  Rural Women Program (PCRW) in the early 
‘80s. F rom the beginning this approach had a strong focus on empowerment through awareness as wel l  as 
through access to self-earned income. The program created the first cadre o f  Women Development 
Officers, many o f  whom continue to serve in rural areas and constitute an important presence at the 
district level. Women have also been increasingly incorporated into the user group approaches that have 
been successful in many sectors in Nepal including forestry, drinking water, agricultural innovation, 
literacy and sometimes health, though there are inconsistencies in the attention devoted to empowerment 
and social inclusion in the formation and operation o f  these groups. 
36. I n  addition to grassroots development programs, there has been some progress recently on 
inclusion at the policy level. Although it s t i l l  leaves many issues unaddressed, the passage o f  the 11’ 
Amendment (known as the Women’s Inheritance Bill) in 2002 was at least a move towards greater legal 
equality for women. The PRSP has also committed to “affirmative action to increase women’s role in 
public office” and to monitoring progress on i t s  gender mainstreaming agenda. The creation o f  a National 
Women’s Commission in 2002 i s  another step, although the Commission has not been able to get the bill 
for i t s  formal establishment as a constitutional body passed by cabinet and the majority o f  i t s  members are 
nominated by the party in power, without adequate representation o f  the NGO and academic 
communities. 
37. With respect to caste and ethnic groups progress has been slow. Although there are now laws 
setting punishments for discrimination against Dalits, different forms o f  discrimination are commonly 
practiced throughout the country and particularly in the rural areas o f  the Far Western H i l l s  and the 
Eastern Terai. Indeed, the Constitution’s protection o f  “traditional practices” actually calls into question 
whether the practices associated with “untouchability” as a part o f  the religion and traditional based caste 
system can actually be outlawed. 
38. I n  terms ofprograms, the PRSP has highlighted the need for affirmative action to “increase their 
representatiodparticipation at various levels o f  public office and polit ical process”. In 1997 the 
government created the Dal i t  Committee within the Ministry o f  Local  Development. The Committee has 
a budget to  implement programs such as scholarships and training programs but the allocation o f  funds i s  
controlled centrally from Kathmandu and accountability for expenditures i s  weak. In early 2002 the 
National Dal i t  Commission was set up by the government, but again the bill for i t s  formal establishment 
as a semi-autonomous body has not yet been approved and the Commission suffers f rom the fact that (like 
the National Women’s Commission) i t s  members were al l  appointed f rom the various Dal i t  wings o f  the 
different polit ical parties with n o  representation on behalf o f  Dal i t  c i v i l  society organizations. Bo th  the 
national women’s commission and the national Dalits commission are inactive at present, since the terms 
of their members expired in March 2004 and n o  new members have been appointed. 
39. The Janajati or indigenous peoples have so far received the least attention in terms of 
government or donor supported grass-roots programs. Many  in government have felt that since the 
Janajati category includes powerful groups l ike the Newars, the Gurungs and the Thakalis, it should not  
be treated as a single group for government support and welfare programs. Indeed, though some Janajati 
groups are concerned about the l o w  socio-economic status o f  some o f  their member groups, others are 
concerned primarily with their l o w  level o f  representation in the polit ical and administrative governance 
of the country. The National Janajati Foundation, created in 2002, succeeded (unlike the National 
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Women’s Commission and the National Dal i t  Commission) in getting the bill for i t s  formal establishment 
as a constitutional body established. 
40. Innovative steps towards inclusive education and civil service representation: In addition to the 
central place that the PRSP has given to governance and social inclusion there are a few important 
concrete actions that the government i s  beginning to take, most notably in the areas o f  education and c iv i l  
service reform. These actions, if implemented with commitment and persistence, could be an important 
signal that the government i s  committed to dismantling the old social and political institutions that have 
blocked pro-poor growth in this country and led to the current crisis o f  governance. 
41. I n  education, the government’s program for primary education, the Nepal Education For Al l  
(NEFA) program, contains specific measures to reach out to lagging ethnic groups. This program, 
supported by mult ip le donors, focuses on the transfer o f  responsibility and funding for primary schools to  
community School Management Committees (SMCs) (see Chapter 6 also). Hiring and firing o f  teachers 
would also be transferred to the SMC to make teachers more accountable to the community they serve. 
T o  address specific threats such as elite capture or politicization o f  the SMC, a possible solution i s  being 
sought by malung the planned block grants to SMCs conditional on the involvement o f  women’s and 
children’s groups or  other strong local organizations to work in partnership with the SMC. The NEFA 
has also addressed the problems faced by children who do not speak Nepali as their mother tongue (52% 
o f  the population). A bilingual home to school transition module for teachers i s  being developed and 
communities are given incentives to hire teachers (preferably women) who are able to speak the local 
language as wel l  as Nepali in the classroom. Success in this area i s  critical for meeting MDG target. This 
may also help find a solution to the difficult issue o f  the use o f  mother tongues in primary education, 
where it i s  necessary to find a middle path between ignoring the problem o f  non-Nepali speakmg children 
on the one hand and burdening the already strained education system with creating separate curricula in 
many different languages on the other. In any case, to make inclusive education a reality, some way must 
be found to ensure that non-Nepali speakers get the extra assistance they need to become successful 
students. 
42. I n  the area of civil service reform, the Ministry of General Administration (MOGA) has recently 
developed a draft “roadmap ” for  Civil Service Reform which contains clear steps towards afirmative 
action, including a proposal to targetheserve 40 percent of all new posts and vacancies for excluded 
groups (20 percent for women, and 10 percent each for Dalits and Janajatis). One o f  the keys to 
introducing greater equity while maintaining the tradition o f  meritocracy seems to be establishing link 
between the move towards greater diversity and improvements in the quality o f  client service, which had 
not yet been done in the MOGA proposal. Only as part o f  the broader effort to improve public 
administration can affirmative action in Nepal escape f rom being seen as “patronage for special interest 
groups” and gain the broad public support i t needs. 
43. Remaining Challenges to Inclusion: These two concrete moves, discussed above, to 
operationalize the PRSP commitment to social inclusion and good governance are encouraging. 
Nevertheless, it i s  necessary to temper the optimism generated by the efforts o f  reform-minded leaders in 
certain parts o f  government with implementation challenges at the middle levels o f  the bureaucracy and at 
the district level and below. There, formal institutions and the progressive reform policies interact with 
the dense network of informal systems o f  behaviors and values based o n  relations o f  kinship, party 
affiliation, business interests, caste, ethnicity and gender. 
44. When it comes to changingpatterns of exclusion based on social identity, the influence of these 
informal institutions or the informal “rules of the game” can be especially strong, because these 
institutions are actually systems of value through which individuals and groups deJine their very 
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identity.68 Policy changes here challenge very fundamental relations o f  power and the self-identity and 
ways o f  interacting with others that follow from those relations. Though i t  i s  more comfortable to think o f  
the “implementation gap” as due to “lack o f  capacity” and therefore something that can be addressed 
through painless donor-funded training, the major causes o f  poor implementation probably l i e  deeper; 
powerful  informal systems, behaviors and norms are s t i l l  very much at work. The “implementation gap” 
can be seen as a manifestation of informal social and polit ical institutions that continue to  be able to block 
the actual realization of government’s stated intentions to get resources and decision-making power 
f lowing more equitably to the excluded groups and remote regions. Overcoming this gap requires strong 
commitment and greater effort. But it must be done in such way as not to create special regimes based on 
ethnic and caste origin of persons. Otherwise, there i s  risk that affirmative action policies may end up 
recreating systems of patronage similar to those o f  feudal times. What can be done best i s  to create 
equality o f  opportunity and not guarantee equality o f  outcomes. 
45. Closing the gap: Reducing the “implementation gap” is critical to get the country back on a 
strong growth path and to achieve lasting peace. T w o  possible ways to close this gap involve increasing 
the diversity among those who make the critical decisions about implementation and using social 
accountability tools to increase civic involvement and instill greater transparency in the allocation and use 
o f  public resources. Some important foundations o f  democratic governance have been la id  in the past 13 
years and the major strength o f  the PRSP i s  that i t seeks to build on these. Tools l ike the Med ium Term 
Expenditure Framework and the effort to develop a strong Poverty Monitoring and Analysis System may 
seem rather technocratic and uninspiring, and citizen’s report cards and social audit may sound l ike the 
latest c i v i l  society fad. But such approaches may in the end be essential to both poverty reduction and 
sustainable peace in Nepal because they are o n  the critical path to a govemment that i s  accountable, that 
delivers on i t s  commitments and ensures that al l  citizens are treated e q ~ i t a b l y . ~ ~  
E. Summingup 
46. Governance: Nepal faces four challenges with respect to governance. These are to strengthen the 
accountability o f  representative institutions both at the national and local levels, c i v i l  service reforms to  
make it more accountable, professional and disciplined; restarting decentralization and expanding 
community managed service delivery programs; and encouraging the government and public service to be 
more inclusive by reducing large gender, ethnic and caste based disparities. 
47. I n  the case of the central Government, this chapter has noted the importance of strengthening 
accountability and representative policy-making institutions so that stability is restored. The need to 
make the c i v i l  service - the Government’s main instrument for implementing i t s  policies - more 
professional, merit-based, and inclusive has been highlighted. Decompressing salaries to  raise incentives 
for the managerial and professional ranks, enforcing discipline, ensuring security o f  tenure through 
carefully delineating the roles o f  the c iv i l  service and polit ical levels have also been identified as 
important. Some suggestions have been made to make the c i v i l  service more inclusive. 
A recent survey in 8 districts in different geographical regions o f  Nepal found 205 different practices o f  caste-based 
discrimination. Fifty-four were related to denial of entry, to services, to common resources to kinship relations and to 
participation.; 8 1 were related to discrimination of different fields o f  occupation, to educational institutions, political rights, 
govemment or NGO programs or offices or religious or cultural activities. O f  the 106 Dal i t  respondents to  the survey 92 
percent reported experienced it in their lifetime and even after democracy. Krishna Bhattachan, Kamala Hemchuri, 
Yogendra Gurung, Chakraman Biswakarma, 2003, Existing Practices o f  Caste-Based Untouchability in Nepal and Strategy 
for a Campaign for i t s  Elimination, Action Aid, Nepal. 
Drawn from Lynn Bennett, “Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal”, Background note for the Nepal Development 
Policy Review, 2004. 
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48. Given the wide heterogeneity, service delivery improvements will l ie in strengthening local 
Governments and devolution of management and financing to communities. This would entail 
consolidating the size of local bodies, implementing administrative decentralization, removing the 
ambiguities and overlapping expenditure and revenue raising assignments and providing stable fiscal 
transfers in line with agreed priorities and empowering local bodies such as school management 
committees and local user groups. The role o f  caste and ethnicity as factors affecting income and human 
development outcomes have been highlighted. Although the government has identified social inclusion as 
a development goal and while there has been some progress with gender exclusion giving greater legal 
equality to women, progress in including disadvantaged caste and ethnic groups has been slower. There i s  
s t i l l  discrimination against Dal i t  children and, in general, non-Nepali speaking children are put at 
disadvantage. Whi le Government has passed legislation to address such unacceptable practices, more 
effort that will go beyond formal rules would be needed to address this issue. This would include political 
support, technical expertise to design systems that do not undermine meritocracy and avoid negative 
effects o f  rigid reservation policies. 
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CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL SECTOR POLICIES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION 
A. Introduction 
1. Starting m u c h  later in development, Nepal has made considerable progress in improving social 
indicators in the past decade, though it s t i l l  remains a very poor country in terms o f  human development. 
Nepal i s  n o w  comparable in indicators such as under-5 mortality, primary school enrollment, female 
enrollment, and access to safe water to i t s  much richer South Asian neighbors (see Chapter 1). In i t ia l  
results f rom a part ia l  sample o f  the most recent household survey shows that the people perceive much 
improved access to education and health services. Still, i t s  maternal mortality ratio, chi ld malnutrition and 
sanitation indicators are among the worst in the world. Nepal could fall below Tenth Plan as wel l  as 
MDG targets. Given widespread poverty and slow growth o f  income, greater effort has to be made in the 
delivery o f  social services in education, health and water supply and sanitation to serve especially those 
who do not adequately benefit f rom growth o f  income or those in areas where social service delivery 
hitherto has been deficient. This i s  an aspect o f  social inclusion. Moreover, the government should 
consider providing social protection to the poor and the vulnerable when they cannot benefit f rom growth 
alone. 
B. Education 
2. Enrollment in primary education grew rapidly during the 1990s, as net enrolment ratio (NER) 
rose to about go%, according to the MoES. The Tenth P l a f l R S P  aims at increasing the NER to  90% by 
2007 and the Education for All (EFA) Program to 96% by 2009. Since the NER has been increasing 
approximately 1% per annum since 1995, these targets are not  l ikely to be met. Moreover, enrollment 
data from household surveys are lower, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
3. Behind this improvement is a significant increase in public expenditures. In the last f ive years, the 
share of public expenditure on education rose from 12% to 15%, and the share o f  primary education has 
r isen significantly f rom 48% to 59% o f  education expenditures, driven by national and international 
commitments to make primary education universal. Although part o f  the increased allocation for the 
primary sub-sector came f rom the increased share o f  education in public spending a substantial part came 
from reduction o f  public spending on higher education. Spending o n  primary education has been 
equitable and the lowest income decile uses public schools as much as higher deciles. 
4. I n  spite of considerable investments in the basic and primary education sub-sector, the quality of 
education remainspoor. The grade 5 completion rate rose from 44% to 54% between 1998 and 2001, but 
this s t i l l  means that almost half the children do not complete primary school. The EFA program aims at 
increasing the Grade 5 completion rate to 60% by 2009. Previous experience indicates that this a im will 
be hard to achieve without significant improvements in the way public schools operate. Public schools 
also perform poorly in terms of success rates in School Leaving Certificate (SLC) Examinations: the pass 
rate i s  85% for private schools and 15% for public schools. 
5. The Government is preparing a sector wide program to support basic and prima ry education. 
Among the innovative features o f  this approach i s  a move towards decentralized planning and 
implementation, based o n  school management at the local level. This i s  l ine with the emphasis placed by 
the loth P l a f l R S P  o n  improving delivery o f  school services by transferring management o f  public 
schools to communities. T h i s  also partly responds to escalating conflict and polit ical uncertainty due to 
which normal functioning of schools i s  threatened as the central agencies can n o  longer reach 
communities in many parts of the country. The new strategy includes a focus o n  results and improving 
monitoring and evaluation by using a common and simplif ied framework. Finally, the Government i s  
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setting up a jo in t  financing arrangement with aligned donor and government procedures for financial 
management, disbursement and reporting. 
Issues 
6. Quality is hampered by lack of funds for supplies, textbooks, and teacher training, as well as by a 
freeze in hiring. The non-salary recurrent budget o f  Rs. 300 per teacher per year for primary schools i s  
grossly inadequate. Given a teacher-student ratio o f  1:40, non-salary expenditure per student i s  only Rs 10 
or less than U S $  0.05 per year. A closely related issue i s  that textbooks are not delivered in time. The 
Government has recently decided to gradually open textbook production and distribution to private sector 
to help ensure timely delivery of textbooks. The Government has also been freezing the number o f  
teacher positions during the last few years while enrollment continues to rise. Th is ,  coupled with 
persisting uneven deployment o f  teachers, has led to a large variance in teacher student ratio. Female 
teachers f rom disadvantaged communities -- instrumental to ensure access for girls and children from 
socially excluded groups - are in short supply. In spite o f  Government pol icy to appoint at least one 
female teacher per school, more than ha l f  o f  primary schools s t i l l  do not have a single female teacher. 
7 .  Access to education by thepoorest is hampered by hidden costs. Even though they are forbidden 
by the Education Ac t  to levy any kind o f  fee, many primary schools impose admission andor 
examination fees in response to dire financial needs. This makes access diff icult for  children f rom poor 
households. It also raises the quality gap between private and public schools, effectively denying poor 
children (who cannot afford private schooling) access to quality education. The Government has 
established various scholarships and fee waivers to help children f rom poor households access primary, 
secondary and tertiary education, but these interventions are poorly targeted and have not been evaluated. 
The need to help with work at home or o n  the family farm also discourages school attendance. 
8. The insurgency has affected the delivery of education. The education sector continues to employ 
the same strategy for delivery o f  education throughout the country as if the insurgency had litt le or n o  
impact. B lock  grants do help to address some o f  the issues arising f rom the insurgency, but they too need 
to be monitored. B lock grants help to get funds allocated at the local level when the machinery o f  
traditional delivery has been disrupted due to the insurgency. Similarly, technical support being provided 
by the government cannot reach many areas o f  the country. Alternative mechanisms o f  delivery and 
monitoring of resources and services need to be developed. 
9. Strengthening School Management Committees and the role of communities in managing schools 
can bring about improvements in school governance, but the legal framework supporting this policy 
needs more clarity. The 7th Amendment o f  the Education A c t  provided the legal basis for  transferring 
school management to communities, but i t s  application has been slow until recently. As a part of i t s  
pol icy o f  decentralizing responsibility for service delivery, HMGN seeks to bring education services at 
the primary and secondary level under community school management. On the other hand, the Local  Self 
Governance Ac t  (LGSA) mandates the Village Development Committee (VDC) to monitor and manage 
schools within i t s  territory. Likewise, it mandates the Municipality to assist in operation and management 
of schools within i t s  territory. But the role o f  these local government authorities vis-a-vis School 
Management Committees needs to be clarified. Ongoing experience with transfer o f  management o f  
schools to communities indicates that transferred schools are yet to gain meaningful autonomy, due in 
part to the confusion in the existing legal framework. 
10. Secondary and higher education needs more budgetary and institutional support. Increased 
expenditures on primary education have crowded out investments in higher education. The share o f  
higher education in public expenditures on education decreased f rom 20% to 10% during the last decade. 
Considering that around 40% o f  university enrolment i s  actually at the higher secondary level, the actual 
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share o f  expenditures for higher education i s  n o  more than 7%. This figure i s  considerably below the level 
o f  15 to 20% recommended by the “Constructing Knowledge Societies: N e w  Challenges for Tertiary 
Education” by a committee appointed to look into secondary and tertiary education. The existing legal 
framework fragments secondary education into lower secondary, secondary and higher secondary 
education. In spite of the Government’s pol icy of integrating higher secondary education with the rest o f  
secondary education, this agenda has remained unfulfi l led for a long time. Lack o f  institutional autonomy 
in higher education undermines good management. 
11. The second most important issue in higher education i s  developing a sound framework for 
formula based funding. Other critical issues in higher education are accreditation, support to 
disadvantaged students, funding for research and development o f  a credible action plan for phasing out 
proficiency certificate level in tandem with upgrading public secondary schools to higher secondary level. 
Whi le the increasing expenditures on primary education to raise enrollment i s  important, the country will 
need to find the right balance as i t  cannot afford to neglect secondary and tertiary education because the 
success achieved in primary education will create demand for secondary and tertiary education, and also 
in the interests o f  long term growth. 
Recommendations 
12. The Government needs to provide adequate grants to schools to meet expenditures on teachers as 
well as non-salary recurrent costs. Particularly, central recruitment needs to be stopped for vacancies and 
be replaced by local level recruitment. But care needs to be taken that this does not lead to l o w  and 
inadequate teachedstudent ratios. 
13. Clearer legislation for transferring power to communities is needed, together with a more careful 
monitoring of the devolution of schools to communities. Otherwise, the vested-interests opposing 
devolution will not  allow i t s  successful implementation. 
14. Inter- and intra- sectoral allocations wil l  need to be reassessed to ensure appropriate level of 
funding for higher education, whi le maintaining the level o f  funding for primary education compatible 
with commitments towards universal primary education. 
C. Health 
15. Nepal also witnessed many health status improvements in the 1990, but given the poor initial 
conditions and dejciencies in delivery systems, health indicators remain poor. Infant mortality rate 
(IMR) declined to 64per 1000 live births and total fert i l ip rate (TFR) fell from 5.6 to 4.1 live births per 
woman of child bearing age. Public expenditure on health as a proportion o f  GDP (0.9%) i s  comparable 
to  other South Asian countries. There are also considerable differences in access to  heath services based 
on income group, locality, caste, ethnic group and gender. These rates are s t i l l  unacceptably high, and 
important challenges remain, including (i) a maternal mortality rate o f  539 per 100,000 live births (ii) 
malnutrition affecting ha l f  o f  a l l  children under five; and (iii) the emerging threat o f  HIV/AIDS. 
Infectious diseases, nutritional disorders, and maternal and prenatal diseases dominate the overall pattern 
of morbidity and mortality in Nepal, accounting for ha l f  o f  a l l  deaths and two thirds o f  lost disability 
adjusted l i fe years (DALYs) (Table 6.1). Non-communicable diseases, including tobacco and alcohol 
related, are beginning to increase in relative importance, though not t o  the same extent yet as they have in 
many low-income countries. Beyond the issues concerning burden o f  disease, another key challenge for 
Nepal i s  to hasten the decline in ferti l i ty and lower population growth rates. 
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16. The highest risk groups are 
children under Jive, particularly 
girls, who account for 52.5 percent 
of all female deaths, and women of 
reproductive age. Although children 
represent only 16 percent o f  the 
population, they account for over 50 
percent of the total DALYs lost 
f rom a l l  causes, and 80 percent o f  
their deaths are due to Group I 
causes. Women 15-49 years old 
experience a 26 percent higher loss 
o f  DALYs than m e n  in the same age 
group. M u c h  o f  this excess loss i s  
related to  pregnancy related problems. 
Causes of Death 
Group I: Infectious diseases and 
maternal, pre-natal and nutritional 
problems. 
Group II: Non-communicable and 
congenital problems. 
Group 111: Injuries and accidents. 
Unclassified. 
Cause-Specific DALYs Lost as 
Deaths as percent percent of All 1 
of All Deaths DALYs Lost 
49.7 68.5 
42.1 22.8 
6.9 8.7 I 
1 .o 0.0 
17. Decentralization Challenge: The Government's main strategy is to promote the devolution of 
power for health service delivery from the center to local governments and promote community oversight. 
Since there are n o  elected bodies at present, the devolution o f  sub-health posts has been l imi ted to 
handing them over to  Local Health Management Committees (LHMC) in district and village councils that 
have adequate representation of females and lower caste people. This arrangement has increased 
community oversight. MOH has begun training o f  L H M C  officials and Government officials at the local 
level to promote effective decentralization o f  services. However, technical support f rom sector agencies 
based at district and central levels remains below what would be needed. 
1 8.  Public Private Partnership: Recognizing the important health services that the private sector and 
NGOs already provide, Government has sought to build partnerships with these groups. Agreements and 
operating mechanisms now exist between the MOH and NGOs and private providers. 
19. Implementation Capacity and Management: Although the Government has a well-articulated 
vision and strategy for health in Nepal, the capacity to implement is weak. Some important functions are 
under-staffed with n o  organizational homes specified for activities such as environmental health, gender 
and social issues and public-private partnership. The shortage o f  physical facilities and technical capacity 
at the district level lowers motivation and productivity. 
Recommendations to Address Unfinished Agenda 
20. Dealing with health of the poor through more focus on priority diseases: I t  wi l l  be crucial to 
target the interventions to the groups not served adequately. Although Nepal spends 5.1 percent o f  i t s  
GDP on health, private-out-pocket spending finances more than 70 percent o f  this expenditure. In the 
medium term improving public provision o f  health services through more focus on preventive care and 
public services such as communicable diseases, maternal mortality, and nutrit ion i s  needed. 
21. Improving management of health service systems and moving towards a stewardship role: Whi le  
85 percent of the nation's population lives in rural areas, only 51 percent o f  total public health 
expenditures serve rural areas. Aside from increasing resources, decentralization and devolution of 
services to community oversight and local Governments wil l be essential t o  increase the accountability of 
service providers. 
22. Developing the framework for public-private partnership. Private delivery of health services, 
already important in Nepal, wi l l  become even more so in the future. There i s  scope and need for the 
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Government to make greater use o f  public-private partnerships to expand services for the poor. A 
transparent and supportive policy framework for  private services, more government use o f  private bodies 
to deliver health services, transferring resources to local Governments and communities to increase their 
discretion to choose among competing suppliers are al l  needed. 
23. Strengthening Government monitoring and oversight capacity. As the Government turns to local 
governments, communities, and the private sector for managing the delivery o f  services, i t will need to 
increase i t s  capacity to monitor the service delivery performance o f  different agents, make monitoring 
results available to the public, and take corrective actions as needed. 
24. A key challenge for Nepal is to hasten the decline in its fertility rate, which according to the 2001 
census, is half of that of 21 other Asian countries. While Nepal’s current population pol icy targets wel l  
some of the key factors driving ferti l i ty -- early marriage and chi ld bearing, son preference and 
uncertainty o f  chi ld survival due to high chi ld morality rates, alongside lack o f  education and poverty -- 
the pol icy i s  undermined by lack o f  a multi-sectoral approach and inadequate attention to supply side 
factors. Current family planning programs have sought to mobilize NGOs, private sector and community 
groups to raise awareness and provide contraceptives. Similarly mass media i s  used to  promote family 
planning practices and surveys suggest a general awareness o f  these. But these efforts need to be made 
more effective by ensuring that supply side factors are also adequately addressed. These factors would 
include skilled and female service providers being available at health facilities, privacy and 
confidentiality, appropriate counseling, information material, and, most important, adequate supply o f  
contraceptives at regional and district levels constrain service users. Also critical will be to ensure the 
availability o f  family planning services. Available data (NDHS 200 1) suggest that contraceptive 
prevalence rate i s  only 39% despite the demand by 67% o f  married women o f  reproductive age for such 
services. 
D. Water  Supply and Sanitation 
25. Sector Developments. I n  the 1990s, the water supply and sanitation sector saw reforms that 
shifted from the supply driven approach to service delivery of the 1980s (the Water and Sanitation 
Decade) to a demand driven approach. I t  also adopted participatory decision malung in rural  water and 
sanitation service delivery. In addition, community participation shifted f rom voluntary labor contribution 
to community empowerment and management. HMGN has defined sector objectives clearly: (i) to 
provide and ensure safe, convenient and adequate water supply to al l  Nepalese people with sanitation as 
an integral component, with a specific focus o n  disadvantaged groups; (ii) to reduce the incidence o f  
water-related diseases; (iii) to lessen the burden o f  women and children who are traditionally involved in 
collecting water; and (iv) taking care o f  domestic sanitation and hygiene. 
26. The Government’s policies in the sector are sound; the main issue lies with implementing them. 
The National Water Supply and Sanitation Policy (1998) and the 10th PladPRSP define the role and 
responsibilities o f  the institutions clearly. The strategy emphasizes decentralization, seeks support and 
partnerships f rom NGOs, private sectors organizations, and involves user groups. I t  also determines tar i f f  
rates for urban water supply to move towards cost recovery and prescribes lower rates for  low-income 
households, but with penalties to discourage waste. As the issues discussed below indicates the main 
challenge ahead l ies in implementing these policies well. 
Sector Issues and Recommendations 
27. Limited sector coverage: The IOth  PladPRSP has set a target for  water supply and sanitation 
coverage at the end of the Plan period o f  85% and 50% respectively compared to 71% and 25% in the 9th 
Plan. Given the need for rehabilitation o f  10% o f  the Government built schemes and major repair o f  some 
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9,500 o f  these schemes, the MDG targets may not be achieved without adequate investments and 
institutional arrangements to make these investments effective and sustainable. 
28. Multitude of sector institution and coordination challenges: The present institutional arrangement 
in the sector involves a multitude o f  organizations. T h e  principal public sector institutions are the 
Department o f  Water Supply and Sewerage (DWSS), the Nepal Water Supply Corporation (NWSC) and 
the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board (the Fund Board) reporting to the 
Ministry o f  Physical Planning and Works (MPPW). This has lead to various approaches to service 
delivery as wel l  as various interpretations o f  the sector policy and some confusion. T h i s  makes 
coordination among the different actors challenging. A related issue i s  donor coordination. In order to 
bring about efficiency in the sector and prevent duplication o f  efforts, the government would need to take 
responsibility in coordinating donors. Whi le the Government could ask donors to assist in providing 
technical inputdadvice, i t needs to coordinate donor agencies and assume full ownership o f  i t s  decisions. 
This would ensure effective use o f  donor resources. 
29. Institutional de$ciencies: Institutional deficiencies, particularly, in the urban sub-sector, have led 
to unreliable, intermittent, inequitable and poor quality supply. Consumers thus make expensive 
investments o n  alternative sources l ike boreholes and tanker services and o n  installing pumps and storage 
devices. The leaks in the distribution system not only result in wastage o f  water but also expose the water 
supplied to contamination and forces households to spend considerable sums o f  money to b o i l  and filter 
the water. There i s  also need to monitor effectiveness and further clarify the roles and responsibilities o f  
sector agencies in the context o f  decentralization, to ensure that the best institutional set up to implement 
sector policies and achieve sector objectives i s  put in place. 
30. Over-programming of sector financing: T h e  sectoral budget as a percentage o f  the development 
budget has remained fairly constant around 6 to 7% in the last five years. In the past, there has been a 
consistent tendency to over program the budget, so actual expenditures tend to be lower than budgeted. In 
this context, a clear priority i s  ensuring efficient use o f  resources through performance based budget 
allocations through regular reviews and a wel l  established framework to  allocate resources among the 
different groups and users. 
3 1. Lack of consistent framework for community contributions/empowerment: In the rural water 
supply and sanitation sector, decentralized participatory approaches with communities malung 
contributions in cash and/or kind are an accepted general norm. However, the amount that communities 
are required to contribute ranges from 10% to over 30% depending on the implementindfunding agency. 
The level o f  community involvement/empowerment, in actual practice, also varies. There i s  a need to 
have a consistent policy framework. 
32. Resource mobilization/politicization of tariff increases: The challenge i s  to ensure that resources 
are mobilized on a regular basis to improve the availability o f  resources for operation and maintenance. 
Further this needs to be done without burdening the people, as has often been the case, with costly lumpy, 
politicized ad hoc tariff increases required because o f  deferred maintenance leading, in a vicious cycle, to 
costly rehabilitatiodreplacements. 
33. A key mechanism to make investments more effective and achieve coordination would be to 
promote greater customer responsiveness and involvement and use monitoring and evaluation: The 
different service delivery mechanisms, such as service delivery through the public sector - central 
government, local government - NGOs, community based organizations need to be more responsive to 
customer needs. Customer satisfaction surveys could be used for monitoring. The central government 
would need to concentrate i t s  efforts on monitoring and evaluation both o f  service delivery and o f  water 
quality. Efficiency in monitoring would help to eliminate mismanagement o f  resources such as 
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personnel, vehicles etc. T h i s  would also provide an effective tool for the Government to weed out 
inefficient and costly service delivery approaches. 
E. Social Protection 
34. I n  the IOth Plan, HMGN follows a two-part strategy: foster broad based growth to beneft 
principally the moderately poor (who are some 60% of the poor), and combine targeted programs with 
social mobilization to reach the very poor. Social protection programs in Nepal also go beyond poverty 
reduction to pension and provident funds for the formal sector. 
Social Safety Nets for the Poor and Vulnerable 
35. There are several uncoordinated government programs, many with small numbers of actual 
beneficiaries and relatively high administrative overheads, covering diferent benefciaries, from children 
to the disabled to war victims (see Table 6.2). That more than 400 budget lines exist t o  finance these 
programs, indicate the fragmented and uncoordinated nature o f  social safety ne t  programs in Nepal. Many  
o f  these programs originated from the signing o f  international conventions (e.g. children, disabled etc.) or 
from donor-funded programs, which have lost external support. The Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) i s  
emerging as a major instrument to consolidate these programs and thus reduce overhead and improve 
monitoring o f  costs and impact. 
Table 6.2 Coverage of Major Social Protection Programs in Nepal [need to indicate source] 
Cost in Rupees 
1000s 
Program Number of Beneficiaries 
Non-Contributory Schemes 
Old Age Income Security 192,000 348,264, 
Helpless Widows Assistance 228,000 226,760, 
Disabled Pensions 3,700 4,400, 
Pensions for Civil Servants, Teachers, Military and Police 318,000 3,260,000, 
Food for Work 300,000 350,000, 
Food for Education 292,000 290,000, 
Other Schemes for children, elderly etc. Few millions mostly in 
overhead 
Source: World Bank team estimates. 
Few Thousands 
Coverage and Assessment of Main Programs 
36. A number of programs appear to be of a short-term nature, being funded for one or two years 
and then terminated. This may again be a response to changes in donor support, but may also reflect 
polit ical pressures. Whatever the reasons, the inconsistent funding o f  programs leads to inefficiency and 
reduces effectiveness, with chronic under-funding o f  programs and termination after the in i t ia l  
investments. In addition, special projects may create parallel local administrative structures that 
undermine existing mechanisms. Monitoring and evaluation remains a problem for al l  programs and this 
i s  necessary as a first step to assess whether programs are cost-effective or need to be redesigned. 
37. Food Based Assistance: There is one major public works program, heavily supported by WFP 
until 2006. The Rural Community Infrastructure Works (RCIW) program i s  a food-for-work intervention 
that involves poor households in the creation and maintenance o f  critical physical assets such as rural  
roads, irrigation, agro-forestry assets and r iver control. RCIW operates in 30 o f  Nepal's 75 districts, 
including some o f  the country's most remote and food-insecure areas. The program relies o n  a 
decentralized approach in which communities help select project activities. Nearly 300,000 beneficiaries 
are estimated to benefit f rom the program annually, with an annual cost o f  US$4.6 mi l l ion.  R C I W  
67 
operates through the Ministry of Local Development and receives extensive support from WFP, with 
technical support from GTZ, DANIDA and DfID. 
38. The Food-for-Education (Ffi) program was started in 1996 with WFP assistance. It currently 
provides food to public primary and lower secondary children in schools within 16 districts. Children 
receive a hot midday meal of blended food (haluwa). In addition, a de-worming program operates within 
the FfE in coordination with the WHO and Ministry o f  Health. The program i s  implemented by District 
Education Offices under the Ministry o f  Education and Sports. WFP estimates that FfE can serve 292,000 
children annually at a cost o f  US$3.8 mill ion. 
39. Safety Net Programs for the Elderly: The universalflat old age pension (OAP) of Rupees 100 to 
a l l  people above 7.5 years was first announced on 26 December 1994. Five districts f rom the five 
development regions of Nepal were selected on a pi lot  basis and the implementation of the pi lot  was 
carried out by the Ministry of Education and Sports and at the grass-roots level by the Village 
Development Committees. During the financial year 1995-96, OAP was extended to the entire country 
and was implemented by the Home Ministry. Since 1996-97, the Ministry o f  Local  Development has 
administered the OAF’, and the allowances have been distributed by the ward offices in the urban areas 
and Vil lage Development Committees in the rural areas. T w o  additional transfers were introduced in 
1996, namely the Helpless Widows Allowance for widows above 60 years o f  age” and a disabled 
pension71, each paying Rupees 100 per month. During the International Year o f  Elderly Persons (1999), 
the ruling Nepali Congress raised the o ld  age allowance from Rupees 100 to Rupees 150. All Nepalese 
men and women who are 75 years and older are eligible for the pension. According to the directives 
issued by the Ministry of Local Development, eligibility for old age allowance i s  strictly based on the age 
mentioned in the Nepalese Citizenship certificate. A Social Security Program Identity Card will be issued 
to those eligible. The combined number o f  beneficiaries exceeded 400,000 individuals or about 1.8 
percent o f  the total population. 
40. I n  principle, this program overlaps with those covering formal sector employees. On the other 
hand, coverage o f  the contributory schemes i s  l ikely to remain very l o w  for decades to come, making the 
Old Age Pension Program the sole alternative to family support systems for the vast majority o f  the 
population. So i t s  ro le i s  to fill a gap that i s  created by l o w  coverage in the formal sector schemes. 
41. A preliminary analysis suggests that this program, along with the means-tested widows benefit, 
reaches a high proportion of the eligible population, but that there are sharp geographic diflerences. 
There i s  also a tradeoff between administrative simplicity and inclusion o n  the one hand and budgetary 
limitations on the other hand that needs to be better understood. 
Pensions and Provident Fund for the Formal Sector 
42. Public Sector Pensions. Approximately 320,000 civil servants, military, police and teachers 
belong to dejked benefit schemes that pay pensions with provisions for survivors. Currently, it i s  
estimated that there are around 103,000 pensioners. The pension bill in 2003-04 was close to Rs3.3 b i l l ion 
rupees, rising from Rs3.06 b i l l ion in 2002-03, excluding teachers’ pensions. This i s  financed directly 
f rom the budget and i s  now equivalent to 5.4 percent o f  regular expenditures. Whi le  an estimate o f  the 
’ O  
” 
All Nepalese widows who have crossed the age of 60 and do not have any economic source o f  income, those who don’t get 
any care from family members, and those who don’t get the pension o f  their late husbands are entitled. 
Disabled Nepalese citizens having the following physical infirmities and being at least sixteen years o f  age: blind, who do 
not have both hands or who have hands that don’t work, who do not have both legs or who have legs that don’t work. 
68 
present value o f  future spending has not yet been produced, based on international experience, the figure 
i s  likely to be o f  the order o f  15-20 percent o f  GDP.72 
43. Hidden within these aggregates are important differences between sub-schemes. Specifically, it i s  
necessary to distinguish c iv i l  servants and teachers f rom military and police because eligibility 
requirements differ substantially. While c iv i l  servants typically retire at age 58 or above and are required 
to have at least 20 years o f  service in order to receive a pension, military and police personnel are not  
subject to an age requirement and may receive a pension after only 16 years o f  service. 
44. I n  order to accurately assess the financial status of the defined benefit system, it is important to 
disaggregate the key indicators, as shown in Table 6.3. It i s  important to note that the ratio o f  pensioners 
to contributors would have been much higher if i t  were not for the recent doubling o f  the size o f  the army. 
Also important i s  the fact that teachers were only granted pension rights in 1996 so that the relatively high 
ratio o f  active employees to pensioners reflects the immaturity o f  this scheme. T h i s  ratio will rise rapidly 
as evidenced by the growth in the number o f  pensioners in this category f rom four to  ten thousand in the 
last f ive years. 
Table 6.3 Key indicators of public sector pension schemes in 2003 
Category Active employees Pensioners Ratio: active to Spending 2003-4 Share of 
pensioners (Rs millions) spending 
Civil servants’ 87016 30000 2.9 
Army2 80000 38000 2.2 
Police2 55000 25000 2.2 
Teachers2 96000 10000 9.6 n.a. n.a 
Total 318016 103000 3.1 3260 
Note: ITThere are 99,398 positions but 12,000 are not currently filled. 2IEstimates by DPR team. 
45. Employees’ Provident Fund: Public sector employees and private firms with at least 10 
employees are required to either contribute to the EPF or set up provident funds meeting the same 
conditions. The tax-exempt contributions mandated are set at 20 percent o f  basic salary, split evenly 
between employer and employee. Currently, there are an estimated 380,000 contributors to the EPF and 
an unknown number of employees covered by employer-administered provident finds. T h i s  represents an 
estimated 20 percent o f  employees in Nepal and 6 percent o f  the entire economically active population. 
Despite the high contribution rate, several factors limit the effective amount o f  forced savings. destined to 
generate income at retirement. Whi le withdrawals have always been allowed upon termination o f  
employment, other types o f  withdrawals were allowed pr ior  to retirement until this practice was ended in 
2001. However, loans to members are permitted and this represented 32% o f  program assets in 2003. 
46. The long-run rate of return on EPF accounts in real terms has barely exceeded inflation until 
recently. Although data o n  average covered wage growth are not available, the differential between EPF 
returns and wage growth i s  l ikely to be small or even negative. For  example, income per capita has grown 
at about 1.5 percent per annum since 1970 while real returns o n  EPF balances have averaged about 1 
percent during this period. Real wage growth for lower level c iv i l  servants appears to be much higher 
over the same three decades. Finally, since allowances are not  included in the earnings base subject t o  
provident fund contributions, the effective replacement rate that can be generated i s  reduced. In private 
’’ See Holzmann, Palacios and Zvinniene (2001). “On the Economics and Scope o f  Implicit Pension Debt: An Intemational 
Perspective”, Empirica 28 (2001)/1, 97-1 29. 
69 
sector f i r m s  in particular, allowances can make up a significant share o f  total compensation. Overall, EPF 
plays a minimal ro le  in old age income security even for the limited share o f  the labor force that it covers. 
47. Next Steps in Reforming Pension Funds and the EPF: The main impetus for pension reform in 
Nepal today is the growth in expenditures on civil service pensions. This phenomenon poses a fiscal 
threat that has broader negative impact o n  the population through larger deficits or the crowding out o f  
other programs. The fact that pensions are indexed to c iv i l  service salaries at present also complicates 
broader efforts to reform the public sector. Until recently, l i tt le attention has been given to the long term 
financial viabil ity of this scheme so that recent growth trends have caused justifiable concern. 
48. Aside from the fiscal impact, the civil service pension scheme exhibits many design flaws at the 
microeconomic level with implications for labor markets and equity. For example, labor mobi l i ty  i s  
hindered by the back-loaded benefit formula and vesting rules that create a substantial loss for a c iv i l  
servant that shifts f rom public to private sector employment. The use o f  a benefit formula and position- 
specific indexation also introduce inequities within and across generations. 
49. nese  are common features of civil service pension schemes in South Asia and elsewhere and are 
now in the process of being reformed in many countries including neighboring India. One set o f  reform 
options involves a range of parametric changes to rationalize within the current structure such as 
increasing the retirement age, lengthening o f  the earnings base used in the benefit calculation, reduction 
in accrual rates and a shift from wage to price indexation. Another approach would be to  move towards a 
contributory pension system that resulted in an accumulation o f  assets that would be used to offset 
pension liabilities. These approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
50. Employee Provident Fund. A thorough review o f  the overall pension system covering the entire 
formal sector would consider the merits o f  integration o f  public and private sector pensions to achieve 
better labor mobility, lower costs and common social pol icy objectives. 
Microfinance 
5 1. Nepal has a fairly sophisticated group of micro-finance practitioners and donors who are well 
aware of global best practice that discourages mixing financial service delivery (where loans must be 
paid back promptly) with the delivery of grant money (which does not need to be paid back). There i s  a 
great deal o f  successful experience in the country o f  savings-led micro-finance service delivery which has 
proved to be both operationally and financially self-sustaining after init ial investments to build group 
capacity and social capital. 
52. Micro-credit is one of the principal methods of encouraging income generation and small 
business development in Nepal. There are several targeted micro-credit programs operated through 
different ministries with different donors supporting them. The major credit initiatives include the Small 
Farmers Development Program (SFDP), the Production Credit for Rural Women (PCRW) and the M ic ro -  
Credit Project for Women (MCPW). 
53. I n  recent years, two trends have been evident in microfinance. First, some organizations are 
increasingly turning to lending without collateral requirements to reach the poorest segments o f  the 
population. Second, formal financial institutions have become less directly involved in lending 
operations, relying instead on intermediary organizations such as NGOs and cooperatives to reduce 
operating costs. There has also been an emphasis o n  generating local funds either through revolving credit 
funds such as PCRW and M C P W  or enforced group savings (Grameen clones). 
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54. Issues and Future Potential in Microfinance: Despite Nepal’s vibrant micro-finance sector, 
outreach to poor rural borrowers is still very low with something like 6.5 percent of poor men and women 
estimated to have access to micro-credit through formal public and private sector institutions. Why has 
coverage remained so low? There i s  broad agreement in the micro-finance community that the constraints 
to  scaling up include: 
o 
banlung culture and increasing politicization; 
has adopted forward-looking policies which allow development banks with lower levels o f  capitalization, 
permit NGOs to register as financial intermediaries and grant l imited banlung licenses to cooperatives 
approved by the central bank, many flaws remain in the legislation and the central bank i s  overstretched 
in i t s  regulatory role; 
farm and non-farm enterprises and the demand for money to finance these enterprises; 
(MFIs) and Business Support Services; and 
the rural areas - and has particularly threatened the operation o f  micro-finance organizations and 
programs identif ied with the government. 
55. The security situation appears to have hampered the development of new approaches in micro- 
finance such as life and health insurance which can contribute to risk reduction and social protection. 
Micro-finance organizations in Bangladesh and India are offering these types o f  products and even 
pensions but these have yet to reach Nepal despite i t s  vibrant and large micro-finance sector. Technical 
support and possible partnerships with micro-finance NGOs in Bangladesh and India could help in the 
development o f  these new micro-finance products which could have significant impact on social 
protection. 
Weak mainstream formal sector intermediaries - characterized by a cautious and rather bureaucratic 
Shortcomings in the policy and regulatory framework for micro-finance. Despite the fact that Nepal 
General lack o f  rural infi-astructure and markets which, in turn, limit the potential for  high retum rural 
Inadequate investment in social intermediation, capacity building o f  Micro-Finance Intermediaries 
The security situation which has increased the general r is luness attached to a l l  economic activities in 
F. Summingup 
56. First, there are many social protection schemes in Nepal. Their effectiveness i s  however reduced 
by not being coordinated; in some cases their impact i s  not  clear. Some are assured funding only in the 
short term and their continuing funding i s  an issue. Assistance programs, which encourage good practices 
such as food for education, are dependent on food surpluses in W o r l d  Food Program (WFP) donor 
countries that are beyond the control o f  the Government. The pension and provident funds in the formal 
sector unless reformed could create fiscal problems in the future and they have to  b e  monitored carefully 
and reformed to be fiscally and financially sustainable. 
57. Second, apart from the fiscal implications, there are labor market implications for the pension 
andprovident funds. They tend to reduce the flexibility of the labor market as we l l  as raise real wages for 
those involved in the schemes, unrelated to productivity gains. Labor mobi l i ty  i s  hindered by the back 
loaded benefit formula used. There i s  a need to develop a new contributory pension scheme which allows 
labor mobi l i ty  and where the benefits are not back-loaded. 
58. Finally, microfinance schemes can be seen as social protection even if the loans are market 
priced and savings are accumulated at rates that allow the funds to continue to the future. Global 
experience as wel l  as regional experience shows that the issue for poor has always been more about 
access to credit and less about the cost of credit. Microfinance in Nepal needs to develop and offer 
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financial products beyond credit to include savings73 and micro-life insurance, which has been tried in 
Bangladesh and other countries. 
73 Again global experience shows that the poorest are better reached through micro-savings schemes which help provide a 
cushion against vulnerability. 
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CHAPTER 7. - ACHIEVING PEACE AND RESTORING PROGRESS 
A. Medium Term Development Prospects 
1. Nepal is at a crossroad today between the prospect of sustaining and accelerating gains in 
human development and poverty reduction and the danger of serious reversals of these gains. Despite a 
late start in development and a diff icult geography, Nepal succeeded in building up a wide range o f  good 
government institutions - a system o f  laws and organizations, checks and balances - in a short span o f  
time since the 1950s, though their newness and compressed history have also made them fragile. Policies, 
infrastructure, incomes, and human development outcomes steadily improved under these institutions. 
Economic growth accelerated in the 1990s, became more inclusive and less volatile in the second ha l f  of 
the 1990s. Evidence from several household surveys corroborate that poverty has declined appreciably 
since the mid 1990s. But n o w  this progress i s  under threat o f  reversal f rom polit ical instability and a 
domestic conflict that has sharply escalated in the past two years. Meanwhile conflict and an increasingly 
competitive extemal environment could prevent the country f rom reaching the high rates o f  export growth 
that it reached in the 1990s. 
2. Nepal’s medium term prospects largely hinge on its ability to tackle these immediate threats by 
restoring a minimum degree of stability under which development can proceed and the country can 
undertake structural reforms to increase competitiveness. While the immediate need i s  t o  reduce the 
severity o f  the conflict if not negotiate a complete settlement, Nepal’s development strategy wil l need to 
confront the issues o f  the lagging regions, disadvantaged ethnic and caste groups, who feel excluded and 
disempowered. Focusing development efforts on these groups and regions through investing in better 
connectivity, agricultural development, public services and institutions to  empower them will be key 
elements o f  the medium term strategy. Second, policy measures have to  be taken to increase 
competitiveness and productivity, rather than rely exclusively o n  raising investment and saving (at present 
levels o f  productivity) to raise GDP. The latter is  neither advisable nor feasible. Productivity gains can be 
achieved through improvements in transport and customs procedures and through pol icy reforms to make 
the labor market flexible and also by removing minimum support prices and S M E  reservations. Third, a 
more concerted effort to commercialize agriculture can al l  help to raise i t s  growth prospects. All such 
measures will help Nepal to exploit i t s  comparative advantage in agriculture, labor intensive 
manufacturing and tourism. In turn these measures can improve the country’s medium term growth and 
poverty reduction prospects. 
B. The Poverty Reduction Strategy and Growth Scenarios 
3. Nepal’s 1 Oih Five Year Plan, whose summary is the poverty reduction strategy has four pil lars: 
(1) broad based growth with special emphasis on agriculture; (ii) accelerating human development 
through renewed emphasis o n  effective delivery o f  basic social services and economic infrastructure; (iii) 
ensuring social and economic inclusion o f  the poor, marginalized groups and backward regions; and (iv) 
vigorously pursuhg good governance as a means o f  delivering better development results and to ensure 
social and economic justice. Planned public investment has been, appropriately, focused o n  developing 
social and physical infrastructure. 
4. The PRSPpresents two medium term scenarios - the normal case and the alternative case - to 
take into account the downside risks arising from the present conflict. Underpinned by a prudent fiscal 
frame work that lowers public sector borrowing requirements to less than 1% of GDP in the final year, the 
“normal” scenario in the PRSP projects a growth rate o f  6.2% p.a. over the next f ive years -with growth 
rates reaching a maximum o f  7.5% at the end o f  the plan. The low-case scenario projects a 4.3% growth 
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rate per annum. In sectoral terms, the normal scenario envisages that more than 3/4th o f  GDP growth will 
come from the non-agriculture sector in keeping with past trends. 
years, per-capita-GDP would be 10% to 
14% lower than what it would have 
been if peace had been restored in 
5. The normal case is contingent on a “quick rebound” of economic activity following peace, 
especially in the non-agriculture sectors such as manufacturing, exports, construction and tourism -- all 
based on private sector led growth. The PRSP envisages a strong recovery o f  private sector investment 
(rising to 19% o f  GDP by 2007, compared to 12% currently) that would lead to strong trade and export 
growth. Public investments in power, roads and telecommunications are the instruments for encouraging 
private sector investment. In the rural sector, the implementation o f  the APP, including ensuring the 
supply o f  fertilizer, irrigation, and the development o f  livestock, horticulture and high value crops in the 
hill regions would drive agriculture growth. Expansion o f  rural roads, electricity and marketing networks, 
expansion and rehabilitation o f  irrigation networks and small-scale surface irrigation schemes in the hill 
regions will be the drivers behind agricultural growth in those areas. 
I I 
source; World Bank estimate 
6. Unfortunately, the Jirst two years of the IOth  plan has made it clear that assumptions of the 
normal case are not holding and it has become evident that even attaining the “alternative case” 
scenario wil l  be challenging. Nepal’s growth rate in the past three years has only averaged at around 
2.0%. W h i l e  growth in the last two years has been in line with the alternative case scenario, it has been 
possible only because o f  the resilient growth o f  the agricultural sector and not the non-agricultural sector. 
Except for tourism, growth in other sectors such as manufacturing, transport and communications has 
been considerably below the trend o f  the 1990s. This means that even attaining the “alternative case 
target” o f  4.3% in a scenario o f  continuing insurgency would depend largely on good weather. 
7. The reason for poor 
performance of the non-agriculture 
sector is the cost imposed on the sector 
by the conflict. These costs have tumed 
out to be steep and consequently 
Nepal’s export growth i s  much slower 
in the last three years compared to 
1990s. A conservative estimate i s  that 
GDP growth rates have fallen by 2% 
points p.a. (i.e. t o  around 4%) due to 
falling investment (by more than 3% 
Doints o f  GDP), due to disruptions in 
economic activity and associated rising 
costs. This implies that in the next 5 
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8 ,  Overall, ifpeace is restored, the “normal case scenario does not look too unrealistic going by 
past trends and If Government can make the needed adjustments. The economy showed considerable 
responsiveness to good policies in the past, achieving a trend growth rate o f  about 5% in the 1990s and 
attained a growth rate of 6% in FY 2001. Considering that both human and capital stock have increased 
substantially over the 1990s, infrastructure has improved markedly and currently a steady stream o f  
remittances stimulates demand, medium-term growth prospects would seem favorable. But Government 
would need to  focus more on two areas than it does in the 10* plan. These are to provide an environment 
to increase productivity and efficiency instead o f  depending on higher investment and savings as wel l  as 
encourage the commercialization o f  agriculture. 
9. Some growth arithmetic highlights the point on the excessive reliance of the PRSP on investment 
and savings instead of productivity. The 10” Plan envisages investment and private investment rates to 
more than double in real terms compared to the rates o f  investment during 1996 to 2001, a period o f  
relative normalcy. Similarly, the consumption rate i s  expected to fall by 5 percentage points o f  GDP to 
provide a part o f  the savings for investment. But as may be expected f rom a low-income country such as 
Nepal, the recent household consumption surveys show that consumption has increased appreciably in 
regions and across income levels. Hence, clearly the premise o f  achieving significantly higher investment 
and savings rates i s  not tenable and more focus on growth o f  productivity i s  needed. A s  discussed earlier 
in Chapter 2, the empirical evidence f rom both aggregate analysis and firm level analysis suggests that 
productivity levels and growth are very l o w  in Nepal. Aggregate productivity growth even after 
considerable improvement in the 1990s was s t i l l  at 0.3% p.a. compared to say 2.5% growth in India. 
10. Nepal has the basis to increase its productivity by primarily focusing on four areas. The f i rst  i s  
commercializing agriculture to take advantage o f  i t s  diverse agro-ecological zones and the variety o f  high 
value crops, horticulture, and livestock, some at off-season, that it can produce wil l raise agricultural 
incomes and productivity in the hills. The prospects for commercial agriculture are already evident in the 
faster growth o f  commercial crops, livestock and exports in the second ha l f  o f  the 1990s. Second, by 
focusing o n  trade competitiveness. Nepal has revealed comparative advantage in agriculture and 
manufacturing products (garments, carpets, pashmina, and edible oils, light manufacturing goods). The 
proximity to the large and fast growing Indian and Chinese economies and the availability o f  preferential 
access to  Europe and to India, which many o f  i ts  neighbors don’t enjoy, lower wages and an arguably 
better investment climate than neighboring Uttar Pradesh and Bihar - in terms o f  infrastructure and 
governance -- could help to draw foreign and Indian investment with their know-how and market access 
for export oriented activities. 
11. This leads to the third prospect of growth and productivity, i.e. by attracting foreign direct 
investment. At present, FDI i s  by far the lowest in South Asia. In comparison to Sri Lanka where 70% o f  
ready-made garments exports come f rom foreign investors, in Nepal FDI share in that sector i s  virtually 
nil. A combination o f  conflict, polit ical instability and unfriendly Govemment policies such as 
reservations on carpet manufacturing, restrictions on foreign supply o f  services, and high transactions 
costs have kept FDI shy away f rom the country. But with Nepal’s accession to the WTO, i t s  commitment 
to modernize Customs and liberalize a wide range o f  services that investors need, and i t s  preferential 
access to India and Europe can make the country attractive to  FDI. Starting f rom a l o w  base, this could 
be a significant factor to spur productivity. 
12. The fourth source of future growth and productivity comes with its changing demographic 
composition with more and better education. This raises the prospects o f  increasing productivity o f  both 
capital and labor. As more o f  Nepal’s population enters the labor force and the dependency ratio declines, 
that would add to growth. For  a long time, labor force growth rate and schooling growth rates have 
remained persistently low, but that changed in the 1990s as Nepal underwent a demographic transition. 
The share of working age population after increasing from 53.4% in 1996 to 54.8% in 2006 i s  expected to 
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increase at a faster rate to 57.8% by 2016 increasing the growth o f  productive labor even if participation 
rates remain the same. Alongside, the significant increase in schooling in the 1990s offers the scope for 
raising productivity. Although, it i s  worth emphasizing that these increases in productivity can only 
happen if there i s  investment in raising productivity and labor market f lexibil i ty provides greater 
incentives for both f irms and labor to invest in increasing their productivity. 
13. Another asset, especially important for human capital development and growth, is the strong 
presence and vibrancy of Nepal’s communities - i.e. local or community level social capital. This i s  
witnessed in the dynamism of i t s  many user groups in various sectors such as forestry, irrigation, water 
and sanitation, micro-finance and women’s savings. It i s  also witnessed in the good start o f  local 
Governments in Nepal, where even though development i s  in the early phases and at present i t  i s  arrested. 
Local  governments have displayed considerable activism in development and organizing the delivery o f  
public, specifically “club,” goods that benefit the communities. This asset has enabled Nepal to achieve 
significant improvements in human development indicators despite weak public services and the 
disruptions due to  polit ical instability and conflict. It also offers Nepal a route to improve public service 
delivery through devolution. T o  some extent these assets are highlighted in the Government medium 
term growth and development strategy spelled out in the loth Five Year Plan and the PRSP. 
C. Risks 
14. I t  is self-evident that risks in Nepal are very high, but the resilience of its economy and 
institutions are also high. Despite significant instability and turmoil over the last decade, the economy 
grew at a respectable rate and considerable human development took place. Still, the escalating conflict o f  
the last three years and growing street agitation shows that the main risk i s  political. The other downside 
r isks arise f rom the changing foreign trade environment (such as the rescinding o f  the MFA) and Nepal’s 
excessive dependence o n  remittances to maintain i t s  current account balance. Other r i sks  include the 
constraints o n  Government capacity to implement an inclusive growth strategy, address contingent 
liabilities, and tackle Nepal’s population growth. 
15. The first and most signijkant risk comes from political instability and conflict that has created 
instability and uncertainty about institutions, rules and laws. The roots o f  this instability l ie  in the 
relative exclusion of lagging regions primarily in the hills o f  the mid- and far-Westem regions and the 
dalits and indigenous groups from having access to income and other benefits o f  public services. An 
eight-year long insurgency originating from these regions has claimed more than 9,500 lives - most o f  
them since 2001 - has disrupted development, local governments, and public services in large parts o f  
Nepal. The war has inflicted large costs to the tune o f  more than 2% o f  GDP each year and has large 
cumulative adverse effect on future growth. More recently, polit ical unrest, transport blockades and street 
demonstrations every month have eroded business confidence. The suspension o f  laws and representative 
institutions have also led to greater uncertainty. I t  i s  unclear that Nepal  will be able to attain i t s  l o w  
altemative case growth scenario in this climate. 
16. The second risk comes from a more competitive external environment brought about by the 
forthcoming phasing out of the MFA, the loss of i t s  market share o f  carpets to cheaper machine made 
carpets, and a more stringent trade treaty with India. These factors suggest that the rapid growth in 
exports and the non-agricultural sector in the 1990s - that accounted for 3/4’ o f  a l l  growth in the 1990s -- 
cannot be sustained without implementing further policy reforms and serving better access to Indian and 
foreign markets. Per capita income has fallen since 2001 as the shock o f  fall ing exports and escalating 
conflict combined wi th  excessive rainfall in 2002. As the inexorable pressure o f  population grows and the 
share o f  working age population increases - as demographic trends predict - the challenge will be to 
stimulate growth and investment at a faster pace to create the jobs needed to employ the new entrants to 
the labor force. 
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17. The third risk is posed by substantial reform agenda that the Government needs to implement to 
restart growth and to have more inclusive growth. The insurgency and the social conflict make 
implementation o f  the various agenda items identified in this review and programs already identified by 
the Government diff icult. In one sense the reform are the antidote to the conflict (such as policies to 
increase inclusion, increase transparency and provide better service delivery). But the implementation 
i tsel f  i s  constrained by the on going conflict. This calls for careful prioritization and phasing o f  the reform 
agenda. 
18. The fourth risk is posed by the contingent liability of the non-performing assets of the two large 
banks whose negative net worth is estimated to be about 7% of GDP. The inability to restructure these 
assets in an orderly manner could lead to a significant fiscal burden and a sharp reduction in the access to 
credit. In either case, there would be crowding out o f  private investment. 
19. The $$h risk of losing the race against population growth is more long term risk, though it 
requires intervention now. W h i l e  Nepal’s demographic transition into lower fertility rates has started it i s  
very recent and slow. At i ts  current rate of fertility decline, Nepal’s population wi l l  grow to 77 m i l l i on  in 
the next 50 years. This will lead to overwhelming and unbearable pressure on its l imi ted land resources 
and overwhelm growth and poverty reduction prospects. Alternatively, i f  Nepal i s  able to intervene 
through both supply and demand side of family planning practices leading to a decline in ferti l i ty similar 
to the average o f  2 1 selected Asian c~untries’~, then population growth rate would slow down and grow to 
about 50 m i l l i on  in the next 50 years, leading to a much more manageable situation. 
D. Summingup 
20. Starting from a low base, Nepal has made good progress in developing a wide range of 
institutions - laws and organizations and checks and balances. But their newness also made these 
institutions fragile and unable to deal with the foremost challenge o f  the exclusion o f  lagging regions and 
ethnic groups and castes. Their inabil ity to cope with the tide o f  rising expectations that came with 
democracy in 1990 has led to widespread resentment particularly among the lagging regions and groups. 
T h i s  has fueled an eight-year long insurgency that has violently escalated in the last three years leading to 
the unraveling o f  key representative and accountability institutions. This now threatens to stall and r o l l  
back the progress that Nepal has achieved and more fundamentally the legitimacy o f  the state. 
21. This review has attempted to offer a menu of technical options that Nepal needs to pursue in 
order to restart growth, increase social inclusion and improve service delivery. These options can be 
pursued only with a mitigation o f  the conflict. That in turn depends on the reaching o f  a pol i t ical  
consensus. Without such a consensus, the country will not  only endanger future growth and poverty 
reduction, but will face the prospect o f  reversing i t s  achievements to date. 
74 Thapa, Shyam, “Population Growth in Nepal: T h e  Challenges Ahead”, Perspective, 2001. Dr. Thapa cites a UN Study’s 
estimate o f  21 Asian countries. 
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T a b l e  1.1: Nepal: N o m i n a l  Gross Domes t i c  P r o d u c t  by Sector, 1994/95-2002/2003 
Est. 
1994195 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 2002103 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and  forestry 
Industry 
M in ing  and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity and water 
Construction 
Trade, restaurants, and hotels 
Transport and communications 
Financial and real estate 
Community and social services 
Services 
GDP at factor cost 
Agricultural GDP 
Non-agricultural GDP 
Value o f  imputed banking services 
Net indirect taxes 
GDP a t  market prices 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and  forestry 
Industry 
M in ing  and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity and water 
Construction 
Trade, restaurants, and hotels 
Transport and communications 
Financial and real estate 
Community and social services 
Services 
GDP at factor cost 
Agricultural GDP 
Non-agricultural GDP 
85.6 
46.6 
1.1 
19.6 
2.9 
23.1 
77.8 
24.3 
14.0 
20.5 
18.9 
210.0 
85.6 
124.4 
5.1 
14.3 
219.2 
40.8 
22.2 
0.5 
9.3 
1.4 
11.0 
37.0 
11.6 
6.7 
9.8 
9.0 
100.0 
40.8 
59.2 
(In bil l ions o f  Nepalese rupees, at current prices) 
96.9 108.8 112.5 132.4 
53.5 60.0 63.4 69.9 
1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 
22.5 24.8 27.0 30.3 
3.6 4.5 4.4 4.6 
26.1 29.3 30.5 33.3 
89.0 100.8 113.9 127.7 
28.3 30.6 33.7 39.3 
15.9 19.3 22.6 24.6 
23.5 27.2 29.8 33.2 
21.3 23.7 27.8 30.6 
239.4 269.6 289.8 330.0 
96.9 108.8 112.5 132.4 
142.5 160.8 177.3 197.6 
5.9 7.0 7.9 9.4 
15.5 18.0 18.9 21.5 
248.9 280.5 300.8 342.0 
40.5 
22.3 
0.6 
9.4 
1.5 
10.9 
37.2 
11.8 
6.6 
9.8 
8.9 
(Percentage share in nominal GDP) 
40.4 38.8 40.1 
22.3 21.9 21.2 
0.6 0.5 0.5 
9.2 9.3 9.2 
1.7 1.5 1.4 
10.9 10.5 10.1 
37.4 39.3 38.7 
11.3 11.6 11.9 
7.2 7.8 7.5 
10.1 10.3 10.1 
8.8 9.6 9.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
40.5 40.4 38.8 40.1 
59.5 59.6 61.2 59.9 
145.1 
78.7 
1.8 
33.6 
5.9 
37.4 
142.4 
42.9 
29.3 
36.9 
33.3 
366.3 
145.1 
221.1 
10.7 
23.9 
319.5 
39.6 
21.5 
0.5 
9.2 
1.6 
10.2 
38.9 
11.7 
8.0 
10.1 
9.1 
100.0 
39.6 
60.4 
151.1 
84.0 
1.9 
35.5 
7.0 
39.6 
158.5 
44.6 
33.3 
41.6 
39.0 
393.6 
151.1 
242.5 
11.9 
28.6 
410.3 
38.4 
21.3 
0.5 
9.0 
1.8 
10.1 
40.3 
11.3 
8.5 
10.6 
9.9 
100.0 
38.4 
61.6 
160.1 
84.5 
2.1 
32.8 
7.4 
42.2 
159.9 
40.5 
34.7 
43.9 
40.8 
404.5 
160.1 
244.3 
12.4 
29.2 
421.3 
39.6 
20.9 
0.5 
8.1 
1.8 
10.4 
39.5 
10.0 
8.6 
10.8 
10.1 
100.0 
39.6 
60.4 
169.7 
88.9 
2.2 
33.7 
8.5 
44.5 
169.9 
42.6 
37.1 
46.9 
43.4 
428.5 
169.7 
258.8 
13.3 
31.0 
446.2 
39.6 
20.7 
0.5 
7.9 
2.0 
10.4 
39.7 
9.9 
8.7 
10.9 
10.1 
100.0 
39.6 
60.4 
Source: LMF. 
Table 1.2: Nepal: Real Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1994/95-2002/03 
Est. 
1994195 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 2002103 
(In bil l ions ofNeualese ruuees. at 1994195 urices) 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and forestry 
Industry 
Min ing  and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity and water 
Construction 
Trade, restaurants, and hotels 
Transport and communications 
Financial and real estate 
Community and social services 
Services 
GDP at factor cost 
Agricultural GDP 
Non-agricultural GDP 
Value o f  imputed banking servioes 
Ne t  indirect taxes 
GDP at market prices 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and forestry 
Industry 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity and water 
Construction 
Transport and communications 
Trade, restaurants, and hotels 
Financial and real estate 
Community and social services 
Services 
GDP at factor cost 
Agricultural GDP 
Non-agricultural GDP 
Value o f  imputed banking servioes 
Ne t  indirect taxes 
CDP at market prices 
85.6 
46.6 
1.1 
19.6 
2.9 
23.1 
77.8 
24.3 
14.0 
20.5 
18.9 
210.0 
85.6 
124.4 
5.1 
14.3 
219.2 
-0.3 
4.0 
3.5 
2.0 
12.0 
5.2 
6.0 
10.6 
5.5 
4.3 
4.8 
2.9 
-0.3 
5.3 
12.0 
16.1 
3.5 
88.8 
50.7 
1.3 
21.3 
3.4 
24.7 
82.4 
25.4 
14.8 
22.1 
20.1 
221.9 
88.8 
133.1 
5.6 
14.6 
230.9 
3.8 
8.8 
13.0 
9.0 
19.3 
7.1 
5.9 
5.5 
4.5 
7.6 
6.2 
5.7 
3.8 
7.0 
11.0 
2.1 
5.3 
92.7 93.5 96.2 
54.0 55.3 58.6 
1.3 1.4 1.4 
22.8 23.6 24.9 
3.5 3.3 3.5 
26.4 27.0 28.8 
86.3 92.1 97.0 
26.5 28.0 29.1 
15.9 17.2 18.4 
23.1 24.5 25.7 
20.8 22.4 23.9 
233.0 240.8 251.8 
92.7 93.5 96.2 
140.3 147.3 155.6 
5.7 6.2 6.6 
15.7 15.5 16.2 
243.0 250.2 261.4 
(Annual percentage change) 
4.4 0.9 
6.5 2 3  
6.8 1.3 
7.1 3.4 
1.8 -4.1 
6.6 2.2 
4.8 6.7 
7.7 8.1 
4.1 5.8 
4.7 5.9 
3.6 7.6 
2.8 
6.0 
3.7 
5.3 
5.7 
6.8 
5.4 
6.8 
3.9 
5.0 
6.6 
5.0 3.3 4.5 
4.4 0.9 2.8 
5.4 5.0 5.6 
1.5 8.4 6.9 
7.7 -0.9 4.5 
5.3 2.9 4.5 
100.9 
63.7 
1.5 
26.6 
4.0 
31.6 
102.5 
31.0 
19.6 
27.0 
24.8 
267.1 
100.9 
166.2 
7.2 
17.5 
277.4 
4.9 
8.7 
4.5 
7.2 
14.3 
9.6 
5.7 
7.0 
6.8 
5.1 
4.0 
6.1 
4.9 
6.8 
9.4 
7.8 
6.1 
106.4 
65.4 
1.5 
27.6 
4.4 
31.8 
107.9 
31.5 
20.9 
27.5 
28.1 
279.8 
106.4 
173.4 
7.8 
18.6 
290.6 
5.5 
2.7 
4.5 
3.8 
9.6 
0.9 
5.3 
6.2 
1.5 
1.7 
13.1 
4.7 
5.5 
4.3 
8.3 
6.4 
4.8 
108.8 
63.3 
1.6 
24.9 
4.5 
32.4 
106.4 
28.2 
21.2 
28.4 
28.5 
278.5 
108.8 
169.7 
7.8 
18.5 
289.2 
2.2 
-3.3 
1 .o 
-10.0 
1.7 
1.7 
-1.4 
1.9 
-10.4 
3.3 
1.7 
-0.5 
2.2 
-2.1 
0.1 
-0.6 
-0.5 
111.1 
64.7 
1.6 
25.0 
5.0 
33.1 
109.2 
28.6 
22.0 
29.5 
29.2 
285.1 
111.1 
174.0 
8.2 
19.0 
295.8 
2.1 
2.3 
2.9 
0.4 
11.5 
2.4 
2.7 
3.5 
1.4 
3.7 
2.2 
2.4 
2.1 
2.5 
5.1 
2.5 
2.3 
Source: MF. 
T a b l e  1.3: Nepa l :  Gross  Domes t i c  P r o d u c t  Def lators,  1994/9S-2001/02 
Est. 
1994195 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000/01 2001102 2002103 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and forestry 
Industry 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity and water 
Construction 
Trade, restaurants, and hotels 
Transport and communications 
Financial and real estate 
Community and social services 
Services 
GDP a t  factor cost 
Agricultural GDP 
Non-agricultural GDP 
Value o f  imputed banking servioes 
Net indirect taxes 
GDP at market prices 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and forestry 
Industry 
M in ing  and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity and water 
Construction 
Transport and communications 
Trade, restaurants, and hotels 
Financial and real estate 
Community and social services 
Services 
GDP a t  factor cost 
Agricultural GDP 
Non-agricultural GDP 
Value o f  imputed banking servioes 
Net indirect taxes 
GDP a t  market prices 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
7.8 
8.4 
7.4 
109.1 
105.5 
106.3 
105.4 
105.4 
105.5 
108.0 
111.4 
107.7 
106.4 
105.8 
107.9 
109.1 
107.1 
105.6 
106.2 
107.8 
8.5 
4.7 
-11.4 
4.4 
3.4 
5.5 
8.5 
7.7 
16.3 
7.0 
1.5 
7.8 
8.5 
7.2 
4.1 
6.3 
7.8 
(1 994-95=100) 
117.3 120.3 
111.1 114.7 
110.9 113.8 
108.7 114.3 
128.3 131.6 
111.0 113.1 
116.7 123.7 
115.5 120.4 
121.5 131.5 
117.4 121.6 
114.0 124.2 
137.7 
119.4 
119.0 
122.1 
131.6 
115.5 
131.6 
135.2 
134.2 
129.1 
128.0 
115.7 120.3 131.1 
117.3 120.3 137.7 
114.6 120.4 127.0 
122.9 127.7 142.8 
114.5 121.9 132.1 
115.4 120.3 130.9 
(Annual percentage change) 
7.8 2.5 14.4 
6.7 3.3 4.0 
15.4 2.6 4.6 
3.9 5.2 6.8 
25.0 2.6 0.0 
6.6 1.9 2.2 
6.2 6.0 6.4 
11.8 8.3 2.1 
-0.3 4.3 12.3 
9.9 3.6 6.2 
7.1 9.0 3.1 
7.0 4.0 8.9 
7.9 2.5 14.4 
6.4 5.0 5.5 
13.0 3.9 11.8 
7.8 6.5 8.4 
6.9 4.2 8.8 
143.9 
123.5 
122.6 
125.9 
147.6 
118.5 
138.9 
138.2 
149.3 
136.6 
134.0 
137.1 
143.9 
133.0 
148.1 
136.8 
136.8 
4.5 
3.5 
3.1 
3.2 
12.2 
2.5 
5.5 
11.3 
2.2 
5.8 
4.7 
4.6 
4.5 
4.7 
3.7 
3.5 
4.6 
142.0 
128.4 
124.4 
128.4 
158.7 
124.4 
146.8 
141.5 
159.6 
151.4 
138.9 
140.7 
142.0 
139.9 
152.1 
153.7 
141.2 
-1.3 
3.9 
1.4 
2.0 
7.5 
5.0 
5.7 
6.9 
2.4 
10.9 
3.6 
2.6 
-1.3 
5.2 
2.7 
12.4 
3.2 
147.3 
133.4 
131.4 
131.8 
164.0 
130.6 
150.2 
143.5 
163.4 
154.5 
142.8 
145.3 
147.3 
144.0 
158.0 
157.9 
145.7 
3.7 
3.9 
5.7 
2.7 
3.4 
5.0 
2.3 
2.4 
1.5 
2.0 
2.8 
3.2 
3.7 
2.9 
3.9 
2.7 
3.2 
152.8 
137.2 
136.2 
134.9 
169.5 
134.2 
155.5 
148.8 
168.8 
159.1 
148.6 
150.3 
152.8 
148.7 
161.4 
163.2 
150.8 
3.8 
2.9 
3.7 
2.4 
3.3 
2.8 
3.5 
3.3 
3.7 
3.0 
4.0 
3.5 
3.8 
3.3 
2.1 
3.4 
3.5 
Source: IMF. 
Table 1.4: Nepal: Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure Components, 1994/95-2001/02 
Est. 
1994195 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 2002103 
GDP at market prices 
Consumption 
Public 
Private 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed Investment 
Public 
Private 
Change in stocks 
Resource Balance 
Exports 
Imports 
Consumption 
Public 
Private 
Gross Domestic Investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Public 
private 
Change in stocks 
Resource Balance 
Exports 
Imports 
219.2 
184.9 
20.3 
164.6 
55.2 
48.4 
15.1 
33.3 
6.9 
-20.9 
54.7 
75.7 
84.3 
9.2 
75.1 
25.2 
22.1 
6.9 
15.2 
3.1 
-9.5 
25.0 
34.5 
248.9 
212.8 
23.0 
189.8 
68.0 
56.1 
17.6 
38.5 
11.9 
-31.9 
56.8 
88.7 
85.5 
9.2 
76.2 
27.3 
22.5 
7.1 
15.4 
4.8 
-12.8 
22.8 
35.6 
(In billions o f  Nepalese rupees, at current prices) 
280.5 300.8 342.0 379.5 
241.4 259.4 295.5 321.9 
25.0 28.0 30.5 34.0 
216.4 231.4 264.9 287.9 
71.1 74.1 70.1 92.3 
60.8 65.4 65.3 73.3 
19.4 22.6 23.9 26.4 
41.4 42.8 41.4 46.9 
10.3 9.4 4.8 18.9 
-31.9 -33.3 -23.5 -34.7 
73.9 68.7 78.2 88.4 
105.8 101.9 101.6 123.1 
(Percentage share in nominal GDP) 
86.0 86.2 86.4 84.8 
8.9 9.3 8.9 8.9 
17.1 76.9 77.5 15.9 
25.3 24.8 20.5 24.3 
21.7 21.7 19.1 19.3 
6.9 7.5 7.0 7.0 
14.8 14.2 12.1 12.4 
3.7 3.1 1.4 5.0 
-11.4 -11.1 -6.9 -9.1 
26.3 22.8 22.8 23.3 
37.7 33.9 29.7 32.4 
410.3 
349.3 
40.2 
309.1 
98.3 
78.0 
31.3 
46.8 
20.3 
-37.3 
91.8 
129.1 
85.1 
9.8 
15.3 
24.0 
19.0 
7.6 
11.4 
4.9 
-9.1 
22.4 
31.5 
421.3 
371.5 
42.3 
329.2 
103.6 
81.3 
32.0 
49.2 
22.4 
-53.8 
67.7 
121.5 
88.2 
10.0 
78.1 
24.6 
19.3 
1.6 
11.7 
5.3 
-12.8 
16.1 
28.8 
446.2 
395.6 
46.8 
348.8 
116.3 
85.5 
31.5 
54.1 
30.8 
-65.1 
65.2 
130.9 
88.7 
10.5 
78.2 
26.1 
19.2 
7.0 
12.1 
6.9 
-14.7 
14.6 
29.3 
Note: Exports and imports o f  goods and services reflect the revised coverage of the balance o f  payments 
Source: IMF. 
Table 1.5: Nepal: Savings and Investment, 1994/95-2000/01 
Est. 
1994195 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 2002103 
Gross national savings 
Public sector 1/ 
Private sector 
Foreign Savings 
Gross domestic Investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Change in stocks 
Saving-investment gap 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Gross national savings 
Public sector I/ 
Private sector 
Foreign Savings 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Change in stocks 
Saving-investment gap 
Public sector 
Private sector 
44.9 
3.1 
41.8 
0.0 
55.2 
48.4 
15.1 
33.3 
6.9 
-10.3 
-1 1.9 
8.5 
20.5 
I .4 
19.1 
0.0 
25.2 
22.1 
6.9 
15.2 
3.1 
-4.7 
-5.4 
3.9 
(In billions o f  Nepalese rupees, at current prices) 
47.1 60.8 65.4 65.3 73.3 78.0 103.6 116.3 
3.8 3.8 3.9 3.1 4.3 1 .o 0.9 2.6 
43.3 48.8 52.9 64.0 71.0 81.8 55.2 45.9 
0.0 7.9 8.5 -1.7 -1.9 4 . 7  47.6 67.8 
68.0 71.1 74.7 70.1 92.3 98.3 103.6 116.3 
56.1 60.8 65.4 65.3 73.3 78.0 81.3 85.5 
17.6 19.4 22.6 23.9 26.4 31.3 32.0 31.5 
38.5 41.4 42.8 41.4 46.9 46.8 49.2 54.1 
11.9 10.3 9.4 4.8 18.9 20.3 22.4 30.8 
-20.9 -10.3 -9.4 -4.8 -18.9 -20.3 0.0 0.0 
-13.8 -15.6 -18.7 -20.8 -22.1 -30.3 -31.1 -28.9 
4.8 7.4 10.1 22.6 24.1 35.0 5.9 -8.2 
(In percent o f  nominal GDP) 
18.9 21.7 21.7 19.1 19.3 19.0 24.6 26.1 
1.5 1.4 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 
17.4 17.4 17.6 18.7 18.7 19.9 13.1 10.3 
0.0 2.8 2.8 -0.5 -0.5 -1.2 11.3 15.2 
27.3 25.3 24.8 20.5 24.3 24.0 24.6 26.1 
22.5 21.7 21.7 19.1 19.3 19.0 19.3 19.2 
7.1 6.9 7.5 7.0 7.0 7.6 7.6 7.0 
15.4 14.8 14.2 12.1 12.4 11.4 11.7 12.1 
4.8 3.7 3.1 1.4 5.0 4.9 5.3 6.9 
-8.4 -3.7 -3.1 -1.4 -5.0 -4.9 0.0 0.0 
-5.6 -5.6 -6.2 -6.1 -5.8 -7.4 -7.4 -6.5 
1.9 2.6 3.3 6.6 6.4 8.5 1.4 -1.8 
Note: Defined as revenue less regular expenditure and estimated recurrent costs of development expenditure. 
Source: IMF 
Table 1.6: Nepal: Social Indicators 
Latest sinale vear Same reaionlincome arouo 
1970-75 1980-85 1994-00 India South Low 
Total population mid-year (millions) 
Growth rate (percent annual average) 
Urban population (percent of population) 
Total fertility rate (births per woman) 
Total labor force (millions) 
Females in labor force (percent) 
Labor force participation rate 
Poverty 
National headcount index 
Urban headcount index 
Rural Headcount index 
Income 
GNP per capita (US. dollars) 
Consumer price index (1995=100) 
Food price index (1995-100) 
Incomeiconsumption distribution 
Gini index 
Lowest quintile (percent of income or consumption) 
Highest quintile (percent of income or consumption) 
Public expenditure 
Health (percent of GDP) 
Education (percent of GNP) 
Social security and welfare (percent of GDP) 
Net primary school enrollment rate (percent of age group) 
Total 
Male 
Female 
Total 
Male 
Female 
Gross secondary school enrollment 
Adult literacy (percent) 
Female literacy 
Access to safe water (percent of population) 
Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Access to electricity (percent) 
Population per physician 
Population per hospital bed 
Immunization rate (Percent under 12 months) 
Measles 
DPT 
Child malnutrition (percent under 5 years) 
Life expectancy at birth (in years) 
Total 
Male 
Female 
Mortality 
Infant (per thousand live births) 
Under 5 (per thousand live births) 
Adult(l5-59) 
Male [per 1,000 population) 
Female (per 1,000 population) 
Maternal (per 100,000 live births) 
13.1 
2.0 
5.0 
6.2 
120 
17 
1.5 
0.1 
... 
12 
19 
4 
8 
85 
5 
69 
45 
46 
44 
160 
234 
482 
476 
16.2 
2.1 
7.8 
5.9 
7 
39 
48 
170 
35 
33 
2.6 
0.1 
60 
80 
37 
27 
39 
14 
22 
24 
79 
20 
30,221 
5,719 
34 
32 
51 
52 
50 
115 
180 
376 
395 
23 
2.4 
11.9 
4.3 
11 
40 
48 
42 
23 
44 
240 
137 
144 
36.7 
7.6 
44.8 
1.3 
2.5 
0.4 
78 
93 
63 
32 
45 
18 
58 
33 
81 
85 
80 
15 
13,617 
4,308 
73 
76 
47 
59 
59 
59 
74 
105 
260 
265 
830 
1016 
1.8 
28.4 
3.1 
439 
32 
43 
35 
30.5 
36.7 
450 
144 
137 
37.8 
8.1 
46.1 
0.8 
2.9 
77 
83 
71 
49 
59 
39 
68 
45 
88 
92 
86 
54 
2,459 
1,503 
50 
55 
47 
63 
62 
63 
69 
88 
222 
209 
440 
1,355 
1.9 
28.4 
3.3 
585 
33 
43 
440 
142 
0.9 
3.0 
77 
83 
70 
66 
42 
67 
92 
85 
2,500 
1,429 
53 
57 
49 
62 
62 
63 
73 
96 
227 
212 
2,460 
2.0 
31.9 
3.6 
1,085 
38 
50 
410 
140 
1.2 
3.4 
86 
89 
82 
71 
52 
76 
88 
70 
1,152 
57 
57 
59 
58 
60 
76 
115 
294 
261 
Table 2.l(a): Nepal: Balance of Payments, 1995/96-2002/03 
(in Millions of U.S. dollars) 
Est. 
1994195 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001/02 2002103 
Exports, f.0.b. 
Merchandise exports 
Re-exports 
Imports, c.i.f. 
Trade balance 
Services (net) 
Receipts 
Payments 
Private transfers (net) 
Receipts 
Recorded private transfers, 
Estimated remittances 
Payments 
Current account balance (excluding grants) 
Official grants 
Current account balance (Including grants) 
Official capital grants and loans (net) 
Official capital grants. 
Official, capital (net) 
Loans 
Amortization 
Private (net) 
FDI 
Private capital and errors and omissions 
Overall balance 
Memorandum items: 
Current account (excl. official transfers; percent o f  GDP) 
Current account (excluding gold) 
Current account (incl. official transfers; percent o f  GDP) 
Gross foreign assets (eop; at period average rates) 
o/w: Central Bank 
(in months o f  imports o f  g&s) 
Short-term debt as percent o f  gross foreign assets of  NRE 
Total extemal debt as a percent of GDP 
Gross foreign assets o f  banking system as percent o f  rese 
Debt service (in percent o f  exports o f  goods and services 
and private transfer receipts) 
NRKJS dollar (period average) 
NW$ exchange rate (eop) 
659 
353 
0 
1277 
-617 
203 
48 1 
279 
207 
218 
118 
100 
10 
-207 
107 
-100 
283 
107 
176 
228 
52 
0 
0 
-182 
1 
-4.7 
-6 
-2 
869 
702 
5.4 
7.4 
n.a. 
132.5 
6.3 
0.0 
50 
50 
602 
360 
0 
1350 
-748 
177 
46 1 
285 
192 
202 
78 
125 
10 
-380 
137 
-243 
144 
0 
144 
186 
52 
0 
7 
62 
-40 
-8.4 
-9.1 
-5.4 
805 
609 
3.7 
16.0 
n.a. 
125.2 
6.8 
0.0 
55 
56 
1160 
398 
0 
1750 
-589 
141 
381 
240 
309 
330 
117 
213 
21 
-139 
102 
-38 
170 
21 
149 
197 
48 
0 
29 
-95 
66 
-2.8 
-4.4 
-0.8 
870 
650 
4.4 
27.2 
50.5 
121.0 
4.8 
0.0 
57 
57 
856 
445 
0 
1551 
-695 
203 
435 
232 
355 
383 
138 
245 
28 
-137 
88 
-49 
430 
286 
144 
229 
44 
22 
11 
-277 
179 
-2.8 
-3.6 
-1.0 
973 
712 
5.3 
28.0 
52.7 
131.1 
4.7 
0.0 
62 
68 
763 
525 
238 
1390 
-627 
314 
545 
23 1 
338 
354 
188 
166 
16 
25 
137 
162 
248 
143 
105 
174 
47 
29 
9 
-315 
155 
0.5 
0.1 
3.2 
1133 
791 
4.9 
28.1 
53.7 
147.5 
5.1 
0.0 
68 
68 
971 
722 
250 
1713 
-742 
273 
513 
240 
497 
524 
224 
300 
28 
28 
133 
161 
237 
114 
123 
198 
53 
4 
3 
-208 
220 
0.5 
0.2 
2.9 
1347 
947 
5.6 
26.1 
51.8 
153.8 
4.8 
0.0 
69 
70 
942 
755 
187 
1773 
-831 
216 
477 
262 
680 
699 
290 
409 
19 
64 
108 
172 
181 
84 
97 
164 
61 
-7 
6 
-320 
38 
1.2 
2.2 
3.1 
1423 
1020 
7.0 
21.8 
49.9 
152.4 
6.1 
0.0 
74 
75 
754 
618 
136 
1496 
-742 
108 
362 
254 
777 
803 
316 
487 
26 
143 
143 
287 
236 
74 
162 
105 
66 
-1 
-4 
-420 
-2 5 
2.6 
2.6 
5.2 
1371 
1048 
6.7 
18.9 
52.9 
7.5 
0.0 
76 
78 
633 
633 
0 
1630 
-997 
120 
372 
252 
825 
855 
318 
537 
31 
-53 
161 
107 
78 
78 
123 
73 
-5 
-2 
-137 
92 
-0.9 
-1 
2 
1490 
1177 
6.9 
18.3 
52.2 
7.4 
0.0 
78 
75 
GDP at market prices (US$) 4401 4522 4919 4856 5034 5494 5582 5549 5738 
Table 2.l(b): Nepal: Balance of  Payments with India, 1995/96-2001/02 
(in Mill ions o f  US. dollars) 
1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 
Exports, f.0.b. 
Merchandise exports 
Re-exports 
Imports, c.i.f. 
Trade balance 
Services (net) 
Receipts 
Payments 
Private transfers (net) 
Receipts 
Recorded private transfers. 
Estimated remittances 
Payments 
Current account balance (excluding grants) 
Official grants 
Current account balance (Including grants) 
Official capital grants and loans (net) 
Official capital grants. 
Official, capital (net) 
Loans 
Amortization 
Private capital Grants 
Private capital and errors and omissions 
Overall balance 
Memorandum item: 
Current account balance (percent o f  GDP) 
309 
67 
242 
444 
-135 
68 
163 
95 
59 
67 
36 
31 
8 
-9 
16 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-15 
-8 
-0.2 
553 
142 
41 1 
587 
-34 
18 
108 
90 
89 
113 
49 
64 
24 
73 
23 
96 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-51 
40 
1 .5 
855 
92 
763 
341 
508 
33 
118 
85 
69 
78 
32 
46 
9 
41 1 
20 
43 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-369 
62 
8.3 
423 
185 
238 
596 
-113 
39 
140 
101 
108 
122 
66 
56 
14 
-26 
19 
-7 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-66 
-1 1 
-0.5 
557 
307 
250 
693 
-136 
46 
142 
96 
135 
153 
74 
79 
18 
45 
24 
69 
3 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
13 
85 
0.8 
540 
353 
187 
141 
-207 
45 
133 
88 
158 
175 
73 
102 
17 
-4 
7 
3 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
80 
84 
-0.1 
512 
376 
136 
159 
-241 
21  
111 
84 
165 
189 
83 
106 
24 
-55 
22 
-33 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
38 
1 
-1 .o 
Source: IMF 
Table 2.l(c): Nepal: Balance of Payments with Third World, 1995/96-2001/02 
(in Mill ions 0fU.S. dollars) 
1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001/02 
Exports, f.0.b. 
Merchandise exports 
Re-exports 
Imports, c.i.f. 
Trade balance 
Services (net) 
Receipts 
Payments 
Private transfers (net) 
Receipts 
Recorded private transfers, 
Estimated remittances 
Payments 
Current account balance (excluding grants) 
Official grants 
Current account balance (Including grants) 
Official capital grants and loans (net) 
Official capital grants. 
Official, capital (net) 
Loans 
Amortization 
Private capital Grants 
Private capital and errors and omissions 
Overall balance 
Memorandum item: 
Current account balance (percent o f  GDP) 
293 
293 
0 
906 
-613 
99 
298 
199 
134 
136 
42 
94 
2 
-380 
121 
-259 
134 
0 
134 
186 
52 
0 
94 
-3 1 
-9.4 
303 
303 
0 
964 
-661 
187 
328 
141 
266 
270 
89 
181 
4 
-208 
96 
-112 
360 
215 
145 
195 
S I  
39 
-151 
136 
4 . 3  
305 
305 
0 
1203 
-898 
107 
263 
156 
241 
253 
85 
168 
12 
-550 
73 
-471 
296 
147 
149 
197 
48 
0 
179 
-2 
-1 1.2 
340 
340 
0 
794 
-454 
274 
405 
131 
230 
232 
122 
110 
2 
50 
118 
168 
214 
109 
105 
I S 8  
53 
32 
-198 
216 
1 .o 
414 
414 
0 
1020 
-606 
227 
37 1 
144 
362 
37 1 
1 so 
22 1 
9 
-1 7 
12s 
108 
196 
73 
123 
182 
59 
26 
-206 
124 
-0.3 
402 
402 
0 
1026 
-624 
171 
344 
173 
522 
524 
217 
307 
2 
69 
87 
156 
120 
17 
103 
164 
61 
65 
-386 
-45 
1.2 
242 
242 
0 
737 
-495 
80 
250 
170 
613 
614 
233 
381 
1 
198 
121 
319 
85 
46 
39 
105 
66 
22 
-465 
-3 9 
3.6 
Source: IMF. 
Table 2.2(a): Nepal: Foreign Trade, 1995/96-2001/02 
(in Mi l l i ons  o f  US. dollars) 
1995196 1996/97 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000/01 2001/02 
Exports, f.0.b. 
Merchandise exports 
Food and l i ve  animals 
Tobacco and beverages 
Crude materials and edibles 
An ima l  and vegetable oil and fats 
Chemicals and drugs 
Manufactured goods, classified 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Commodities and transactions n.i.e. I 1  
Re-exports 
Imports, c.i.f. 
Food and l ive animals 
Tobacco and beverages 
Crude materials and edibles 
Animal and vegetable oil and fats 
Chemicals and drugs 
Manufactured goods, classified 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Commodities and transactions n.i.e. I/ 
Memorandum items: 
Trade Balance (percent of GDP) 
Exports 
Imports 
60 1 
359 
35 
0 
14 
4 
11 
189 
0 
105 
1 
242 
1351 
87 
9 
88 
101 
51 
157 
510 
277 
69 
2 
-16.6 
13.3 
29.9 
856 
445 
51 
0 
8 
35 
31 
188 
1 
130 
1 
411 
1551 
79 
13 
112 
267 
33 
179 
526 
270 
64 
8 
-14.3 
17.6 
32.0 
1160 
397 
41 
0 
12 
6 
23 
194 
1 
114 
0 
763 
1750 
95 
10 
96 
126 
41 
149 
784 
242 
70 
137 
-12.0 
23.6 
35.6 
763 
525 
55 
I 
7 
53 
41 
199 
1 
168 
0 
238 
1390 
112 
13 
92 
227 
49 
184 
377 
266 
63 
7 
-12.4 
15.2 
27.6 
971 
721 
61 
1 
8 
46 
57 
230 
6 
312 
0 
250 
1713 
157 
13 
101 
273 
64 
210 
498 
297 
97 
3 
-13.5 
17.6 
31.2 
942 
755 
65 
1 
10 
56 
55 
257 
5 
307 
0 
187 
1773 
81 
12 
102 
357 
76 
175 
558 
312 
98 
2 
-14.9 
16.9 
31.8 
754 
618 
70 
2 
13 
98 
42 
224 
5 
164 
0 
136 
1496 
92 
11 
89 
305 
102 
163 
424 
245 
63 
2 
-13.4 
13.6 
27.0 
Note: Includes classified exports and imports, and adjustments t o  reconcile figures with summary balance o f  payments data. 
Source: IMF. 
Table 2.20): Nepal: Foreign Trade with India, 1995/96-1999/00 
(in Mi l l i ons  o f  US. dollars) 
1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 
Exports, f.0.b. 
Merchandise exports 
Food and l ive animals 
Tobacco and beverages 
Crude materials and edibles 
Animal and vegetable o i l  and fats 
Chemicals and drugs 
Manufactured goods, classified 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Commodities and transactions n.i.e. I/ 
Re-exports 
Imports, c.i.f. 
Food and l i ve  animals 
Tobacco and beverages 
Crude materials and edibles 
An ima l  and vegetable oi l  and fats 
Chemicals and drugs 
Manufactured goods, classified 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Commodities and transactions n.i.e. 11 
Memorandum items: 
Trade Balance (percent o f  GDP) 
Exports 
Imports 
308 
66 
23 
0 
6 
2 
11 
22 
0 
1 
1 
242 
444 
59 
8 
16 
8 
1 
64 
172 
96 
18 
2 
-3.0 
6.8 
9.8 
855 
92 
31 
0 
7 
3 
23 
27 
0 
1 
0 
763 
547 
64 
9 
12 
9 
2 
71 
157 
89 
22 
112 
6.3 
17.4 
11.1 
553 
142 
28 
0 
5 
32 
31 
41 
0 
4 
1 
41 1 
587 
54 
11 
16 
153 
0 
85 
160 
83 
22 
3 
-0.7 
11.4 
12.1 
423 
185 
30 
1 
5 
so 
41 
48 
0 
10 
0 
238 
596 
81 
I O  
20 
128 
1 
81 
154 
98 
20 
3 
-3.4 
8.4 
11.8 
557 
307 
54 
1 
7 
42 
56 
81 
3 
63 
0 
250 
693 
101 
9 
22 
129 
1 
91 
203 
101 
34 
2 
-2.5 
10.1 
12.6 
540 
353 
54 
1 
10 
53 
54 
121 
3 
57 
0 
187 
747 
60 
9 
32 
151 
6 
90 
245 
118 
3s 
2 
-3.7 
9.7 
13.4 
512 
376 
63 
2 
12 
95 
42 
131 
4 
27 
0 
136 
759 
75 
10 
38 
197 
0 
69 
244 
100 
24 
2 
-4.5 
9.2 
13.7 
Note: Includes classified exports and imports, and adjustments t o  reconcile figures w i t h  summary balance o f  payments data. 
Source: IMF. 
Table 2.2(c): Nepal: Foreign Trade with Third World, 1995/96-2001/02 
(in Mi l l i ons  o f  US. dollars) 
1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 
Exports, f.0.b. 
Merchandise exports 
Food and l ive animals 
Tobacco and beverages 
Crude materials and edibles 
An ima l  and vegetable o i l  and  fats 
Chemicals and drugs 
Manufactured goods, classified 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Commodities and transactions n.1.e. I1 
Re-exports 
Imports, c.i.f. 
Food  and l ive animals 
Tobacco and beverages 
Crude materials and edibles 
An ima l  and vegetable o i l  and fats 
Chemicals and drugs 
Manufactured goods, classified 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Commodities and transactions n.i.e. 11 
Memorandum items: 
Trade Balance (percent o f  GDP) 
Exports 
Imports 
293 
293 
12 
0 
8 
2 
0 
167 
0 
104 
0 
0 
907 
28 
1 
72 
93 
so 
93 
338 
181 
51 
0 
-13.6 
6.5 
20.0 
305 
305 
16 
0 
5 
3 
0 
167 
1 
113 
0 
0 
1203 
31 
1 
84 
1 I 7  
39 
78 
627 
153 
48 
25 
-18.3 
6.2 
24.5 
303 
303 
23 
0 
3 
3 
0 
147 
1 
126 
0 
0 
964 
2s 
2 
96 
1 I 4  
33 
94 
366 
187 
42 
5 
-13.6 
6.2 
19.9 
340 
340 
2s 
0 
2 
3 
0 
151 
1 
158 
0 
0 
794 
31 
3 
72 
99 
48 
103 
223 
168 
43 
4 
-9.0 
6.8 
15.8 
414 
414 
7 
0 
1 
4 
1 
149 
3 
249 
0 
0 
1020 
56 
4 
79 
144 
63 
1 I 9  
295 
196 
63 
1 
-11.0 
7.5 
18.6 
402 
402 
11 
0 
0 
3 
1 
136 
2 
250 
0 
0 
1026 
21 
3 
70 
206 
70 
85 
313 
194 
63 
0 
-11.2 
7.2 
18.4 
242 
242 
7 
0 
1 
3 
0 
93 
1 
137 
0 
0 
731 
17 
1 
51 
108 
102 
94 
180 
145 
39 
0 
-8.9 
4.4 
13.3 
Note: Includes classified exports and imports, and adjustments t o  reconcile figures with summary balance o f  payments data. 
Source: EMF. 
Table 2.3: Nepal: Exports o f  M a j o r  Commodities, 1994/95 - 2001/02 
1994195 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 
Carpets 
Pashmina 
Ready-made garments 
Hides and Skins 
Jute goods 
Pulses 
Handicrafts 
Cardamon 
Catechu 
Ghee 
Mustard and linseed 
R a w  ju te  
Dr ied  ginger 
Herbs 
Other Exports 
o f  which: Vegitable Ghee 
Total Merchandise exports 
Carpets 
Pashmina 
Ready-made garments 
Hides and Skins 
Jute goods 
Pulses 
Handicrafts 
Cardamon 
Catechu 
Ghee and vegetable ghee 
Mustard and linseed 
R a w  ju te  
Dr ied  ginger 
Herbs 
Other Exports 
o f  which:  Vegitable Ghee 
Total Merchandise exports 
Carpets 
Pashmina 
Ready-made garments 
Hides and Skins 
Jute goods 
Pulses 
Handicrafts 
Cardamon 
Catechu 
Ghee and vegetable ghee 
Mustard and linseed 
R a w  ju te  
Dr ied  ginger 
Herbs 
Other Exports 
154.5 147.9 
n.a. n.a. 
102.9 97.3 
11.5 10.7 
4.6 8.2 
9.2 12.0 
2.9 1.5 
2.8 3.5 
0.1 0.5 
1 .o 0.6 
1.3 1 .o 
1.7 0.6 
1.5 0.9 
1 .o 0.9 
58.1 74.5 
n.a. n.a. 
353.2 360.0 
-4.3 
n.a. 
-5.4 
-6.9 
77.4 
31.3 
-49.0 
28.1 
250.7 
-36.0 
-25.6 
-65.3 
-44.6 
-10.3 
28.3 
n.a. 
1.9 
43.8 41.1 
n.a. n.a. 
29.1 27.0 
3.3 3.0 
1.3 2.3 
2.6 3.3 
0.8 0.4 
0.8 1 .o 
0.0 0.1 
0.3 0.2 
0.4 0.3 
0.5 0.2 
0.4 0.2 
0.3 0.2 
16.4 20.7 
(In thousands o f  U.S. dollars) 
155.7 137.0 144.3 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
104.4 113.2 142.8 
8.1 9.9 6.6 
9.9 11.6 12.8 
19.2 17.1 17.6 
2.5 2.6 3.2 
3.7 3.7 3.4 
1 .o 1.1 1.7 
1.6 2.7 5.8 
0.6 0.2 0.3 
0.1 0.1 0.0 
0.8 0.7 0.6 
1.2 1.1 0.6 
89.2 119.4 185.5 
n.a. 25.5 46.3 
396.9 444.6 525.3 
(Annual  percentage change) 
5.2 -12.0 5.3 
ma. n.a. n.a. 
7.3 8.5 26.1 
-24.9 22.9 -33.1 
20.7 17.5 10.0 
60.0 -11.2 3.2 
68.3 3.3 25.8 
3.4 0.5 -6.6 
97.8 15.9 53.4 
146.2 70.8 114.0 
-36.3 -75.2 85.0 
-90.6 44.6 -100.0 
-4.7 -17.8 -9.7 
40.7 -15.0 -42.7 
19.6 33.9 55.3 
n.a. n.a. 81.6 
10.2 12.0 18.2 
(Share o f  total exports) 
39.2 30.8 27.5 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
26.3 25.5 27.2 
2.0 2.2 1.3 
2.5 2.6 2.4 
4.8 3.8 3.4 
0.6 0.6 0.6 
0.9 0.8 0.7 
0.2 0.3 0.3 
0.4 0.6 1.1 
0.2 0.0 0.1 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.2 0.2 0.1 
0.3 0.2 0.1 
22.5 26.9 35.3 
142.5 
90.0 
201.9 
4.9 
16.0 
15.3 
3.7 
3.2 
2.9 
5.4 
0.4 
0.0 
0.9 
1.1 
238.4 
39.7 
721.7 
-1.2 
n.a. 
41.4 
24.7 
13.2 
-6.0 
67.1 
-5.7 
49.8 
42.3 
83.3 
28.5 
-25.7 
-13.1 
-14.2 
37.4 
19.7 
12.5 
28.0 
0.7 
2.2 
2.1 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
0.8 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
33.0 
116.4 
92.8 
177.8 
9.6 
17.5 
16.5 
3.6 
4.0 
2.0 
6.4 
0.5 
1.5 
0.8 
1.3 
304.1 
48.2 
754.8 
-18.3 
3.1 
-11.9 
94.6 
9.7 
7.5 
-2.8 
25.1 
-29.6 
17.2 
21.0 
-4.1 
19.4 
27.6 
21.4 
4.6 
15.4 
12.3 
23.6 
1.3 
2.3 
2.2 
0.5 
0.5 
0.3 
0.8 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.2 
40.3 
80.8 
24.5 
101.8 
8.0 
21.2 
15.8 
3.2 
4.7 
2.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.9 
1.2 
264.7 
91.6 
618.4 
-30.6 
-73.6 
-42.7 
-16.4 
21.0 
-3.9 
-11.6 
15.1 
12.5 
-97.4 
-74.1 
-93.3 
7.4 
-6.2 
-13.0 
90.0 
-18.1 
13.1 
4.0 
16.5 
1.3 
3.4 
2.6 
0.5 
0.8 
0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
42.8 
o f  which:  Vegitable Ghee n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.7 8.8 5.5 6.4 14.8 
Source: IMF. 
Table  2.4(a): Nepal: Services a n d  Current  Transfers, 1995/96-2001/02 
(in Millions of US. dollars) 
1995/96 1996197 1997/98 1998/99 1999100 2000101 2001102 
Services and current transfers (net) 
Services (net) 
Receipts 
Freight and insurance 
Transportation 
Travel 
Investment income 
Compensation of employee 
Govemment, n i e  
Other 
Payments 
Freight and insurance 
Transportation 
Travel 
Investment income 
Compensation o f  employee 
Govemment, n.i.e. 
Other 
Private current transfers (net) 
Receipts 
Privafi remittances 
Indian excise refund 
Other estimated remittances 
Payments 
Official Current transfers (net) 
Receipts 
Payments 
496 
167 
46 1 
0 
64 
172 
31 
0 
88 
106 
294 
2s 
34 
146 
33 
0 
7 
49 
192 
202 
78 
n.a. 
125 
I O  
137 
137 
0 
619 
205 
436 
0 
67 
160 
30 
8 
99 
72 
23 1 
2s 
34 
85 
23 
1 
8 
55 
355 
383 
138 
n.a. 
245 
28 
119 
119 
0 
541 
140 
381 
0 
60 
1 so 
35 
0 
70 
66 
24 1 
2s 
27 
105 
29 
0 
8 
47 
309 
331 
127 
n.a. 
214 
21 
93 
93 
0 
788 
313 
545 
0 
56 
179 
38 
13 
191 
68 
232 
29 
36 
77 
27 
1 
9 
53 
338 
354 
188 
19 
166 
16 
137 
137 
0 
903 
273 
513 
0 
64 
175 
51 
16 
128 
79 
240 
29 
43 
69 
31 
0 
9 
59 
497 
524 
224 
19 
300 
27 
133 
133 
0 
990 
216 
477 
0 
56 
159 
60 
14 
102 
86 
262 
27 
45 
7s 
51 
0 
9 
54 
680 
699 
290 
19 
409 
19 
94 
94 
0 
1028 
108 
362 
0 
33 
113 
39 
16 
116 
45 
254 
18 
45 
7s 
63 
1 
7 
45 
778 
803 
316 
22 
487 
2s 
143 
143 
0 
Source: IMF. 
Table  2.4@): Nepal: Services and Current  Transfers w i t h  India,  1995/96-2001/02 
(in Millions o f  US. dollars) 
1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 
Services and current transfers (net) 
Services (net) 
Receipts 
Freight and insurance 
Transportation 
Travel 
Investment income 
Compensation o f  employee 
Govemment, n.i.e 
Other 
Payments 
Freight and insurance 
Transportation 
Travel 
Investment income 
Compensation o f  employee 
Govemment, n.i.e. 
Other 
Private current transfers (net) 
Receipts 
Privaft remittances 
Indian excise refund 
Other estimated remittances 
Payments 
Official Current transfers (net) 
Receipts 
Payments 
143 
68 
163 
0 
12 
98 
3 
0 
1 
49 
95 
22 
3 
43 
2 
0 
0 
25 
59 
67 
36 
n.a. 
31 
8 
16 
16 
0 
121 
33 
118 
0 
11 
62 
3 
0 
1 
42 
85 
23 
3 
35 
1 
0 
0 
23 
69 
79 
32 
n.a. 
46 
9 
20 
20 
0 
130 
18 
108 
0 
I O  
56 
1 
3 
0 
38 
90 
23 
2 
31  
0 
0 
0 
28 
89 
1 I 3  
49 
n.a. 
64 
24 
23 
23 
0 
166 
39 
140 
0 
11 
53 
2 
2 
47 
25 
101 
26 
2 
43 
1 
1 
0 
28 
108 
122 
66 
19 
56 
14 
19 
19 
0 
205 
46 
142 
0 
16 
55 
2 
2 
35 
32 
96 
2 1  
5 
33 
0 
0 
0 
31 
135 
153 
74 
19 
79 
18 
24 
24 
0 
210 
45 
133 
0 
10 
47 
9 
2 
36 
29 
88 
24 
4 
32 
0 
0 
3 
25 
158 
175 
13 
19 
102 
17 
I 
7 
0 
214 
21 
111 
0 
6 
37 
13 
1 
30 
24 
84 
16 
7 
34 
0 
1 
0 
26 
165 
189 
83 
22 
106 
24 
22 
22 
0 
Source: IMF 
Table 2.4(c): Nepal: Services and Current Transfers with Third World, 1995/96-2001/02 
(in Millions o f  U.S. dollars) 
1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 
Services and current transfers (net) 
Services (net) 
Receipts 
Freight and insurance 
Transportation 
Travel 
Investment income 
Compensation o f  employee 
Govemment, n.i.e 
Other 
Payments 
Freight and insurance 
Transportation 
Travel 
Investment income 
Compensation o f  employee 
Govemment, n.i.e. 
Other 
Private current transfers (net) 
Receipts 
Privaft remittances 
Indian excise refund 
Other estimated remittances 
Payments 
Official Current transfers (net) 
Receipts 
Payments 
353 
99 
298 
0 
52 
74 
28 
0 
87 
57 
199 
3 
31 
103 
31 
0 
7 
2s 
133 
135 
42 
94 
2 
121 
121 
0 
420 
107 
263 
0 
49 
88 
32 
0 
69 
25 
IS6 
2 
24 
70 
28 
0 
8 
25 
240 
252 
95 
168 
12 
73 
73 
0 
549 
187 
328 
0 
57 
1.04 
29 
S 
99 
34 
141 
2 
32 
48 
23 
1 
8 
27 
266 
270 
89 
181 
4 
96 
96 
0 
622 
274 
405 
0 
45 
126 
36 
11 
144 
43 
131 
3 
34 
34 
26 
0 
9 
25 
230 
232 
122 
110 
2 
118 
118 
0 
698 
227 
371 
0 
48 
120 
49 
14 
93 
47 
144 
2 
38 
36 
31 
0 
9 
28 
362 
371 
150 
22 1 
9 
109 
109 
0 
780 
171 
344 
0 
46 
112 
51 
12 
66 
57 
174 
3 
41 
43 
51 
0 
6 
29 
522 
524 
217 
307 
2 
81 
87 
0 
814 
81 
251 
0 
27 
76 
26 
15 
86 
21 
170 
2 
38 
41 
63 
0 
7 
19 
613 
614 
233 
381 
1 
121 
121 
0 
Source: IMF. 
Table 2.5: Nepal: Tourism Indicators, 1994-2002 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Tourist arrivals (in thousands) 
(Percentage Change) 
Ofwhich : Europe 
India 21 
Japan 
United States 
and Canada 
Average days of stay 
Per capita expenditure 
(In Nrs) 21 
(In US. dollars) 31 
(Percentage Change) 
Hotel-bed capacity 
(Percentage Change) 
325.6 
11.2 
135.2 
102.5 
19.6 
26.1 
10.0 
14,400 
394 
16.9 
17,730 
41.3 
363.4 
11.3 
137.7 
117.3 
25.4 
29.7 
11.3 
24,6 17 
474 
20.5 
21,807 
23.0 
393.6 
8.3 
139.8 
122.5 
29.9 
30.6 
13.5 
24,344 
430 
-9.3 
25,638 
17.6 
421.9 
7.2 
143.4 
133.4 
35.0 
36.3 
10.5 
23,226 
402 
-6.6 
27,612 
7.7 
463.7 
9.9 
157.8 
143.2 
37.3 
43.0 
10.8 
31,282 
476 
18.4 
28,878 
4.6 
491.5 463.0 
6.0 -5.8 
171.6 166.3 
140.7 95.9 
38.8 41.0 
46.9 49.0 
12.8 12.0 
32,550 32163.0 
479 454.0 
0.6 -5.9 
32,214 34958.0 
11.6 8.5 
3 62 216 
-21.8 -26.7 
137.8 
64.3 
28.9 
39.1 
12 12 
34345 
467.3 
2.9 
36163 
3.5 
Notes: 
I/ Estimated. 
21 By  air only. 
31 Excluding Indian tourists 
Source: IMF. 
Table 2.6: Nepal: Average Customs Duty by M a i n  Category of  Goods, 1999/2000 - 2001-02 1/ 
Chapter 
Numbers Main  Category o f  Goods 1999100 2001102 
1-10 
11-20 
21-30 
3 1-40 
41-50 
5 1 - w  
6 1-70 
71-80 
81-90 
91-97 
L ive  animals 
Grains, vegetable extracts, sugars 
Beverage, tobacco, mineral fuels, pharmaceuticals 
Fertilizers, cosmetics, soaps, chemicals, plastics 
Raw hides, skins, wood, paper, silk 
wool, cotton, man-made fibres, carpets 
Clothing. footwear, ceramics, glassware, stoneware 
Iron, steel copper, nickel, aluminum, lead, zinc, tin 
Tools, machinery, vehicles, aircrafts 
Clocks, musical instruments, arms, fumiture, art 
Total number o f  items 
Sum o f  duties 
5.0 
15.6 
11.7 
15.3 
10.9 
13.2 
21.1 
12.9 
11.9 
20.6 
10.5 
16.7 
13.6 
20.6 
11.7 
11.2 
20.1 
12.9 
11.9 
21.1 
5,198 5,321 
68,3 10 76,441 
Average customs duty 13.1 14.4 
Notes: 
I/ Harmonized System Classification; Average o f  customs duties for all i tem in each chapter. 
Source: IMF. 
Table 3.1. Nepal: External Debt and Debt Service, 199495-2001/02 
1994/95 1995/96 1996197 1997/98 1998/99 1999100 2000/01 2001102 
(In millions of US. dollars) 
Debt outstanding I/ 
Total Medium and Long-term 
Multilateral 
AsDB 
EEC 
IDA 
IFAD 
IMF 21 
NDF 
OPEC 
Bilateral 2/ 
Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
France 
Korea 
Kuwait 
OECF 
Saudi Fund 
Short-term debt 3/ 
Total debt service 
Amortization 4/ 
Interest 41 
Of which : To IMF 51 
Ofwhich : To IMF 
Debt service ratio 6/ 
Of which : To IMF 
Outstanding debtlGDP 
O f  which: To IMF 
2,295 
2,295 
1,842 
698 
10 
1002 
58 
55 
8 
12 
453 
0 
9 
0 
51 
0 
16 
370 
8 
... 
82 
59 
7 
23 
0.2 
6.3 
0.6 
52.1 
1.3 
2,370 
2,320 
1,940 
757 
9 
1052 
57 
43 
11 
10 
380 
6 
8 
0 
53 
0 
15 
29 1 
7 
50 
84 
60 
8 
24 
0.2 
6.8 
0.7 
52.4 
1 .o 
2,482 
2,361 
1,983 
802 
8 
1059 
57 
34 
16 
7 
3 78 
5 
7 
6 
51 
0 
13 
286 
10 
121 
84 
55 
7 
28 
0.7 
4.8 
0.5 
50.5 
0.7 
2,561 
2,414 
2,090 
910 
8 
1080 
44 
25 
18 
6 
324 
5 
6 
6 
52 
2 
12 
229 
13 
147 
86 
62 
7 
24 
0.7 
2,702 
2,532 
2,169 
948 
7 
1107 
58 
21 
20 
9 
3 63 
4 
6 
6 
48 
10 
11 
264 
14 
170 
84 
59 
7 
25 
0.7 
(in percent) 
4.7 5.0 
0.5 0.3 
52.8 53.7 
0.5 0.4 
2,848 
2,662 
2,244 
1012 
6 
1123 
57 
15 
20 
11 
418 
6 
5 
7 
45 
10 
10 
309 
26 
186 
83 
57 
6 
26 
0.4 
4.7 
0.2 
51.8 
0.3 
2,786 
2,630 
2,251 
1043 
6 
1102 
55 
10 
19 
16 
3 79 
5 
4 
6 
40 
9 
8 
29 1 
16 
156 
98 
69 
5 
29 
0.4 
6.1 
0.2 
49.9 
0.2 
2,933 
2,808 
2,394 
1132 
6 
1156 
57 
7 
20 
16 
414 
5 
8 
6 
44 
10 
8 
317 
16 
125 
132 
81 
4 
51 
0.4 
7.5 
0.4 
52.9 
0.1 
l /  Consists primarily o f  medium- and long-tem public and publicly guaranteed debt excluding foreign 
liabilities o f  the banking system other than liabilities to the IMF. 
2/ Amounts less than U S 1  million were owed to Russia, United States and Australia in various years. 
3/ Includes outstanding trade credits and amortization due in the following year. 
4/ Includes principal and interest repayments of public enterprises and some private entities, as well as the central go 
51 Excluding IMF trust fund. 
6/ In percent o f  exports o f  goods and services (excluding re-exports) and private transfers. 
lvemment. 
Source: IMF. 
Table 3.2: Nepal: Gross International Reserves, 1994/95-2001/02 1/ 
1994195 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES 
Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) 
Convertible 
Nonconvertible 
Commercial banks 
Convertible 
Nonconvertible 
Convertible 
Nonconvertible 
Total 
Other gross foreign assets of NRB 
SDR holdings 
Gold 21 
Reserve tranche position 
Total gross foreign assets of NRB 
Nepal Rastra Bank 
Gross foreign assets 
(In millions o f  US. dollars, end o f  period) 
694 594 63 6 702 781 
568 488 475 533 709 
126 106 161 169 72 
169 197 219 262 345 
156 187 203 246 304 
13 10 16 16 41 
863 791 855 964 1126 
724 675 678 779 1013 
139 116 177 185 113 
932 
772 
160 
401 
369 
32 
1333 
1141 
192 
15 15 15 14 14 14 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 6 6 6 6 6 
9 9 9 8 8 8 
709 609 651 716 795 946 
(In months o f  imports o f  goods and services) 
5.2 3.7 4.4 5.3 4.9 5.6 
1007 
710 
297 
402 
364 
38 
1409 
1074 
335 
14 
0 
6 
7 
1021 
7.0 
1035 
727 
308 
323 
303 
20 
1358 
1030 
328 
14 
0 
6 
8 
1049 
6.7 
Notes: 
11 Totals differ from monetary sector figures owing to valuation effects. 
21 Valued at historical prices. 
Source: IMF.  
Table 4.1: Nepal: Summary of  Centra l  Government Operations, 1994195-2002/03 1/ 
Est. 
1994195 1995196 I996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 2002103 
Total revenue and grants 
Total revenue 
Tax revenue 
Nontax revenue 
Grants 
Total expenditure 
Regular expenditure 
Development expenditure 
Overall balance before grants 
Overall balance after grants 
Financing 
Net foreign loans 
Gross disbursements 
Amortization 
N e t  domestic financing 
Bank financing 
Nonbank financing 
Total revenue and grants 
Total revenue 
Tax revenue 
Nontax revenue 
Grants 
Total expenditure 
Regular expenditure 
Development expenditure 
Overall balance before grants 
Overall balance after grants 
Financing 
Net foreign loans 
Gross disbursements 
Amortization 
Net domestic financing 
Bank financing 
Nonbank financing 
Memorandum item: 
Nominal GDP (Billions Nrs) 
26.9 
22.9 
19.2 
3.7 
3.9 
35.0 
15.2 
19.8 
-12.1 
-8.2 
8.2 
5.4 
7.3 
1.9 
2.8 
1.3 
1.5 
12.3 
10.4 
8.8 
1.7 
1.8 
16.0 
6.9 
9.0 
-5.5 
-3.7 
3.7 
2.5 
3.3 
0.9 
1.3 
0.6 
0.7 
219.2 
31.6 
26.9 
21.7 
5.1 
4.8 
43.7 
18.7 
25.0 
-16.9 
-12.0 
12.0 
7.1 
9.5 
2.4 
5.0 
2.2 
2.9 
12.7 
10.8 
8.7 
2.0 
1.9 
17.6 
7.5 
10.0 
-6.8 
-4.8 
4.8 
2.9 
3.8 
1 .o 
2.0 
0.9 
1.2 
248.9 
35.5 
29.5 
24.4 
5.1 
6.0 
46.4 
20.7 
25.7 
-16.9 
-10.9 
10.9 
6.9 
9.0 
2.1 
4.0 
2.0 
2.0 
12.7 
10.5 
8.7 
1.8 
2.1 
16.5 
7.4 
9.2 
-6.0 
-3.9 
3.9 
2.5 
3.2 
0.7 
1.4 
0.7 
0.7 
280.5 
(In billions o f  Nepalese rupees) 
37.1 39.3 
31.7 35.0 
25.9 28.8 
5.8 6.5 
5.4 4.3 
50.5 52.8 
27.7 31.9 
22.9 20.8 
-18.8 -17.7 
-13.4 -13.4 
13.4 13.4 
11.5 8.7 
14.2 11.9 
2.7 3.2 
1.9 4.7 
2.7 2.4 
-0.8 2.4 
(In percent o f  GDP) 
12.3 11.5 
10.5 10.2 
8.6 8.4 
1.9 1.9 
1.8 1.3 
16.8 15.4 
9.2 9.3 
7.6 6.1 
-6.2 -5.2 
-4.5 -3.9 
4.5 3.9 
3.8 2.5 
4.7 3.5 
0.9 0.9 
0.6 1.4 
0.9 0.7 
-0.3 0.7 
300.8 342.0 
46.4 
40.7 
33.2 
7.6 
5.7 
59.8 
36.5 
23.3 
-19.0 
-13.3 
13.3 
10.0 
13.7 
3.7 
3.4 
5.5 
-2.2 
12.2 
10.7 
8.7 
2.0 
1.5 
15.7 
9.6 
6.1 
-5.0 
-3.5 
3.5 
2.6 
3.6 
1 .o 
0.9 
1.5 
-0.6 
379.5 
53.6 
46.8 
38.9 
8.0 
6.8 
72.1 
45.8 
26.3 
-25.3 
-18.5 
18.5 
7.5 
12.0 
4.5 
11.0 
7.2 
3.7 
13.1 
11.4 
9.5 
1.9 
1.6 
17.6 
11.2 
6.4 
-6.2 
-4.5 
4.5 
1.8 
2.9 
1.1 
2.7 
1.8 
0.9 
410.3 
54.4 
48.6 
39.3 
9.2 
5.8 
12.6 
48.7 
23.9 
-24.0 
-18.2 
18.2 
6.0 
10.8 
4.8 
12.2 
4.0 
8.2 
12.9 
11.5 
9.3 
2.2 
1.4 
17.2 
11.6 
5.7 
-5.1 
-4.3 
4.3 
1.4 
2.6 
1.1 
2.9 
0.9 
1.9 
421.3 
64.3 
54.7 
42.0 
12.7 
9.6 
72.7 
51.6 
21.1 
-18.0 
-8.4 
8.4 
3.1 
8.6 
5.5 
5.3 
10.1 
-4.8 
14.4 
12.3 
9.4 
2.8 
2.2 
16.3 
11.6 
4.7 
-4.0 
-1.9 
1.9 
0.7 
1.9 
1 .2 
1.2 
2.3 
-1.1 
446.2 
I/ Fiscal years start on July 16. 
Source: IMF. 
T a b l e  4.2: Nepal:  C e n t r a l  Government  Revenue, 1995/96-2002103 
Est. 
1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 2002103 
(In billions of Nepalese rupees) 
Total revenue 1/ 
Tax revenue 
Taxes on income and profits 
Taxes on property 
Registration and land revenue 
Other property taxes 
Taxes on goods and services 
VATlSales tax 21 
Excise taxes 
Other 31 
Taxes on intemational trade 
Import taxes 
Indian excise refund 
Export taxes 
Other 
Nontax revenue I /  
Charges, fees, fines, etc. 
Sales o f  goods and services 
Dividends 
Royalty and,fixed asset sales 
Interest receipts 
Miscellaneous 
Total revenue I /  
Tax revenue 
Taxes on income and profits 
Taxes on property 
Taxes on goods and services 
VAT1Sales tax 21 
Excise taxes 
Other 31 
Import taxes 
Indian excise refund 
Export taxes 
Taxes on intemational trade 
Nontax revenue 1/ 
Charges, fees, fines, etc. 
Sales o f  goods and services 
Dividends 
Royalty and,fixed asset sales 
Interest receipts 
Miscellaneous 
Memorandum Item: 
Nominal GDP (Billions ofNrs.) 
26.8 
21.7 
3.3 
1.3 
1.1 
0.2 
9.8 
6.4 
1.9 
1.4 
7.3 
6.3 
0.9 
0.2 
0.0 
5.1 
0.9 
0.0 
1.4 
0.1 
1.7 
0.0 
10.8 
8.7 
1.3 
0.0 
0.5 
0.4 
0.1 
0.0 
3.9 
2.6 
0.8 
0.6 
2.9 
2.5 
0.4 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
2.1 
248.9 
29.5 
24.4 
4.1 
1.1 
1 .o 
0.1 
10.9 
7.1 
2.3 
1.5 
8.3 
7.1 
1 .o 
0.2 
0.0 
5.1 
1.1 
1 .o 
1.1 
0.4 
1.4 
0.1 
10.5 
8.7 
1.5 
0.0 
0.4 
0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
3.9 
2.5 
0.8 
0.5 
3.0 
2.5 
0.4 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
1.8 
280.5 
31.7 
25.9 
4.9 
1.1 
1 .o 
0.1 
11.4 
7.1 
2.9 
1.4 
8.5 
7.2 
1.1 
0.2 
0.0 
5.8 
1.2 
1.3 
1.3 
0.6 
1.2 
0.1 
10.5 
8.6 
1.6 
0.0 
0.4 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
3.8 
2.4 
1 .o 
0.5 
2.8 
2.4 
0.4 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
1.9 
300.8 
35.0 
28.8 
6.2 
1.1 
1 .o 
0.1 
11.9 
7.9 
3.0 
1.1 
9.5 
7.9 
1.2 
0.4 
0.0 
6.3 
1.4 
1 .o 
1.8 
0.2 
1.7 
0.1 
40.7 ' 
33.2 
7.4 
1.1 
1 .o 
0.1 
13.8 
9.9 
3.1 
0.8 
10.8 
9.0 
1.3 
0.4 
0.0 
7.6 
1.7 
1.1 
2.5 
0.6 
1.6 
0.1 
(In percent o f  GDP) 
10.2 10.7 
8.4 8.7 
1.8 2 .0 
0.0 0.0 
0.3 0.3 
0.3 0.3 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
3.5 3.6 
2.3 2.6 
0.9 0.8 
0.3 0.2 
2.8 2.8 
2.3 2.4 
0.4 0.4 
0.1 0.1 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
1.8 2.0 
342.0 379.5 
46.8 
38.9 
9.1 
0.6 
0.6 
0.0 
16.6 
12.0 
3.8 
0.8 
12.6 
10.6 
1.5 
0.5 
0.0 
8.0 
1.9 
1.2 
2.3 
0.9 
1.4 
0.1 
11.4 
9.5 
2.2 
0.0 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
4.0 
2.9 
0.9 
0.2 
3.1 
2.6 
0.4 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
1.9 
410.3 
48.6 
39.3 
8.9 
1.1 
1.1 
0.0 
16.6 
11.9 
3.8 
0.9 
12.7 
10.0 
1.7 
0.9 
0.0 
9.2 
2.0 
1.1 
2.5 
0.7 
1.2 
1.6 
11.5 
9.3 
2.1 
0.0 
0.3 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
3.9 
2.8 
0.9 
0.2 
3.0 
2.4 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
2.2 
42 1.3 
54.7 
42.0 
7.8 
1.4 
1.4 
0.0 
18.7 
13.4 
4.7 
0.6 
14.3 
10.6 
2.4 
0.9 
0.4 
12.7 
2.3 
1.3 
3 .O 
1.9 
0.9 
3.2 
12.3 
9.4 
1.7 
0.0 
0.3 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
4.2 
3 .O 
1.1 
0.1 
3.2 
2.4 
0.5 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
2.8 
446.2 
11 Adjusted by taking out o f  non-tax revenue the principal repayments from corporations (classified as negative capital spending). 
21 Sales tax prior to 1997198. 
31 Includes taxes on entertainment hotel, contracts, and air flight. Air flight revenues are now mostly retained by the Civil Aviation 
Authority. 
Source: IMF 
Table 4.3: Nepal: Central Government Expenditure by Economic Classification, 1995/96-2001/02 
1995196 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999100 2000/01 2001/02 
(in billions o f  Nepalese rupees) 
Total expenditure 
Current expenditure 1/ 
Goods and Services 
Wages, salaries and benefits 
Core c iv i l  service 
Police salaries 
Defense salaries 
Teacher salaries 
Retirement facilities 
Other Goods and Services 
Interest payments 
Domestic debt 
Foreign debt 
Subsidies and transfers 
Capital Expenditure 2/ 
Acquisition o f  fixed assets 
Purchase o f  stocks 
Capital transfers (grants) 
Net  Lending 
Investment in loans 
Less repayment o f  loans 
Total expenditure 
Current expenditure 1/ 
Goods and Services 
Wages, salaries and benefits 
Core c iv i l  service 
Police salaries 
Defense salaries 
Teacher salaries 
Retirement facilities 
Other Goods and Services 
Interest payments 
Domestic debt 
Foreign debt 
Subsidies and transfers 
Capital Expenditure 2/ 
Acquisition o f  fixed assets 
Purchase o f  stocks 
Capital transfers (grants) 
Net Lending 
Investment in loans 
Less repayment o f  loans 
Memorandum Item: 
Nominal GDP (Billions o f  Nrs.) 
43.7 
18.7 
3.9 
2.6 
1.3 
1.7 
25.0 
17.5 
7.5 
1.5 
1 .o 
0.5 
0.7 
10.0 
248.9 
46.4 
20.7 
4.1 
2.9 
0.0 
1.8 
25.7 
16.5 
7.4 
1.5 
1 .o 
0.0 
0.7 
9.1 
280.5 
49.9 
27.8 
20.8 
16.5 
6.9 
2.3 
2.1 
5.2 
1 .o 
3.4 
3.8 
2.4 
1.3 
3.2 
19.0 
12.5 
1.9 
4.6 
3.2 
4.4 
1.2 
16.6 
9.2 
6.9 
5.5 
2.3 
0.8 
0.7 
1.7 
0.3 
1.1 
1.2 
0.8 
0.4 
1 .o 
6.3 
4.2 
0.6 
1.5 
1.1 
1.5 
0.4 
300.8 
52.8 
31.9 
23.7 
18.1 
7.1 
2.6 
2.5 
6.0 
1.2 
4.4 
4.1 
2.5 
1.5 
4.1 
19.0 
13.3 
1.6 
4.2 
1.8 
4.0 
2.2 
15.4 
9.3 
6.9 
5.3 
2.1 
0.8 
0.7 
1.7 
0.3 
1.3 
1.2 
0.7 
0.5 
1.2 
5.6 
3.9 
0.5 
1.2 
0.5 
1.2 
0.7 
342.0 
59.8 
36.5 
26.5 
19.8 
7.7 
2.8 
2.9 
6.4 
1.3 
5.5 
4.8 
3.2 
1.6 
5.1 
19.4 
13.1 
1.3 
4.9 
3.9 
6.1 
2.2 
15.7 
9.6 
7.0 
5.2 
2.0 
0.7 
0.8 
1.7 
0.3 
1.4 
1.3 
0.8 
0.4 
1.3 
5.1 
3.5 
0.3 
1.3 
1 .o 
1.6 
0.6 
379.5 
72.1 
45.8 
35.4 
28.5 
11.3 
4.1 
3.6 
9.5 
2.1 
4.9 
4.7 
3.0 
1.7 
5.7 
21.2 
14.4 
1.1 
5.6 
5.1 
7.1 
2.1 
17.6 
11.2 
8.6 
6.9 
2.8 
1 .o 
0.9 
2.3 
0.5 
1.2 
1.1 
0.7 
0.4 
1.4 
5.2 
3.5 
0.3 
1.4 
1.2 
1.7 
0.5 
410.3 
72.3 
48.7 
37.9 
29.9 
10.0 
5.0 
4.5 
10.4 
2.8 
5.2 
5.8 
4.0 
1.8 
5.0 
20.9 
13.8 
1.5 
5.6 
2.9 
4.8 
1.9 
17.2 
11.6 
9.0 
7.1 
2.4 
1.2 
1.1 
2.5 
0.7 
1.2 
1.4 
0.9 
0.4 
1.2 
5.0 
3.3 
0.4 
1.3 
0.7 
1.1 
0.4 
421.3 
Notes: 
1/ Current Expenditure adjusted by subtracting payment o f  amortization on domestic and foreign loans. 
2/ Capital expenditure adjusted by adding net lending. 
Source: IMF. 
Table 4.4: Nepal: Central Government Expenditure by Functional Classification, 1995/96-2001/02 
1994195 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 
(In bil l ions o f  Nepalese rupees) 
Total expenditure 
Current expenditure 
Social services 
Education 
Health 
Other 
Agriculture related 
Forestry 
Infrastructure 
Other 
Defense 
Interest payments 
General administration 
Other 
Economic services 
Development expenditure 
Social services 
Education 
Health 
Dr inking water 
Other 
Economic services 
Agriculture related 
Infrastructure 
Other 
Total expenditure 
Current Expenditure 
Development Expenditure 
Social services 
Ofwhrch: Education 
Health 
Dr inking water 
Economic services 
Ofwhrch : Agriculture related 
Defense 
Interest payments 
General administration 
Other 
Infrastructure 
Total expenditure 
Current Expenditure 
Development Expenditure 
Social services 
Ofwhich: Education 
Health 
Drinking water 
Economic services 
Ofwhich : Agriculture related 
Defense 
Interest payments 
General administration 
Other 
Memo Item 
Nominal  GDP (Billions Nrs) 
Infrastructure 
43.7 
18.7 
5.3 
4.3 
0.8 
0.2 
1.7 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.2 
2.1 
3.9 
3.1 
2.5 
25.0 
7.6 
1.7 
0.9 
1.1 
3.9 
17.4 
5.4 
10.4 
1.6 
17.6 
7.5 
10.0 
5.2 
2.4 
0.7 
0.4 
7.7 
2.3 
4.4 
0.9 
1.6 
1.3 
1 .o 
100.0 
42.8 
57.2 
29.5 
13.7 
3.9 
2.5 
43.8 
13.2 
25.2 
4.9 
8.9 
7.2 
5.8 
# 248.9 
46.4 
20.7 
5.9 
4.8 
1.0 
0.2 
1.9 
0.4 
0.5 
0.7 
0.3 
2.4 
4.1 
3.5 
3.0 
25.7 
8.3 
2.4 
1.6 
1.3 
3.0 
17.4 
5.0 
10.9 
1.5 
16.5 
7.4 
9.2 
5.1 
2.6 
0.9 
0.5 
6.9 
1.9 
4.1 
0.8 
1.5 
1.3 
1.1 
100.0 
44.7 
55.3 
30.6 
15.4 
5.6 
2.9 
41.5 
11.5 
25.0 
5.1 
8.8 
7.6 
6.4 
280.5 
49.9 52.8 
23.2 26.5 
7.1 7.9 
5.7 6.0 
1 .o 1.1 
0.3 0.7 
2.0 2.3 
0.4 0.4 
0.5 0.7 
0.8 0.9 
0.3 0.3 
2.6 3.0 
3.8 4.1 
3.9 4.5 
3.9 4.7 
26.7 26.4 
10.7 9.7 
2.4 1.6 
2.7 1.7 
1.7 1.9 
4.0 4.5 
15.9 16.7 
4.8 4.9 
10.8 11.4 
0.3 0.4 
(In percent o f  GDP) 
16.6 15.4 
7.7 7.7 
8.9 7.7 
5.9 5.1 
2.7 2.2 
1.3 0.8 
0.6 0.6 
6.0 5.6 
1.7 1.6 
3.9 3.6 
0.9 0.9 
1.2 1.2 
1.3 1.3 
1.3 1.4 
59.8 
29.3 
8.9 
6.7 
1.3 
0.8 
2.4 
0.5 
0.8 
0.9 
0.3 
3.5 
4.8 
5.5 
4.3 
30.4 
12.2 
2.6 
2.1 
2.4 
5.1 
18.2 
5.6 
11.4 
1.2 
15.7 
7.7 
8.0 
5.6 
2.4 
0.9 
0.6 
5.4 
1.6 
3.2 
0.9 
1.3 
1.4 
1.1 
(In percent o f  total expenditure) 
100.0 100.0 lOO.0 
46.6 50.1 49.1 
53.4 49.9 50.9 
35.6 33.2 
16.2 14.5 
7.5 5.3 
3.4 3.6 
36.0 36.0 
10.5 10.1 
23.3 23.2 
5.2 5.7 
7.5 7.7 
7.9 8.6 
7.8 8.8 
35.3 
15.5 
5.8 
4.1 
34.6 
10.1 
20.5 
5.8 
8.1 
9.1 
7.1 
300.8 342.0 379.5 
72.1 
37.1 
10.7 
8.2 
1.5 
0.9 
2.5 
0.5 
0.8 
0.9 
2.6 
3.8 
4.7 
8.0 
7.3 
35.0 
12.9 
2.8 
2.0 
2.4 
5.7 
22.1 
6.6 
12.8 
2.7 
17.6 
9.0 
8.5 
5.7 
2.7 
0.9 
0.6 
6.0 
1.7 
3.3 
0.9 
1.1 
2.0 
1.8 
100.0 
51.4 
48.6 
32.7 
15.3 
4.9 
3.3 
34.2 
9.9 
19.0 
5.3 
6.5 
11.1 
10.1 
410.3 
72.6 
44.1 
13.5 
10.4 
2.1 
0.9 
3.0 
0.6 
1 .o 
1.1 
3.7 
5.8 
5.8 
11.0 
5.1  
28.5 
10.5 
2.3 
1.6 
2.0 
4.6 
18.0 
5.4 
10.4 
2.2 
17.2 
10.5 
6.8 
5.7 
3 .O 
0.9 
0.5 
5 .o 
1.4 
2.7 
1.4 
1.4 
2.6 
1.2 
100.0 
60.7 
39.3 
33.0 
17.5 
5.1 
2.7 
28.9 
8.2 
15.8 
8.0 
8.0 
15.1 
7.1 
42 1.3 
Source: IMF. 
Table 5.1: Nepal: Monetary Survey, 1994/95-2002/03 
Est. 
1994/95 1995/96 1996197 1997198 1998/99 1999100 2000101 2001/02 2002103 
(In billions of NeDalese ruDees. end of Deriod) 
Net foreign assets 
Assets 
Liabilities 
Net domestic assets 
Domestic credit 
Public sector 
Government (net) 
Nonfinancial public enterprises 
Private sector 1/ 
Other item (net) 
Broad money 
Narrow money 
Quasi-money 
Net foreign assets, 
Net domestic assets 
Domestic credit 
Public sector 
Private sector I /  
Broad money 
Narrow money 
Quasi-money 
37.09 
43.86 
6.78 
43.90 
69.60 
23.83 
22.60 
1.23 
45.77 
-25.70 
80.98 
32.99 
48.00 
30.8 
25.1 
4.5 
39.4 
16.1 
15.7 
16.3 
37.70 
45.27 
7.57 
54.95 
86.62 
26.85 
24.89 
1.96 
59.78 
-31.67 
92.66 
36.50 
56.16 
1.7 
25.2 
24.5 
12.6 
30.6 
14.4 
10.6 
17 
40.19 
49.37 
9.18 
63.53 
98.27 
28.18 
26.58 
1.60 
70.09 
-34.74 
103.72 
38.46 
65.26 
6.6 
15.6 
13.4 
5.0 
17.3 
11.9 
5.4 
16.2 
55.57 65.03 ' 80.4; 
66.11 77.61 94.86 
10.54 12.58 14.39 
70.89 87.77 105.65 
112.82 130.97 154.35 
29.82 32.62 36.40 
28.76 31.06 34.59 
1.06 1.57 1.81 
83.00 98.35 117.95 
-41.93 -43.20 -48.70 
126.46 152.80 186.12 
45.16 51.06 60.98 
81.30 101.74 125.14 
(Annual percentage change) 
38.3 17.0 23.7 
11.6 23.8 20.4 
14.8 16.1 17.8 
5.8 9.4 11.6 
18.4 18.5 19.9 
21.9 20.8 21.8 
17.4 13.1 19.4 
24.6 25.1 23.0 
87.80 
106.19 
18.39 
126.66 
183.43 
46.99 
44.77 
2.22 
136.44 
-56.78 
214.45 
70.58 
143.88 
9.8 
18.9 
19.3 
28.0 
16.5 
15.2 
15.7 
15.0 
88.42 92.05 
107.00 1 1 1.47 
18.58 19.42 
135.57 150.15 
200.31 222.76 
58.60 61.57 
55.52 58.67 
3.08 2.90 
141.71 161.19 
-64.74 -72.61 
223.99 242.20 
77.16 81.42 
146.83 160.78 
4.0 4.1 
16.9 10.8 
13.5 11.2 
12.7 5.1 
13.8 13.7 
4.4 8.1 
9.3 5.5 
2.1 9.5 
I /  Include credit to financial public enterprises. 
Source: IMF. 
Table 5.2: Nepal: Structure o f  Interest Rates, 1994/95-2001/02 
1994195 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 
Refinancing Facilities of Nepal 
Rastra Bank to commercial banks 
Export bills 
Industrial Sector 
Agricultural sector 
Service sector 
Commercial banks 
Savings deposits 
Time deposits 
3 months 
6 Months 
1 year 
2 years 
Loans 
Industry 
Agriculture 
Services 
Export bills 
Commercial loans and overdrafts 
Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal 
To cooperatives 
To others 
Nepal Industrial Development 
Corporation 
Government securities 
National savings certificates 
Treasury bills (3 month) 1/ 
Treasury bills (1 year) 
Development bonds 
25-year special bonds 
20-year special bonds 
Special loan 
11 .o 
11 .o 
11.0 
11.0 
7.0-8.0 
5.0-7.5 
6.0-8.0 
8.0-9.25 
negotiable 
14.0-18.0 
13.0-15.5 
17.0-18.0 
12.0-16.0 
12.0-19.0 
12.0-15.0 
14.0-17.0 
15.0-16.0 
9.0-15.5 
7.4 
3.0-10.5 
... 
3.0 
3.0 
1 .O-14.0 
11.0 
11.0 
11.0 
11 .o 
7.5-8.0 
6.75-8.0 
7.25-9.0 
9.5-1 1 .O 
negotiable 
15.0-17.5 
14.5-16.0 
18.0 
13.0-16.0 
14.5-20.0 
12.0-15.0 
14.0-17.0 
15.0-16.0 
9.0-15.5 
10.9 
3.0-12.0 
... 
3.0 
5.0 
1.0-13.0 
11.0 9.0 9.0 6.5 6.5 2.0-4.5 
11.0 9.0 9.0 7.5 7.5 3.0-5.5 
11.0 9.0 9.0 6.5 6.7 4.5-5.5 
11.0 9.0 9.0 7.5 7.5 3.0-5.5 
7 .340 6.5-8.0 5.75-8.0 4.0-6.5 3.0-6.5 2.5-6.25 
6.75-9.0 5.0-8.0 4.0-7.5 4.0-6.0 2.5-6.0 2.0-5.25 
7.25-9.0 6.0-8.5 6.0-8.0 5.0-6.75 3.5-6.76 2.5-6.0 
9.5-11.0 9.0-10.5 7.25-9.5 6.0-7.75 4.5-7.75 3.5-7.0 
negotiable 9.5-12.0 7.25-10.25 5.75-8.5 4.25-8.5 3.25-8.0 
15.0-17.5 13.5-17.0 11.5-17.0 10.5-15.5 9.5-15.0 7.0-14.5 
14.5-16.0 14.5-15.5 14.0-15.5 12.0-14.5 12.5-14.5 12.0-14.0 
18.0 18.0 18.0 7.5-17.0 7.5-16.0 7.0-15.5 
14.5-16.5 12.5-16.0 7.5-15.0 7.5-15.0 7.5-12.5 6.5-12.5 
14.5-20.0 13.5-20.0 10.0-19.0 9.0-18.0 9.0-18.0 2.0-4.26 
12.0-15.0 13.0-16.0 13.0-16.0 11.0-12.0 11.0-12.0 10.0-12.0 
14.0-17.0 15.0-18.0 15.0-18.0 12.0-16.0 12.0-16.0 10.0-16.0 
15.0-18.0 15.5-18.0 15.5-18.0 15.5-18.0 15.5-18.0 13.5-14.5 
9.0-1 3.25 9.0-13.25 9.0-1 3.25 8.5-1 3.25 8.5-1 3.25 8.5-13.25 
10.2 3.5 2.3 5.3 4.3 3.8 
9.0-12.0 5.9-7.3 4.7-7.0 5.5-7.3 5.1 5.2 
3.0-12.0 3.0-12.0 3.0-12.0 3.0-10.5 3.0-10.5 3.0-8.0 
3.0 3.0 3.0 
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 
1.0-13.0 1.0-13.0 1.0-9.5 1.0-9.5 1.0-9.5 1.0-9.0 
1/ Annual weighted average. 
Source: IMF. 
Table 5.3: Nepal: Non-Performing Loans o f  Public Enterprises, 1996197-2001102 
(In millions of Nepalese rupees, end of period) 
1996197 1999/00 2000/01 200 1/02 
Principal Interest Total Principal Interest Total Principal Interest Total Principal Interest Total 
Nepal Food Corporation 
Nepal Transportation Corporation 
Himal Cement Company 
Bhaktapur Tile and Brick Corporation 
Raghupati Jute Mill 
Rice Exporting Companies 
Cottage Industrial and 
Handicraff Emporium 
National Trading Ltd. 
Agricultural Tools Factory 
Hetadua Leather Factory 
Hetadua Clothes Factory 
Total 
0 
19 
2 
3 
10 
13 
93 
0 
0 
2 
0 
140 
0 
13 
0 
2 
137 
100 
07 
0 
31 
18 
0 
387 
0 
32 
2 
4 
147 
112 
179 
0 
31 
19 
0 
527 
7 
19 
0 
2 
0 
3 
0 
1 
137 
2 
37 
207 
5 
27 
0 
3 
0 
32 
136 
0 
8 
20 
0 
247 
12 
46 
0 
5 
0 
35 
136 
1 
145 
30 
45 
455 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
2 
37 
45 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
32 
136 
0 
0 
33 
15 
220 
0 0 
0 19 
0 29 
7 16 
0 0 
35 3 
136 3 
0 0 
0 0 
35 2 
52 0 
265 72 
0 
69 
61 
21 
0 
0 
136 
0 
0 
34 
0 
329 
0 
00 
90 
37 
0 
11 
139 
0 
0 
36 
0 
401 
Source: IMF. 
Table 6.1: Nepal: Agricutural Production and Yield, 1995196-2001102 
1995196 1996197 I997198 1998199 1999/00 2000101 2001102 1995196 1996197 1997198 1998199 1999100 2000101 2001102 
Production of Major Crops 
Foodgrains 
Paddy 
Wheat 
Maize 
Miilet 
Bariey 
Cash Crops 
Sugarcane 
Jute 
Oilseeds 
Potato 
Tobacco 
Distrlbutlon of FertiHzer I /  
Area under cultivatlon. 2/ 
Fwdgrains 
Paddy 
Wheat 
Maize 
Millet 
Barley 
Cash Crops 
Sugarcane 
Jute 
Oilseeds 
potato 
Tobacco 
Yields 
Foodgrains 
Paddy 
Wheat 
Maize 
Miilet 
Barley 
Cash crops 
Sugarcane 
Jute 
Oilseed 
potato 
Tobacco 
6,256 
3,579 
1,013 
1,331 
292 
41 
2,604 
1,569 
15 
116 
898 
6 
133 
3,242 
1,497 
654 
792 
260 
39 
353 
45 
11 
185 
106 
6 
1 9  
2 4  
1 5  
1 7  
1 1  
1 1  
7 4  
34 9 
1 4  
0 6  
8 5  
1 0  
6,395 
3,699 
1,056 
1,312 
289 
39 
2,722 
1,622 
14 
119 
962 
5 
122 
3,267 
1511 
667 
794 
260 
35 
356 
46 
11 
182 
111 
6 
2 0  
2 4  
1 6  
1 7  
1 1  
1 1  
7 6  
35 3 
1 3  
0 7  
8 7  
0 8  
(In thousands of metric tons) 
6,331 6.465 6,985 7,172 7,247 
3,641 3,710 4,030 4,216 4,165 
1,001 1.086 1,184 1,158 1,258 
1,367 1,346 1,445 1.484 1,511 
285 291 295 283 283 
37 32 31 30 31 
2.782 3.203 3,428 3.678 3,877 
1,718 1,972 2.103 2,212 2,248 
15 16 15 16 17 
109 120 123 132 135 
935 1,091 1.183 1,314 1,473 
5 4 4 4 4 
109 157 148 146 141 
(in thousands of hectares) 
3,243 3.253 3,321 3,314 3,296 
1,506 1,514 1,551 1,560 1,517 
640 641 660 641 667 
799 802 819 825 826 
262 264 263 260 258 
36 32 28 28 28 
361 379 390 391 398 
49 54 58 59 59 
12 12 15 11 12 
179 190 190 168 188 
118 118 123 129 135 
5 5 4 4 4 
(In metric lonslhectares) 
2 0  2 0  2 1  2 2  2 2  
2 4  2 5  2 6  2 7  2 7  
1 6  1 7  1 8  1.8 1 9  
1.7 1.7 1 8  1.8 1.8 
1.1 1 1  1.1 1.1 1.1 
1.0 1 0  1 1  1 1  1.1 
7 7  8 5  8 8  9 4  9 7  
351 365 363 375 381 
1 3  1 3  1 0  1 5  1 4  
0 6  0 6  0 6  0 7  0 7  
8 1  9 2  9 6  102 109 
1 0  0 8  1 0  1 0  0 9  
156  
22 2 
10 8 
4 6  
9 0  
36 7 
5 8  
4 5  
36 4 
13 7 
6 9  
-14 3 
-24 4 
4 3  
5 3  
3 2  
2 7  
4 0  
25 8 
8 8  
7 1  
22 2 
8 8  
9 3  
-14 3 
13 5 
138  
10 6 
-1 1 
2 1  
5 1  
-2 9 
-2 3 
4 9  
4 5  
-2 6 
0 0  
2 2  
3 4  
4 2  
-1 4 
-1 0 
-4 9 
4 5  
3 4  
-6 7 
2 6  
7 1  
-16 7 
-8 3 
0 8  
0 9  
2 0  
0 3  
0 0  
-10 3 
0 8  
2 2  
0 0  
-1 6 
4 7  
0 0  
1 4  
2 4  
2 2  
-1 7 
-1 0 
6 0  
3 7  
1 1  
-6 7 
4 3  
2 3  
-16 7 
(Percentage Change) 
-10 2 1  8 0  
-16 1 9  8 6  
-52 8 5  9 0  
4 2  -15  7 4  
-14 2 1  1 4  
-5 1 -135 -3 1 
2 2  151 7 0  
5 9  148 6 8  
7 1  6 7  -63 
-84 101 2 5  
-28 167 8 4  
0 0  -200 0 0  
-107 670  236 
(Percentage change) 
-07 0 3  2 1  
-03 0 5  2 4  
-40  0 2  3 0  
0 6  0 4  2 1  
0 8  0 8  -04 
2 9  -11 1 -125 
1 4  5 0  2 9  
6 5  102 7 4  
9 1  0 0  250 
-16  6 1  0 0  
4 5  1 7  4 2  
-167 0 0  -200 
(Percentage change) 
-03 1 8  5 8  
-12 1 4  6 0  
-12 8 3  5 9  
3 5  -19  5 1  
-21 1 3  1 8  
-78  -27 107 
0 8  9 7  4 0  
-06  4 2  -07 
-1 8 6 7  -250 
-69  3 7  2 5  
-70  147 4 0  
200 -200 250 
2 7  
4 6  
-2 2 
2 7  
-4 1 
-3 2 
7 3  
5 2  
6 7  
7 3  
11 1 
0 0  
-1 4 
-0 2 
0 6  
-2 9 
0 7  
-1 1 
0 0  
0 3  
1 7  
-26 7 
-1 1 
4 9  
0 0  
4 6  
3 9  
0 3  
2 0  
-1 9 
-0 6 
6 9  
3 4  
50 0 
8 1  
6 1  
0 0  
1 0  
-1 2 
8 6  
1 8  
0 0  
3 3  
5 4  
1 6  
6 3  
2 3  
12 1 
0 0  
-3 4 
-0 5 
-2 8 
4 1  
0 1  
-0 8 
0 0  
1 8  
0 0  
9 1  
0 0  
4 7  
0 0  
0 0  
0 0  
5 6  
0 0  
0 0  
0 0  
3 2  
1 6  
-6 7 
0 0  
6 9  
-10 0 
Notes' 
11 Private sector has participated in fertilizer trading activity since November 1997 
21 Areas cuitivated with m r e  than one crop are incuded under each crop. 
Source IMP. 
Table 6.2: Nepal: Manufacturing Production Indices, 1997/98-2001/02 
Weights I /  1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001102 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 
Overall production 
Food 
Of which: Sugar 
Vegetable ghee 
Rice 
Soybean oil 
Processed milk 
Beverage 
Tobacco 
Textile 
of which: Cotton cloth 
Synthetic cloth 
Woolen carpet 
Jute Goods 
Readymade garments 
Processed leather 
Wood products 
Paper 
Other chemical products 
Rubber products 
Plastic Products 
Nonmetallic mineral products 
of which: Bricks 
Cement 
Iron and Steel Basic Industries 
Electrical Industrial Machinery 
Apparatus, appliances, etc. 
100.0 
26.2 
3.5 
1.5 
2.0 
0.8 
3.0 
10.5 
13.8 
22.4 
1.5 
3.0 
16.7 
1.2 
7.2 
1 .o 
1.2 
1.9 
6.8 
1.5 
1.9 
13.3 
3.9 
4.3 
5.1 
1.8 
103.4 
111.6 
104 
115.6 
124 
115 
108 
111.4 
92.2 
103.3 
94 
106 
102.9 
114 
96 
109 
99 
101 
98.6 
96 
105 
104.7 
83 
124.1 
107.9 
113 
(Indices 1996/97 = 100) 
108.9 
118.1 
110.2 
111.5 
131.4 
131.1 
111.2 
120.2 
98.8 
107 
79.9 
93.3 
111.2 
116.3 
103.7 
111.2 
95.6 
103 
105.5 
98 
111.3 
114.5 
96.5 
130.6 
107.4 
116.4 
116.1 
127.3 
142.7 
118.9 
125.7 
133.5 
114.5 
131.1 
108 
107.1 
70.6 
99.6 
109.7 
135.1 
123.5 
108.1 
93.3 
111.3 
114.5 
96.5 
110.6 
120.6 
96.3 
142.4 
120.4 
121.0 
120.1 
134.5 
11 9.4 
153.1 
131 
146.3 
124.1 
139.8 
113.9 
99.1 
65.9 
101.5 
99.3 
130.9 
122.1 
134.6 
91.4 
125.5 
130.7 
96.6 
148.6 
117.9 
96.5 
137.1 
134.1 
146.4 
112.2 3.4 
127.3 11.6 
95.6 4 
188.5 15.6 
148.3 24 
165.3 15 
135.8 8 
117.5 11.4 
112.1 -7.8 
71.5 3.3 
59 -6 
103.8 6 
61.9 2.9 
139.6 14 
88.7 -4 
121.8 9 
99 -1 
123.6 1 
148.6 -1.4 
101.2 -4 
178.6 5 
124.5 4.7 
100.9 -1 7 
145.8 24.1 
139.7 7.9 
151.5 13 
(percentage chi 
5.3 
5.8 
6.0 
-3.5 
6.0 
14.0 
3.0 
7.9 
7.2 
3.6 
-1 5.0 
-12.0 
8.1 
2.0 
8.0 
2.0 
-3.4 
2.0 
7.0 
2.1 
6.0 
9.4 
16.3 
5.2 
-0.5 
3.0 
-4 1 
6.6 
7.8 
29.5 
6.6 
-4.3 
1.8 
3.0 
9.1 
9.3 
0.1 
-1 1.6 
6.8 
-1.3 
16.2 
19.1 
-2.8 
-2.4 
8.1 
8.5 
-1.5 
-0.6 
5.3 
-0.2 
9.0 
12.1 
4.0 
Othei's 0.5 93.1 89.3 98.9 92.6 101.7 -6.9 .. . 10.8 
I /  Weights are based on the Census of Manufacturing Establishments (1996/97). 
Source: IMF. 
Table 6.3: Nepal: Energy Consumption, 1994195-2001102 
1996197 1997198 1998199 I999100 2000101 2001102 
Traditional 6,268 6,403 6,540 6,681 6,824 6,997 
Of which : Fuelwood 5,574 5,694 5,816 5,941 6,068 6,217 
Commercial 
Petroleum 
Coal 
Hydropower 
69 1 768 81 1 1,044 1,088 1,169 
554 625 66 1 709 734 758 
60 61 61 236 253 290 
77 83 89 99 108 121 
Total 6,959 7,192 7,376 7,754 7,954 8,205 
Traditional 
Of which : Fuelwood 
Commercial 
Petroleum 
Coal 
Hydropower 
(Annual percentage change) 
1.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.5 
0.9 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.5 
6.1 11.1 5.6 28.7 4.2 7.4 
9.3 12.8 5.8 7.3 3.5 3.3 
-1 6.7 1.7 0.0 286.9 7.2 14.6 
6.9 7.8 7.2 11.2 9.1 12.0 
Total 1.8 3.3 2.6 5.1 2.6 3.2 
Source: IMF. 
Table 6.4: Nepal: Changes in the Consumer Price Index, 1994/95-2001/02 
(Annual percentage change) 
1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 
Overall National Index 7.6 8.1 8.1 8.3 11.4 3.4 2.4 2.9 
By commodity 
Foodgrains 
Milk and Milk products 
Oil and Fats 
Beverages 
Vegetables and Fruits 
Food and beverage 
Other goods and semces 
Cloth, clothing, and sewing services 
Fuel, light and water 
Regional Indices 
Kathmandu 
Terai 
Hills 
7.3 8.9 8.2 
7.9 8.5 9.1 
1.3 10.9 12.0 
11.1 13.2 2.5 
3.9 6.9 9.2 
5.0 3.7 3.7 
8.1 6.7 8.0 
10.1 7.2 7.8 
3.2 3.9 11.2 
7.8 16.2 0.4 -2.4 
3.2 18.6 8.6 -13.7 
7.7 9.5 3.7 5.7 
8.3 29.0 -22.6 -4.7 
14.8 8.7 3.7 2.0 
16.6 19.9 -16.9 4.1 
9.0 5.8 7.1 8.1 
6.9 6.0 4.7 2.2 
7.5 2.8 13.3 22.3 
3.7 
2.1 
1.2 
8.3 
5.0 
7.5 
2.1 
2.5 
-0.9 
8.0 6.0 7.8 7.3 8.2 3.7 3.2 2.0 
7.4 9.5 8.1 9.0 13.3 3.1 1.1 3.4 
7.8 9.5 8.6 8.0 11.6 3.7 5.2 2.5 
Source: IMF. 
Table 6.5: Nepal: Monthly Wages in Major Sectors, 1994/95-2001102 
1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997198 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 
Agriculture 
Kathmandu 
Birg unj 
Biratnagar 
Industry I/ 
Skilled 
Unskilled 
Construction 21 
Kathmandu 
Birg unj 
Biratnagar 
Semi-skilled 
Kathmandu 
Biratnagar 
Kathmandu 
Biratnagar 
Skilled 
Unskilled 
Agriculture 
Kathmandu 
Birg unj 
Biratnagar 
Industry I/ 
Skilled 
Unskilled 
Construction 21 
Skilled 
Kathmandu 
B i rg unj 
Biratnagar 
Semi-skilled 
Kathmandu 
Biratnagar 
Kathmandu 
Biratnagar 
Unskilled 
2,550 
1,350 
1,350 
1,610 
1,450 
5,100 
2,820 
3,600 
4,500 
3,000 
2,700 
1,800 
51.2 
27.1 
27.1 
32.3 
29.1 
102.4 
56.6 
72.3 
90.4 
60.2 
54.2 
36.1 
2,800 
1,500 
1,350 
1,610 
1,450 
5,350 
3,300 
3,600 
4,625 
3,000 
2,950 
1,800 
50.7 
27.2 
24.4 
29.2 
26.3 
96.9 
59.8 
65.2 
83.8 
54.3 
53.4 
32.6 
3,000 
1,500 
1,350 
1,610 
1,450 
5,550 
3,300 
3,600 
4,675 
3,000 
3,000 
1,800 
52.6 
26.3 
23.7 
29.2 
25.4 
97.3 
57.9 
63.1 
82 
52.6 
52.6 
31.6 
(In Nepalese rupees) 
3,000 3,000 
1,500 1,500 
1,350 1,487 
1,960 1,960 
1,800 1,800 
5,700 5,700 
3,375 3,913 
3,950 4,473 
4,950 4,950 
3,250 3,875 
3,000 3,000 
1,925 2,375 
(In US.  dollars) 
48.5 43.8 
24.3 21.9 
21.8 21.9 
31.7 28.6 
29.1 26.3 
92.2 83.2 
54.6 56.9 
62.3 65.3 
80.1 72.3 
52.6 56.5 
48.5 43.8 
31 .I 34.7 
3,000 
1,625 
1,500 
2,276 
2,116 
5,700 
4,050 
4,500 
4,950 
3,900 
3,000 
2,400 
42.2 
22.8 
21 ,I 
32.0 
29.8 
80.2 
57.0 
63.3 
69.6 
54.9 
42.2 
33.8 
3,000 
2,425 
1,500 
2,276 
2,116 
6,000 
4,313 
4,575 
5,050 
3,975 
3,112 
2,400 
40.6 
32.8 
20.3 
30.8 
28.7 
81.3 
58.4 
62.0 
68.4 
53.8 
42.2 
32.5 
3,000 
2,550 
1,500 
2,276 
2,116 
6,300 
4,500 
4,800 
5,550 
4,200 
3,450 
2,400 
39.0 
33.2 
19.5 
29.6 
27.5 
81.9 
58.5 
62.4 
72.2 
54.6 
44.9 
31.2 
Notes: 
I /  Minimum monthly wage, including allowances, which are the same in Kathmandu, Birgunj and Biratnagar. 
21 Carpenters and masons. 
Source: IMF. 



